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Columbia University

The Pentagon Papers—A Discussion
GEORGE MCGOVERN
JOHN P. ROCHE

Invasion of Privacy: A Clarification of Concepts
LOUIS LUSKY

Roosevelt and Truman on Yalta: The Origins of the Cold War
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On the Implementation of the Potsdam Agreement: An Essay on U.S. Postwar German Policy
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On the Two Diverging-Sector Model of Social Development
CHARLES ISSAWI

Reviews

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WALLACE STANLEY SAYRE 1905-1972

Wallace S. Sayre, Eaton professor of public administration at Columbia University, died suddenly on May 18, 1972. He had been for a number of years a member of the editorial advisory board of the *Political Science Quarterly*, and never has there been a more valued member. He was generous with advice when he was asked for it, but he never intruded; he was wise and he was witty; he could listen to others and he never drew attention to himself—the result was that he showed us the way without ever really trying to. All of us were his students; some of us were privileged to be his friends. We loved him and we shall miss him, and we shall remember him always.

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The Pentagon Papers— A Discussion

The publication of "confidential" materials has inevitably given rise to a debate concerning a number of different but related problems: To what extent do the revelations contained in the documents throw light on events or policy decisions with which they deal? To what extent, if at all, does the publication of the information contained in the documents jeopardize the processes of executive decisionmaking? How can the conflict between the public's right to know and the executive's need for confidentiality be reconciled? The editors of the *Political Science Quarterly* have in the past published a number of articles dealing with the issue of access to governmental information and the terms on which that access is made available, notably, Adolf A. Berle's and Malcolm Moos's reviews of Emmet John Hughes, *The Ordeal of Power* (*PSQ*, LXXIX, June 1964) and Theodore Draper's review of Jerome Slater, *Intervention and Negotiation: The United States and the Dominican Revolution* (*PSQ*, LXXXVI, March 1971). The recent publication of the *Pentagon Papers* has given the controversy new urgency. U.S. Senator George McGovern of South Dakota, candidate for the Democratic party nomination for president, and Professor John P. Roche, from 1966-68 special consultant to President Lyndon Johnson, were asked by the editors of the *Political Science Quarterly* to review the *Pentagon Papers* and to debate in print the political and legal issues to which their publication has given rise.

I

Publication of the *Pentagon Papers* has raised a storm concerning the right of the press to publish classified government documents. But the contents of the papers are so sweeping in their disclosures

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of official suppression of the realities in Vietnam, so revealing of the disastrous, secretly conceived policies and practices which led us into this tragic war, that it is impossible—in fact it misses their true significance—to discuss them in such abstract terms.

The integrity of our democracy is profoundly involved, not only in the constitutional sense with respect to the warmaking power, but in the basic sense of the reality of government by popular rule. It is axiomatic with us that a free people can remain free only if it is enlightened and informed. It is axiomatic with us, as well, that a free press is essential to the creation and maintenance of an enlightened and informed people. A press which obtains access to a record revealing so massive a gap between what our executive leadership knew and what it led the nation to believe on so vital a matter as war and peace would be subversive of our democracy if it did not bring that record to public attention.

The question of whether the press was justified in publishing the *Pentagon Papers*, then, cannot be separated from their substance. I will summarize, in brief, what I consider to be some essential aspects of the Pentagon account's disclosures and indicate what I believe to be their significance for our political society.

Much has been made, properly I think, of President Johnson's suppression of vital information in presenting the Tonkin Gulf resolution to Congress in August 1964, and of his lack of candor concerning the war in his election campaign that year. The *Pentagon Papers* confirm much of what had already been revealed about the administration's deception on Tonkin Gulf. They tell us that long before the August 7 congressional resolution, the president had initiated a covert war against North Vietnam with South Vietnamese torpedo boats and had authorized air attacks over Laos, under our command; that on July 30 and August 3, just before the two Tonkin Gulf incidents which were the presumed reason for the resolution, torpedo boats had attacked North Vietnamese coasts and on August 1 and 2, T-28 planes had apparently strafed North Vietnamese villages; that the North Vietnamese boats that encountered the *Maddox* and *Turner Joy* were looking for the attacking vessels, and that the *Maddox*, at least,

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was on an espionage mission associated with these attacks on North Vietnam (pp. 258-61).[1]

Neither Congress nor the country knew anything about the covert war against the North, which was waged without congressional authority, nor did we have any hint that the U.S. vessels attacked were involved in that war. In fact, as the Pentagon account relates, any such association was explicitly denied (pp. 265-67). We were told only that those ships were the victims of an unprovoked assault. We were presented with a resolution presumably drawn up as a result of this assault but actually prepared six weeks earlier in the hope of just such an incident (p. 286). In short, the papers confirm that the Congress of the United States was deceived and manipulated by the executive branch in a carefully prepared plan to gain congressional sanction for a war already under way.

But the deception revealed by the Pentagon account is vastly more pervasive than that of a particular incident. It goes to the heart of the war itself, the way it was presented throughout to the American people, the Congress, and the world. In the case of the Tonkin Gulf attacks, we learn that the decision to bring the war to the North had nothing to do with aggression from the North; it was prompted by the virtual disintegration of our client Saigon regime, which was incapable of rallying popular support against the increasing strength of the Vietcong (pp. 243, 257, 269). Unable to establish a regime which could win politically in the South, we carried the war to the North explicitly in the hope of terrorizing Hanoi into calling off the Vietcong insurgency (pp. 235, 244, 324, 390), (a rather frightening example of the manner in which our policy makers often fell victim to their own propaganda myths; intelligence reports were telling them throughout that the insurrection in the South was not Hanoi's creation). The Pentagon account discloses that this process of military escalation to cover political failure in Saigon operated throughout our involvement, and the evidence is persuasive that

[1] The page numbers in the text refer to *The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam.* The Senator Gravel Edition (4 vols.; Boston: Beacon Press, 1971).

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it is still operating—with indefinite air and naval bombardment as the military means. What is revealed here is that we, the defenders of democracy and champions of law and order, explicitly resorted to bloody, ruthless war because the political decision in a distant land was not going our way.

The argument of administration defenders that President Johnson did not practice deception in the 1964 campaign because only contingency planning of bombing the North was involved is clearly specious in the light of the papers' disclosure that the determination to bomb was made in September, though timed for a later date (p. 323). The contingency argument is wholly irrelevant for the Tonkin Gulf incident, and even more so for the broader deception concerning the source and nature of the war. The contention that the papers, as published in the *New York Times*, represent only a fragment of the total record does not negate what they do tell us.

The central theme of successive administrations has been that we entered Vietnam to help defend it against Communist aggression from North Vietnam, just as we were told in 1950-54 that we were aiding France against Soviet-inspired aggression in the Indochina War. The Pentagon account not only confirms that this explanation is pervasively untrue, but it reveals that our policy makers were continuously informed by our intelligence services that it was untrue. Their private argumentation confirms that administration spokesmen knew their explanation was untrue when they used it. Further, the papers disclose that our policy makers often sought to justify military escalation by promoting the false explanation even while admitting that they had no evidence of the nature or extent of North Vietnamese aid to the Vietcong (p. 246).

While the papers do not deal extensively with the actual reasons for our involvement in Indochina, they do tell us enough to indicate that neither defense against external aggression (from Russia or China or North Vietnam) nor self-determination for the South Vietnamese was among them. Our policy makers were concerned with the consequences for our power of the spread of Communism in Southeast Asia, but it is repeatedly emphasized that they were concerned with this spread "by whatever means" it occurred. Clearly, not "aggression" but Communist influence was

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the target, even if that influence was achieved indigenously by political means. Since intervention against an indigenous revolutionary movement is illegal, a violation of the UN Charter, it was necessary to link local Communist movements with "external aggression" by the world Communist conspiracy. In the Indochinese War, this was done directly. In the Vietnamese War, it was done by charging Hanoi with aggressively engaging in a Moscow-inspired "war of national liberation."

A 1952 National Security Council memorandum reproduced in the papers lists the major reasons for our initial involvement in Indochina: (1) the loss of any country in Southeast Asia to Communist control "by whatever means" would swiftly lead to the loss of all the rest, thereby threatening our military security in the Far East; (2) Southeast Asia, especially Malaya and Indonesia, "is the principal world source of natural rubber and tin, and a producer of petroleum and other strategically important commodities"; (3) the rice exports of Burma and Thailand are essential to "important areas of Free Asia"; (4) the loss of Southeast Asia would "make it extremely difficult to prevent Japan's eventual accommodation to Communism" (pp. 27-28). At that early stage in our intervention, then, we had our own narrow interests for using our vast military power to prevent the Indochinese from establishing independence under Ho Chi Minh's leadership, even though it was universally known that this was the desire of the vast majority of the Indochinese people. While some of these reasons faded later in the struggle, we continued to stress the military strategic aim and concern for our prestige which, it was and is believed, would be damaged by defeat. In the end, the Pentagon account declares, we had to demonstrate that the United States, as "the most powerful nation in the world," had the will and capacity "to have its way in world affairs" (p. 255). President Nixon has given ample evidence that this Machiavellian, essentially xenophobic and imperial attitude still prevails.

Obviously, none of the above reasons can be squared with our UN obligation not to intervene in the internal affairs of other nations, Communist-controlled or not, or with what we had come to believe as our commitment to moral international relations. The Pentagon account tells us how our policy makers sought to obscure our departure from our legal obligations and moral com-

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mitment by suppressing or ignoring the information at their disposal. I can only summarize briefly.

We initially justified our intervention on the side of the French in Indochina in late 1949 on the grounds that Ho Chi Minh was the agent of the Moscow-led world Communist conspiracy. But a 1948 State Department intelligence report concluded that it could find "no hard evidence" that Ho Chi Minh took orders from Moscow (p. 8). Before we threw our support to France, Secretary of State Acheson characterized the French client Bao Dai regime as a puppet without popular support and entirely dependent on French arms for existence (p. 9). After our decision to back France, we recognized this puppet, isolated regime as the "legal" government of Indochina and expended vast sums to help keep it in power.

At Geneva, as we now know, Vietnam was defined as a single independent nation, temporarily divided for military armistice purposes, with a single government to be elected for the entire country in July 1956. Though not a signatory, we pledged—explicitly in the name of our UN obligation to respect independence and territorial integrity—not to disturb the agreements. But, the Pentagon account tells us, within days, the National Security Council decided the agreements were a "disaster" and took steps to nullify them. Specifically, the NSC set as its objectives "to maintain a friendly non-Communist South Vietnam" and "to prevent a Communist victory through all-Vietnam elections" (p. 1). The account also tells us that even before the Geneva Conference was over, the Eisenhower administration had taken steps to impose the Diem government on the South and to launch secret missions of sabotage and subversion in the North (pp. 15-19). The missions did not desist with the signing of the accords and our pledge not to disturb them. Tracing the steps taken to carry out the NSC's policy, the Pentagon account concludes that "South Vietnam was essentially the creation of the United States" (p. 25). When one recalls the lengths to which Secretary Rusk went to obscure the actual nature of the Geneva accords and to prove that it was Hanoi which undermined them, these disclosures are shocking indeed.

It is rather difficult to understand how the North Vietnamese can be labeled aggressors even if, as we charged, they had acted to prevent us from dividing their country in what we considered

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to be our interest. But, as the Pentagon account reveals, for years after the conference they did very little. The insurrection in the South arose out of the oppressive policies of the Diem regime, which by 1955 had placed 50,000 to 100,000 people in detention camps, returned to ex-landlords the lands given to the peasants by Ho's Vietminh during the war against France, and replaced traditionally elected village councils with Catholic appointees loyal to Diem. Though under orders not to fight back, the Vietnam rank and file, out of sheer "fear and anger," resorted to insurrection. Not until 1959, some years after the insurrection began, did Hanoi render even moral and political support (pp. 67-75). By then, the CIA was reporting to Washington that Diem "had alienated all elements of the population by his oppressive policies" (p. 69). Throughout the early 1960s, while we were escalating our aid on the grounds of aggression from North Vietnam, the intelligence services were reporting that the Vietcong had no need of infiltration of men or materials from the North (p. 242), that it was increasing its control of the country and growing in popular strength, and that the Saigon regime was isolated and crumbling (pp. 257, 279, 314). Since these reports estimated that the bulk of the Vietcong was locally recruited and that the first individual Northern soldiers were not seen in the South until late 1964 (p. 338), the inviability of the successive Saigon regimes could scarcely be attributed to Northern aggression, even with a well stretched imagination.

When in mid-July 1965, we sent combat troops openly into South Vietnam, we already had 62,000 troops there. The Pentagon account tells us that our intelligence reported a single North Vietnamese regiment at the time (p. 465). Throughout the remainder of the Pentagon account, until early 1968, our military leaders repeatedly pleaded for escalation in the face of reports of the Vietcong's continued strength and its hold on the population and the continued weakness of successive Saigon regimes. As late as 1968, the Pentagon apparatus reported that despite the terrible expenditure of lives and material, "our" control of the countryside and urban areas was at pre-August 1965 levels (p. 601).

As indicated earlier, the continuous bombing of the North was undertaken early in 1965, not because of alleged infiltration of supplies and men—the Pentagon account indicates the adminis-

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tration did not then know the extent of this infiltration—but in an effort to compel the North to call off the Southern insurrection. This, obviously, demonstrates awareness that the insurrection was indigenous and that it could not be defeated in the South, as indeed several members of the administration confessed in memorandums included among the papers. Months before the systematic bombing of the North began, the administration was seeking ways to provoke the North into attacking because it could not marshal a case for involvement in the South (p. 280) and was fearful that expansion of the war without such a case would disturb key allies (p. 281).

In short, both the Congress and the American people were told, and are still being told, that we are fighting in Vietnam to defend it against North Vietnamese aggression and to gain independence and self-determination for the Vietnamese people. The *Pentagon Papers* tell us that South Vietnam is our creation for our power purposes; that the war began as an indigenous Southern insurrection against the intolerable oppression and corruption of a government which we imposed on the South; that our own intelligence services were telling our policy makers that the source of Vietcong strength was indigenous, arising out of its revolutionary social aims and identification with the independence struggle against France (p. 242); that we bombed the North and sent our troops into the South because our successive client regimes in Saigon were incapable of winning indigenous popular support; and that we resorted to charges of North Vietnamese aggression as a cover for our illegitimate military intervention.

The significance of this deception for our constitutional processes, for the democratic character and moral climate of our society, is obvious; it debases them. But the question of the war's legitimacy extends beyond our frontiers. Presumably, we are committed to the United Nations Charter and the principles of international law embodied in it, a commitment we clearly do not put on a par with that to Chiang Kai-shek or Marshal Thieu. I have referred to our flouting of our UN obligation not to disturb territorial integrity and independence. At no time do the papers indicate that our policy makers had the slightest qualms about the legal (or human) aspects of their decisions to block Vietnamese

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unification or to impose regimes upon the South by military force.

The Charter also requires that disputes be settled peacefully, by negotiation. The *Pentagon Papers* are replete with our opposition to, indeed our dread of, negotiations. We attempted to block the Geneva Conference on the grounds that any negotiation of the Indochinese War would necessarily mean concessions to the Vietminh, and we insisted on a war to the finish, even though we were not a combatant (pp. 10-11). Throughout the 1960s, we opposed negotiations because, as the papers disclose, we know that in any political contest consequent upon a settlement of the war the Vietcong would win (pp. 243, 317, 326, 387-88). For tactical reasons, however, we had to pretend we were for negotiations and so we offered them in terms which were "tantamount to unconditional surrender for the other side" (pp. 249).

From all this it appears clear that our institutional arrangements for controlling the warmaking powers of the president are faulty. Our system of checks and balances was devised because the founders of our system knew that power corrupts. The system broke down because our executive leaders, having assumed exclusive power in the making of decisions about the war, sought to maintain that power by systematic deception, thus proving the founders' adage.

The executive assumed this exclusive power because in the postwar system of international law many of the practices in which we engage are illegal and must be performed clandestinely. I have referred to the *Pentagon Papers'* account of the CIA-directed efforts to subvert and sabotage the Ho Chi Minh government in the North during and after the Geneva Conference. This kind of enterprise, of course, was neither new nor unique. In the same month that it was initiated, a CIA-organized and -directed military coup overthrew the popular, democratically elected government of Guatemala which had effected modern radical reforms in a land that had been essentially feudal. The coup plunged that little country into decades of terror, misery, and ferocious oppression, and it intensified hatred for us throughout Latin America. A year earlier, the CIA had similarly organized the overthrow of the Mossadegh regime in Iran, which had sought to free that

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land from the control of foreign oil syndicates. Activity of this sort, conducted around the globe, requires a secrecy which permits the executive unlimited powers over war and peace. It is criminal in the light of international law, morally abhorrent, and incompatible with our open society. It needs to be eliminated and prohibited.

It is also clear that by virtue of its monopoly of official intelligence services, the executive was able to build a wall of secrecy behind which it could exercise absolute power. If it had been subjected more quickly and more closely to the scrutiny of informed public and congressional opinion, and if the executive were required to account regularly to the Congress as in Britain, it may not have fallen prey to its own delusions and fantasies. We need to devise procedures for such an accounting and for making available to Congress, and to the public, intelligence reports and other informative documents essential to intelligent shaping of decision and opinion. This includes more objective and responsible procedures for document classification and declassification. For these reasons, it appears to me that a searching investigation by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee into the origin and conduct of the war can play an essential role in reshaping the crucial institutional relations for avoiding future Vietnams.

But beyond institutional procedures, there is the far more profound problem of the direction of our foreign policy in the postwar era, which such a searching investigation can help to transform. We tell ourselves that we are dedicated to independence and self-determination for all peoples, but in fact we have based our policy on maintaining our dominant power position in an increasingly pluralistic, nationalistic world. To reconcile the two, we say that maintenance of our power is essential to the defense of independence and self-determination. But, in fact, we are no less self-centered, no less concerned with self-interest, than any other nation. Under the guise of protecting independence and self-determination, we use our great power to try to preserve our world dominance by interfering with independence and self-determination when we deem it necessary. We can do this only through the massive use of deceit.

It is time that we begin to appreciate that policies based on such narrowly conceived definitions of national interest must in-

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evitably lead to major wars and that in this nuclear age such wars are no longer tolerable. Surely, if our national interests are involved in Vietnam, those of China or Russia are even more so since they are far closer. And do not the North Vietnamese plainly have a prior interest in the conflict in the South? It is the collision of such "national interests" which gives rise to modern wars. This Machiavellian system is precisely what the UN was devised to replace. Our foreign policy needs to be reshaped from one which seeks to maintain a world-power dominance to one which recognizes that we are part of a community of nations guided by international law and that our true national interest is in making this law operative.

Where does all this leave us with respect to the continuing war in Indochina? With today's knowledge we should be able to understand what most could not at the time, simply that our initial involvement was both morally and legally indefensible. Yet that basic lesson still seems unable to penetrate, certainly not into the policy councils of the Nixon administration. Now the game is to salvage at least something from a sacrifice that should have never been made, playing as close as possible to public willingness to tolerate continued American involvement in an election year. The same litany of "self-determination," the same attempts to impose our own visions and institutions on Indochina, make up the foundation of our policy today, just as they did some five painful years in the past. And we continue to pound and punish the people of Indochina in pursuit of those fraudulent objectives.

The single way to guarantee the futility of all we have done in Indochina is to ignore its lessons. My greatest fear is that we will regard it as an aberration, as a noble venture somehow gone bad because of faulty tactics. It is that mistaken judgment which has thus far made it impossible for us to let go of this debacle. If it persists, the same judgment will doom us to repeat the Indochina travesty elsewhere.

It is against this perception that current postures, and current negotiating positions, must be judged. We do have the option of completely ending our involvement in Vietnamese affairs, of achieving the release of our prisoners of war, and of leaving the ultimate political fate of that country to the people who live there. Few would argue today, with the experience behind us and the

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Pentagon Papers' revelations before us, that such a course at the beginning of the decade would have been light years better than the one we pursued. Further attempts to have a hand in writing Vietnam's political future are not only hopeless endeavors, they also guarantee a prolonged U.S. involvement and continued torture of the people of Indochina. Worst of all, considering the implications for our own constitutional system and our international posture, they signal a persisting refusal to learn anything at all from all the brutality and bloodshed of the Vietnam War.

GEORGE MCGOVERN
United States Senate

II

Roughly twenty years ago, a law journal sent me a two-volume work in American constitutional history for review in 2,000 words. The study was bizarre, to say the least, and after inch-by-inch annotation, I was confronted with an impossible mission. I wrote the editors and told them that I would submit either a one-sentence review ("This is a fantasy: American constitutional history through the looking glass") or a 25,000-word analytical essay, taking the study apart section by section. I received no reply.

The *Pentagon Papers* falls into precisely the same category. An adequate one-sentence review would state: "While occasionally interesting and enlightening, the *Pentagon Papers* is fundamentally a historical junkpile which provides neither proof nor disproof for any hypotheses about the origins and character of the war in Vietnam." This proposition is one that I can document in 25,000 words, and fully intend to do so on another occasion. For our purposes, however, I shall take a different tack which will hopefully both confine me to the requested 2,000 words and prove useful to the profession. Instead of arguing the merits of the *Pentagon Papers*, I will raise certain questions for the benefit of those masochists who are prepared actually to read the mass of material. The intrepid few who last the course can respond to these questions in terms of their own application of the laws of evidence.

Certain issues of a marginal character can be eliminated, by *obiter dictum*, at the outset; they have only served to muddy the

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historical waters. There is, for example, no logical connection between the substantive merits of the *Pentagon Papers* and the question of censorship or the character of Dr. Daniel Ellsberg. In my judgment, the attorney general was unwise to move against the *New York Times:* inevitably, in the courtroom the parade of horribles began and before long the logical escalator put one in the position of either denying or affirming the right of the government to impose *any* sort of official secrecy. "Hard cases," as Justice Holmes put it, "make bad law"—a generalization which was validated by the murky holdings in the *New York Times* case.

Indeed, a cynic might suggest that most of the public interest in the *Pentagon Papers,* as well as the response of many reviewers, was based on the proposition that unless the documents were really vital, the United States would never have gone to such lengths to suppress them. As usual, cynics overestimate the rationality of the decisionmaking process.

Let us now turn to the questions that the hardy reader should keep in mind as he plows his way into the thicket. First, how authoritative are the *Pentagon Papers?* To put it another way, how accurate a reflection do they present of the decisionmaking process within the government of the United States? Presumably a well trained undergraduate, who had survived a course in American government and perhaps one on the presidency, should be equipped to answer this. Leaving aside the material in the papers pertaining to the period before 1961 (which is fundamentally of antiquarian interest only), what questions would our paradigmatic undergraduate ask himself?

"Where is the president?" is the obvious answer—and beyond that, "Where is the secretary of state?" We all know that the United States either enjoys or suffers under "presidential government" (the verb usage depending on one's attitude towards the incumbent president). Do the papers reflect this?

Not only are the president and the secretary of state ghostly figures, but the papers rarely include even their written contributions to statecraft. What we find are drafts prepared by assistant secretaries for submission to secretaries for eventual consideration by the National Security Council and the president. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara is represented in person

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from time to time, particularly in 1966-67, but his memos to the president do not include presidential replies nor the critiques of others, such as Secretary Rusk, Clark Clifford, or Abe Fortas, to whom the president may have sent them for comment.

To take a case in point, the *Times* commentator indicates that the papers show there was a "consensus" to bomb North Vietnam within the administration before the 1964 presidential election (p. 318).[1] But what do the papers document? Agreed, there were bombing scenarios on various drawing boards (indeed, the possibility of bombing the North had been raised in the 1961 Taylor-Rostow Report to President Kennedy), but what proof is there of a "consensus"? Unless one believes there can be a policy consensus in the executive branch without the agreement of the president, he is confronted with an analytical *cul-de-sac.*

In this same context, the *Times* commentator notes earlier that in May 1964, Johnson was presented with a scenario that included bombing. The documentation is a draft prepared by Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East William P. Bundy and Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs John McNaughton for *submission to* the Executive Committee of the National Security Council. The commentator implies that the president received this recommendation but "delayed another nine months the scenario's denouement in an air war" (p. 255).

This clearly suggests a conscious decision—in context, a deceptive act. But what evidence is there that this recommendation was actually put before the president for decision one way or the other? None. In fact, as I know from my research on the presidential papers, it was deleted at the EXCOM level. But my personal knowledge is irrelevant to the point, namely, the evidential merit of the papers. All we know on this point from the documentation is that Bundy, McNaughton, *et al.* in May 1964 submitted to their principals a scenario that included bombing the North. (Parenthetically it might be noted that the president did not monitor the brisk chit-chat among assistant secretaries. Lyndon Johnson saw most of these documents for the first time when they appeared in the press.)

[1] The page numbers in the text refer to *The Pentagon Papers: The Secret History of the Vietnam War as published by the New York Times* (New York: Quadrangle, 1971).

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Space limitations require that we move to the next question that our well trained undergraduate will hopefully formulate: "What new information emerges from the papers?" What do they tell us about American policy in Vietnam that was not in substance already in the public domain? Obviously they provide cables, memos, and other bureaucratic mementos that have never been revealed, but what do we learn that was not *contemporaneously* available in books, newspapers, columns to anyone who wanted to utilize it?

In other words, were key decisions hidden? Or did contemporary commentators simply not focus on the things we are concerned about today? Recall that in January 1966, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator J.W. Fulbright, said to Secretary Dean Rusk: "I confess I was scarcely conscious about problems of any significance [in Vietnam] until the last few years because our attention was directed largely in Europe."[2] What was true of Fulbright was, *a fortiori*, even more true for the rest of us.

Let us take two examples from the papers. First, there was great dismay expressed last year when it "came to light" that the United States had instigated the coup that overthrew Ngo Dinh Diem on November 1, 1963. It is conceivable that most Americans believed that Tolkien's "Hobbits" had done the job, but anyone who read the *New Yorker* in 1964 or *The Lost Revolution* in 1965 knew from Robert Shaplen's account precisely what occurred in Saigon in the fall of 1963.[3] (Conceded: Shaplen did not name Colonel Lucien Conein as the Central Intelligence Agency's key man.) Indeed, if one read Morris West's jejeune novel *The Ambassador*, he came out with a pretty clear idea of the anti-Diem operation.[4]

Because of the Washington habit of "backgrounding" columnists and top newsmen, I submit that very little occurred inside the bureaucracy that was not reflected in the press, usually quite accurately. (An important exception involved President Johnson's

[2] U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings* on S. 2793, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1956, p. 7.

[3] Robert Shaplen, "Letter from Saigon," *New Yorker*, XXXIX (Dec. 14, 1963), 201 ff.; XL (July 11, 1964), 37 ff.; XL (Sept. 19, 1964), 179 ff. Robert Shaplen, *Lost Revolution* (New York, 1965).

[4] Morris West, *The Ambassador* (New York, 1965).

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frank discussions with a tight circle of personal advisers.) Ironically, one of the conspiracies unearthed by the compilers of the papers probably reflects a failure in backgrounding, namely the allegation that National Security Action Memorandum No. 328 (April 6, 1965) included an authorization to change the mission of the Marine battalions at Danang from "defense" to "offense" (p. 410).

Those unfamiliar with military usage may find a shift from a static to an active defensive posture a "change in mission," but what concerns us here is the alleged secrecy of the whole affair. The papers imply that the State Department only confirmed on June 8 that the Marines had allegedly changed their mission, and that this was done in such a way as to camouflage a quantum jump in strategy. Against this background, let me put two queries to the serious student: (1) when in fact did the Marines inaugurate active patrols? and (2) when was the fact that the Marines had inaugurated active patrolling announced at a Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) briefing in Saigon? A third question for those who do the necessary research: why do you suppose the Saigon press corps did not feature this "change in mission"? Perhaps because the experienced war correspondents in Saigon did not recognize it as a "change in mission"? Could they have been correct?

Richard Harwood of the *Washington Post* has written in this connection:

> the *Post* and the *Times* and other large news organizations published thousands of stories, editorials and essays in 1964 describing the deteriorating military situation in Vietnam—just as it was described in the official memoranda and cables in the Pentagon papers. The various options and contingency plans being put before the President at that time were reported repeatedly and accurately—as they are now reported in the official papers . . . the public was simply not interested. Nor were most members of Congress.[5]

But again my role here is to ask questions, not to answer them. Let me conclude this section by challenging readers of the papers to uncover one significant policy issue that was not contempora-

[5] Richard Harwood, "Few 'Revelations' for Those Who Had Been Listening," *Washington Post*, June 24, 1971.

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neously debated and explored in the media. They may find it useful to begin with the writings of I. F. Stone: whatever one may think of his political views, he knew how to read.

Having looked into, first, the question of how authoritative are the papers as a source and, second, how much new information about policy issues does the volume provide, the reader might finally ask "What significant questions of policy do the papers ignore?" To put it another way, he should ask: "How coherent a history of our involvement emerges from the papers?" Drawing a figure of speech from Sherlock Holmes, let us search for some dogs that did not bark.

Beginning, as before, with 1961, a serious analyst of American policy toward Southeast Asia is immediately confronted with a serious gap in the narrative as found in the papers: there is no examination of the "neutralization" option, which flourished in the aftermath of the 1962 Geneva Agreement on Laos. In retrospect, the notion of the neutralization of all Indochina under great power auspices was doubtless a fantasy—Hanoi simply would not cooperate. But at the time a number of serious men, both inside and outside the government, took the possibility seriously.

Nor do we find any discussion of the decision inside the Kennedy administration that President Ngo Dinh Diem (and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu) must not be permitted to make a private deal with Ho Chi Minh. Mieczyslaw Maneli, the Polish chairman of the International Control Commission in 1963-64, has recently presented serious evidence[6] that Diem and Ho were discussing a "political solution" (Maneli was the intermediary) which would, in essence, have led to South Vietnamese neutrality in the cold war—and an American departure from the premises. Washington, as some memos by Roger Hilsman, then assistant secretary of state for the Far East document,[7] found the prospect unthinkable: South Vietnam could not be permitted to desert the "Free World." Why did the compilers of the papers ignore this

[6] Mieczyslaw Maneli, *The War of the Vanquished* (New York, 1971).

[7] See John P. Roche, "The Jigsaw Puzzle of History," *New York Times Magazine*, Jan. 24, 1971, and my exchange with Hilsman in the letters sections of subsequent issues.

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whole sequence? (They had the Hilsman memorandums at their disposal.)[8]

As it stands, the only significant mention of neutralization in the papers is in a cable from President Johnson in March 1964 to Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge stating that he was intent on "knocking down the idea of neutralization wherever it rears its ugly head . . ."(p. 252). Without indulging in historical paranoia, one may legitimately inquire why the compilers dumped this body on Johnson's doorstep.

This sort of inquiry can be continued almost indefinitely, but without further help from me—at least on this occasion. What the conscientious analyst must do is to go through existing commentaries on our Vietnam policy, particularly Lyndon B. Johnson's *The Vantage Point* with its careful documentation of what occurred in the president's inner circle, and to compare the results with the narrative found in the papers.[9]

Let me confess, in conclusion, that I have done just this. In fact, I have gone through the full version of the papers—a cruel and unusual punishment if ever one existed. It would be both improper and impossible for me to render my verdict on our policy at this time. Improper because the precise point of this essay is that scholars must reach their own judgments on the evidence; impossible because I have been unable to conclude on the basis of all the evidence at my disposal whether certain critical decisions could have been averted given the political environment of the times—for example, would the American people, politicians, and press have permitted the president to liquidate our commitment in 1963, 1964, or 1965?

Finally, one ultimate caveat: anyone who wants to attempt the

[8] In Dec. 1967, I provided Dr. Leslie Gelb, coordinator of "The McNamara History" (as it was then called), with my full dossier on the Diem coup, including the Hilsman memorandums cited above. None of this material appeared in the *Pentagon Papers*.

[9] Lyndon Johnson, *The Vantage Point* (New York, 1971). The Johnson memoirs indicate, for example, that the president began "rethinking" our strategic options long before Tet. To my personal knowledge, he was secretly dismayed with the military's "More of the Same" policy as early as May 1967. Before Christmas 1967, he had resolved not to give MACV any more troops and was awaiting the installation of Clark Clifford as secretary of defense to initiate a total review of our options. Tet intervened and forced the pace.

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job can try to mold a conspiracy theory from these materials, but I hereby issue a formal warning. Go to it! But I will be waiting at the pass—with footnotes. To say that I am not prepared to offer a synoptic interpretation of our policy is not to imply that I am unprepared or unwilling to demolish alternative interpretations based on bad logic, bad evidence, or both.

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Invasion of Privacy: A Clarification of Concepts*

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Those who follow scholarly literature and legal developments on the subject of privacy have noted an unevenness in the pace of doctrinal evolution. Occasionally there has been a leap forward. In 1890, Warren and Brandeis identified privacy—which they defined, in overbroad but meaningful terms, as the right "to be let alone"—as a significant value that deserved, and indeed had to a large extent received, legal protection by the courts.[1] In 1965, five members of the United States Supreme Court joined in a remarkable opinion by one of their number—Justice William O. Douglas—in which, extrapolating from the several Bill of Rights safeguards of *particular* aspects of privacy (such as the privilege against self-incrimination, the immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, and the prohibition against the quartering of troops in civilian homes in peacetime), he postulated the existence of a *general* right of privacy which the Constitution itself protects.[2] And in 1967, only two years thereafter, Professor Alan F. Westin undertook to offer a conceptual system broader than that of his predecessors in two major

* Copyright © 1972, by Louis Lusky. This article, somewhat expanded, also appears in the *Columbia Law Review*, LXXII (1972).

[1] Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy," *Harvard Law Review*, IV (1890), 193.

[2] *Griswold* v *Connecticut*, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

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respects: (1) It embraces protection not only of the interest in preventing *any* unauthorized publicization of certain types of information (such as unpublished personal letters), which Warren and Brandeis had dealt with, but also protection of the interest in preventing *certain uses* of information (such as arrest and conviction records) which can admittedly be legitimately communicated for some purposes and to some people, even without the subject's consent. (2) It offers a formulation not only for constitutional purposes (what measures *can* the lawmakers lawfully take?), but for legislative purposes as well (what measures *should* the lawmakers take in controlling the newly invented intrusions such as supersophisticated wiretapping, electronic eavesdropping, and computerized dossiers?).[3]

Each of these landmark advances has been followed by a period of consolidation or attempted consolidation. After Warren and Brandeis published their article, courts and legislatures gradually (though ever more rapidly) filled in gaps that the earlier common law had left uncovered.[4] The Douglas *tour de force* has engendered a whole rash of constitutional complaints about the so-called "victimless crimes": the power of legislatures to penalize such acts as prostitution, sodomy, pornographic publication, abortion, gambling, and public drunkenness (acts which do no direct harm to anyone but consenting participants, though they may hurt the community at large)[5] has been questioned in the name of privacy—and with some slight success, though the Supreme Court has usually shrunk from the arrogant position that

[3] Alan F. Westin, *Privacy and Freedom* (New York, 1967). In one respect Westin's conception of privacy is *narrower* than that of Warren and Brandeis. Freedom from unwanted intrusion—such as my freedom to be alone and unobserved in the bathroom—fits within the latter but not the former. But this departure from the older usage, though significant, is quantitatively less important because the criminal and civil law have traditionally dealt adequately with trespassers and peeping toms; but cf. n. 12. Therefore, I shall not treat of it further—though it should undoubtedly be considered in any comprehensive redefinition of "privacy" such as that recommended at the end of this paper.

[4] See, e.g., 5 Amer. Law Rep. Annotated 965; 55 id. 971; 106 id. 1453; 138 id. 22; 168 id. 446; 13 Amer. Law Rep. Annotated (2d) 1213; 14 id. 750; 15 id. 794; 28 id. 1141; 46 id. 1016; 99 id. 1388.

[5] The same objection can logically be made against laws that make usury (loan-sharking) a crime. So far as I know, however, the critics of "victimless crimes" have thus far withheld their fire in this quarter.

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natural law (as interpreted by five or more of the anointed nine) must override the will of the people as expressed through their elected representatives.[6] The Westin book has spawned a series of meticulous studies—all grounded as squarely in the Westinian philosophy as medieval scholarship was grounded in the great Aristotelian teachings, rooted as firmly in the unquestioned Westinian source as fundamentalist theology cleaves to the words of the Holy Writ. The disciples beaver away, some collating data needed for application of the Westin theorems, others working out corollaries for evaluation of even newer technological developments.[7] But these careful glosses contain nothing fundamentally new.

Heretical as the suggestion may be, I submit that the time has come for another forward leap. We need a fresh and more exact rationalization than Westin accomplished. Each of the disciples —despite his diligence and indeed the frequent utilitarian value of his findings and proposals—leaves one with an uneasy sense of incompleteness, of large problems avoided rather than attacked. In the particulars of their observations, those meticulous studies are impeccable. In the rationality and constructive value of their recommendations for legislation or other remedial action, they command admiring assent. But they shrink from questioning the Westinian definition of privacy itself, the value that is the object of all their laborious solicitude.

Westin recognizes the central significance of that basic definition. He begins *Privacy and Freedom* thus: "Few values as fundamental to society as privacy have been left so undefined in social theory. . . . It is important to define at the outset what I mean by privacy. . . . Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups

[6] E.g., *Powell* v *Texas*, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (upholding conviction of chronic alcoholic for public drunkenness). The notable exception is *Stanley* v *Georgia*, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (conviction for possession of pornographic movie in one's own home held unconstitutional).

[7] E.g., Arthur R. Miller, *The Assault on Privacy* (Ann Arbor, 1971); Adam C. Breckenridge, *The Right to Privacy* (Lincoln, 1970); Jerry M. Rosenberg, *The Death of Privacy* (New York, 1969); Stanton Wheeler, ed., *On Record* (New York, 1969); M. C. Slough, *Privacy, Freedom and Responsibility* (Springfield, 1969). The Wheeler collection, which examines and reports in minute detail the record-keeping practices of universities, public school systems, prisons, and other such institutions, is the sociological equivalent of the extraction of the value of π to a million decimal places.

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or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others."[8]

This definition suffers two defects, one venial and one more nearly deadly. Forgivable is its impossible breadth: taken literally, it declares my privacy to be invaded, or at least affected somehow, if my one neighbor tells my second neighbor (without my consent) that I am a vegetarian, or that I am suffering from spring fever, or that I like oysters.

To be sure, a touch of definitional hyperbole—though not to be treasured as pearls and rubies—can be tolerated. It does cost something; it demands continued qualification by some common-sense rule of reason, and the fuzziness of the rule of reason tends to weaken the basic concept, to complicate it and diminish its effectiveness in the analysis and solution of practical problems. But we are accustomed to overstatement of this kind: "A man's house is his castle" (unless it is on fire, or is the locale of a felony visible from outside, or is entered under authority of a lawful search or arrest warrant, etc.); "No one can be compelled to accuse himself" (unless he is "persuaded"—i.e., coerced—to plead guilty by the offer of prosecutorial leniency, or is required to submit to a breathalyzer test, or takes the witness stand and testifies contrary to his previous uncoerced but illegally obtained confession,[9] etc.). The original Warren-Brandeis formulation—"the right to be let alone"—was hyperbolic on its face, since no human society can recognize such a "right" unless limited by some such words as: "unless there is acceptable justification for arresting or searching or interrogating or observing or otherwise bothering one." Yet, as has been said, the defect is not fatal. The implicit qualification does not eat up the basic idea, which thus retains potency for the shaping of value judgments and the societal actions that flow from them.

The more troublesome aspect of the Westinian definition is that it *confuses through oversimplification*. It lumps together two quite different types of information transfer, which demand quite different methods of control, and it thus implies that they are

[8] Westin, 7.

[9] *Harris* v *New York*, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (confession, though inadmissible under *Miranda* v *Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), can be introduced to contradict defendant's testimony).

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complementary components of a single comprehensive "privacy universe" that can and should be regulated by a single set of rules. The two main types of privacy invasion can be simply exemplified:

(a) The victim of felonious imprisonment by three escaped convicts, who held him and his family hostage in their home for nineteen hours before releasing them unharmed, finds himself and his family to be the continued objects of journalistic interest. It distresses them, and they move to another state to regain their accustomed obscurity. But the journalists persist (and, incidentally, the Supreme Court holds that the law protects the journalists rather than the victims).[10]

(b) The buyer of a refrigerator refuses to pay for it because its interior is no cooler than that of the kitchen where it sits. He asks the seller to make it work, to replace it, or to take it back. All three requests are refused; the seller insists upon payment of the agreed price and disclaims all obligations to repair, replace, or rescind. The seller, of course, does not sue; he knows that the buyer can successfully defend a lawsuit for the price. Instead, the seller reports to a credit agency, "in confidence," simply that the buyer has not paid the bill. Through modern devices for agglomeration of credit data, this item of information becomes available to merchants, bankers, and employers throughout the land. Thereafter the unlucky buyer finds himself unable to make installment purchases, obtain bank loans, or find a job.[11]

The difference between the two cases is obvious. In the latter, the trouble is that the information about the buyer is so incomplete as to be essentially false, and there is no ready means of correcting it (in this instance, by completing it). In the former case, the trouble is that the information about the hostage, even if entirely true and complete, is of a sort that should not be made the subject of endless commercial exploitation against his will. As a matter of fact, the truer and more complete the information is, the greater the harm and the outrage.

Westin and his disciples offer no useful conceptual basis for

[10] *Time, Inc.* v *Hill*, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). Counsel for the defendant was Harold R. Medina Jr. Counsel for the losing plaintiff was Richard M. Nixon.
[11] Miller, *passim*.

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distinguishing between these two situations. Both situations are said to involve violation of "the" right of privacy. The unfortunate result is that development of comprehensive remedies is hampered, because a remedy suitable to the one case is wholly inappropriate to the other; and remedial action is therefore devised, instead, on an atomistic basis (if at all)—a separate legislative proposal for each separate type of fact-situation. There are other unfortunate consequences as well. For example, Professor Arthur R. Miller's preoccupation with the development of effective measures to control data bank abuses appears to have distracted him from the areas (exemplified by the case of the hostage) where the need is not for *control*—prevention of abuses—but for outright *prohibition*.

One must not make the mistake of dismissing Professor Westin's work as trivial. His *Privacy and Freedom* presents, in dramatic—some would say apocalyptic—fashion, a conspectus of the modern scientific marvels which, if abused, can bring the horrors of 1984 upon us more rapidly than even George Orwell predicted. Chapters two through twelve map the depressing scene, with an almost completely successful effort at detached appraisal; only very occasionally does the author's revulsion show through, and for the most part he refrains from meretricious exploitation of the fiendish technical capabilities.[12] In short, these eleven chapters have administered a much needed shock to the legal and social science fraternities, not to mention the still more complacent general public.

Only in the last two chapters, thirteen and fourteen (collectively titled "Policy Choices for the 1970's"), does the initial definitional flaw come home to roost. The title of the final chapter sufficiently bespeaks the difficulty: "Restoring the Balance of Privacy in America." Here it is that Professor Westin, driven to employ a "rule of reason" to bring his definition of privacy into congruence with the world of the real and the possible, resorts to "balancing" as the sovereign device.

[12] One of the rare exceptions appears in chap. 11, which treats of subliminal suggestion. It is hard to see how subliminal suggestion can be fitted into the Westinian definition of privacy; but, admittedly, it is a spine-tingling subject. Penetration of one's mind without his knowledge and consent can perhaps be brought within the Warren-Brandeis "right to be let alone," but not within Professor Westin's definition.

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We must be clear as to what Westin means by "balancing." The term might be thought to include the process of compromise between competing needs and demands which is the normal business of *legislatures*. The typical statute formulates one or more rules of conduct that are the resultant of these contending forces. Westin uses the term "balancing" in a more restricted sense. For him, "balancing" is the same operation, performed not by legislatures but by *courts*—whose more usual function is *not* to engage in such "balancing" but to interpret and apply the legislative (or constitutional) rules that embody the results of "balancing" in the broader, non-Westinian sense. In the discussion that follows, the narrower Westin usage is employed.

Justice Hugo L. Black, in the closely related field of constitutional safeguards of the individual liberties of speech, press, and association, has launched long and effective philippics against the "balancing" approach.[13] The gist of his passionate objection is that "balancing," by vesting unlimited discretion in the balancers (ultimately the Justices of the Supreme Court), abrogates law. Repeatedly he has warned that a constitutional liberty predicated on "balancing" rests on the shifting sands of membership in the Court (and the sands appear to be particularly quick just now). Perhaps Justice Black's logic carried him a bit too far; there certainly are areas in which ultimate reliance must and should be placed on the vision and good sense of the judges. But, it is submitted, the balancing approach is too dangerous to be used in preference to an available *rule* that does the required job; if and to the extent that the line between the allowed and the forbidden, between the required and the optional, is susceptible of demarca-

[13] E.g., *Konigsberg* v *State Bar*, 366 U.S. 36, 60-80 (1961); *Braden* v *United States*, 365 U.S. 431, 441-46 (1961); *Wilkinson* v *United States*, 365 U.S. 399, 422-23 (1961); *Uphaus* v *Wyman*, 364 U.S. 388, 392-93 (1960); *Barenblatt* v *United States*, 360 U.S. 109, 140-44 (1959); *Beauharnais* v *Illinois*, 343 U.S. 250, 268-70, 274-75 (1952); *Dennis* v *United States*, 341 U.S. 494, 579-81 (1951); *American Communications Ass'n* v *Douds*, 339 U.S. 382, 445-53 (1950). All these were in dissent. Justice Black adhered unswervingly to his position until his death in 1971. See Black, *A Constitutional Faith* (New York, 1968), 50 ff. But during the last ten years of his life the Court majority turned away from balancing, so that his strictures on the subject were less frequently called for—and, when delivered, usually appeared in majority or concurring opinions. His earlier dissents expound his views in their purest and most fully elaborated form.

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tion by words that would be understood the same way by all or nearly all reasonable men, that is what should be done. Such is the connotation of the hackneyed but nevertheless meaningful phrase, "a government of laws and not of men."

It must be acknowledged that our law includes many areas in which that ideal is not approximated very closely and some areas in which (thus far, at least) it has not been approached at all. The protean business of the quasi-judicial administrative agencies is entrusted to them for the very reason that administrative "discretion" is the indispensable key to attainment of legitimate collective goals.[14]

Resort to administrative discretion is routinely ascribed to the need for the specialist's expertise (though often it is justifiable only in terms of the need for quick, low-cost action in multitudinous cases). The persuasiveness of the expertise appeal reaches its apogee, and the tolerability of a "government of men" thus attains its maximum, with respect to problems arising from technological developments that are new, are still progressing into more sophisticated applications, and—being as yet imperfectly understood by the elected legislators—would either be rigidly and harmfully cramped, or inadequately regulated, by any set of rules the legislature would be capable of framing. Reason therefore exists for delegation of authority to administrative agencies or officials, or else—by means of a statute that speaks in deliberately indefinite terms—delegation of authority to the courts in which the statute is to be interpreted and applied.

Now, this is the precise situation that arises in connection with a great many "privacy" problems (as privacy is defined by Professor Westin).[15] The present capabilities and future potentialities of our new gadgets are indeed, to a great extent, *terra incognita* (so far as legislators are concerned), and likely to remain so for a long time. What then is wrong with the balancing approach? Is not Professor Westin offering us the full and simple truth when, in his final chapter, he refers to the individual's "need to keep some facts about himself wholly private, and to feel free to decide for himself who shall know other facts, at what

[14] E.g., Kenneth C. Davis, *Administrative Law* (1970 Supp.) §§ 2.00-.17, and Davis, *Discretionary Justice* (Baton Rouge, 1969).

[15] The whole Miller book is devoted to treatment of such problems.

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time, and under what conditions," and compares it—for "balancing" purposes—with "an equally powerful need in each person to disclose 'personal' or 'private' matters to others, as well as a strong impulse to penetrate the privacy of others . . ."?[16] Is he not accurate in declaring that "[a] deliberate concept of balancing competing interests [is] at the heart of American privacy law, as in the 'reasonable man' standard for common-law privacy rules and in the federal and state constitutions' ban against 'unreasonable' searches"? Can one rightly question his assertion "that the current legal framework is now inadequate to defend the American equilibrium on privacy from new surveillance techniques," or his call for restoration of that "equilibrium"? Can one deny the wisdom of his detailed recommendations to that end?[17]

The answer is no and yes. Given the unitary concept of privacy, the appraisal and the recommendations are unexceptionable (except, perhaps, for the generalized assertion that the "balancing of competing interests" characterizes *all* of American privacy law). But the appraisal might have been more exact, the recommendations more directly on target, had there been recognition of a basic distinction between informational communication which is objectionable only because of its false or misleading character and informational communication which—however accurate and complete—reports facts that cannot decently be retailed.

The latter category calls not for balancing but for the delineation of forbidden areas. A statute that prohibits use of contraceptives can be enforced only through inquiry into (or eavesdropping

[16] Westin, 368.

[17] Westin, 369, 370-99. He proposes several measures designed to redress the present "imbalance" in American society favoring the need for disclosure and surveillance, both by government and private organizations, in preference over the need for privacy. Recommended action in the private sector focuses on the need for self-restraint by corporations and other organizations in the surveillance of their employees and members, the enforcement of professional canons of ethics in support of privacy, the development of inexpensive devices to counter the mechanisms utilized in wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping, and the mobilization of an aroused citizenry to demand a halt to the ever increasing invasion of personal privacy. In the governmental sector, Westin relies primarily on extensive legislative action to combat unreasonable surveillance. He calls for a legislative declaration of the right of government employees to be free from unnecessary invasions of privacy, restriction of the use of polygraph examinations and personality tests to situations

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upon) what happens in bedrooms. If this is deemed intolerable, the statute should be taken off the books.[18] A rule of law that immunizes the press from liability for publication of anything at all that is true, leaves newspapers free to rake up long forgotten bankruptcies and personal tragedies for the entertainment of new generations of readers. If this is deemed intolerable, the rule is due for reconsideration. Of course, the determination of tolerability will result from a legislative judgment on competing values; but whenever it can be found that a particular type of communication (a) possesses negligible social utility and (b) can be demarcated clearly enough to avoid danger that a prohibition will discourage other more useful communication, a rule is ready for formulation and the lawmaking job is at an end. No balancing here.

The effect of insistence upon preliminary inquiry into a communication's social utility is to clarify the objectives of the rule makers and thereby facilitate formulation of rules that respond to real needs rather than to emotion-laden slogans. If the prelimi-

involving national security or requiring determinations of suitability for positions of extreme stress, and the creation of an independent agency to adjudicate and redress employee complaints of privacy infringement. To control federal and state data compilation, Westin proposes the enactment of statutes enabling citizens to examine and challenge information about them contained in government dossiers and delineating the precise conditions under which such information may be disseminated. Westin recommends additional legislation to limit the use of wiretapping and eavesdropping. At the federal level, he would restrict the use of such techniques to cases presenting a threat to national security or human life. Use of the techniques would not commence until the law-enforcement agents had obtained a court order, except in the case of a dire emergency. The order would have to be renewed periodically, and all information obtained pursuant to it would become part of an annual report to the Attorney General. State statutes would have similar provisions, with one substantial modification: electronic surveillance at the state level would be utilized only by the offices of district attorneys and other prosecutors. Finally, Westin entreats federal and state courts to overcome their reluctance to recognize a fundamental freedom of association, immune from all unnecessary and unreasonable technological surveillance.

[18] It by no means follows that the decision in *Griswold* v *Connecticut*, invalidating the Connecticut ban on use of contraceptives even by married couples, is sound. Legislatures are fully capable of repealing stupid laws, and usually do so as soon as an attempt is made to enforce them. One house of the Connecticut legislature had already acted, and the other was ready to act, when the Supreme Court intervened. Justice Douglas might have reserved his *tour de force* for a more worthy occasion.

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nary inquiry leads to the conclusion that social utility is negligible, the only remaining question—as already indicated—is simply whether the pig can be roasted without burning the house down, i.e., whether a ban on socially useless expression can be defined closely enough to avoid unwanted discouragement of other expression that does have social value.

For example, the Supreme Court's remarkably acute allergy to state and federal laws against pornography may well be justified by the fear that—pornography being in the eye of the beholder—such laws can readily be used for suppression of valuable though unpopular expressions of political opinion, a danger that is a matter of proper concern to a court whose main job is to keep the federal system and the open society in good working order. But to justify its virtually unlimited protection of pornography,[19] as the Court has endeavored to do, on the simplistic ground that a pornographic magazine and a political tract are equally entitled to "freedom of the press," can only lead, as it has led, to a doctrinal mess. The Court appears to be trying to extricate itself, at least on the practical level, through the recently invented "pandering" exception, which says, in effect, that a pornographer is punishable if he is so low-minded as to reveal his profit motive in a crude and uncouth manner—even though more discreet merchandising would have left him untouchable.[20] Comparable doctrinal contortions have made their appearance in judicial opinions and scholarly writings about other "victimless crimes" as well—and again, partly because of overgeneralization resulting from the unitary definition of "privacy," "freedom of speech," and other such terms.

[19] Nominally, the Court has declined to give *carte blanche* to pornography. It says that pornographic literature may be suppressed by criminal prosecution, and even by book-burning, if it lacks "redeeming social value." *Memoirs* v *Massachusetts*, 383 U.S. 413 (1966) (the *Fanny Hill* case); *Kingsley Books* v *Brown*, 354 U.S. 436 (1957). In practice, however, the sky is the limit; it is hard to imagine a publication that lacks *all* redeeming social value, and the Supreme Court has done it only once—and with dubious logic. *Mishkin* v *New York*, 383 U.S. 502 (1966) (a companion case to *Memoirs*).

[20] *Ginzburg* v *United States*, 383 U.S. 463 (1966) (involving *Eros*, *Liaison*, and *The Housewife's Handbook on Selective Promiscuity*, all of which the Court assumed *arguendo* could not be made criminal in the absence of offensive merchandising). This, like *Mishkin* v *New York*, was a companion case to *Memoirs* v *Massachusetts*.

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If the preliminary inquiry discloses that an informational communication does or may possess social utility—and this is usually true in the case of the data banks, the wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping devices, and the "psychological surveillance" techniques such as lie-detectors and job aptitude tests—then the balancing approach does become unavoidable, and a different set of questions must be asked and answered. For example:

(1) Is the information literally false?

(2) Is the information so incomplete as to be misleading, either (a) because it relates to a time so remote that it has little bearing on current reality or (b) because it is incomplete *ab initio* (as in the above hypothesized case of the refrigerator buyer or in the case where an arrest report is unaccompanied by information as to the details of the accusation, the nature of the defense—if any—and the ultimate disposition of the case)?

(3) Can procedural safeguards be devised to assure that the person who is reported upon can obtain (or must be accorded) (a) prompt notice (i) that the communication exists and (ii) that its substance is about to be relayed to identified readers, (b) information as to its purport, (c) an effective means of correcting any inaccuracy or material incompleteness? If not, is the value of the information outweighed by the danger of error that is incorrectible, and of criticism that cannot be rebutted because neither its existence nor the identity of its reader is known?

(4) Is the information of such a character that it can rightly be communicated only to certain persons or classes of persons; and, if so, what procedural safeguards can be devised to minimize the risk of revelation to unauthorized persons? If no adequate safeguards can be installed, should the data be suppressed completely?

(5) If and to the extent that information received from a sophisticated modern machine—e.g., via computer print-outs—is given undue weight because of the awe that the machine inspires, how can people be made to understand that data banks know only what they are told—the so-called GIGO ("garbage in, garbage out") principle? (During the past two decades, at least some healthy skepticism has burgeoned with respect to the comparable case of the lie detector.)

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These questions are of course examined by Professor Westin and such of his disciples as Professor Arthur R. Miller, whose 1971 book *The Assault on Privacy* has been received with enthusiastic acclaim.[21] (Professor Miller rather hesitantly embraces the Westin definition, declaring that privacy is "difficult to define because it is exasperatingly vague and evanescent." But then he takes the plunge, saying that "the basic attribute of an effective right of privacy is the individual's ability to control the circulation of information relating to him.")[22] He deals sensibly with the substantive questions, on the whole. And yet the underlying unitary definition of the basic term "privacy" leads to a subtle bias.

Starting, as Miller and other such scholars do, with the idea that "privacy" is a good thing, they naturally demand affirmative justification for any impairment of "the individual's ability to control the circulation of information relating to him." One is reminded of the similar bias with which the more pantheistic conservationists approach ecological problems; for them, a threatened species is *prima facie* an occasion for concern whether the species be homo sapiens, the whooping crane, or the anopheles mosquito.

Biases of this kind are the enemy of just balance. They distract by loading the balancing scale in favor of the value for which recognition is asserted as a broad proposition, subject only to occasional exceptions. Perhaps, in our hierarchy of values, certain values do enjoy a "preferred position," as some of our most respected judges have claimed[23] (not without fierce opposition in equally exalted quarters).[24] But if any such priorities do or should exist, it is not privacy but freedom of expression—which Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo called "the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom"[25]—that

[21] See, e.g., the reviews in the *Harvard Law Review*, LXXXIV (1971), 1740, and the *Harvard Law Record*, May 6, 1971, p. 11.

[22] Miller, 25.

[23] E.g., Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone, dissenting in *Jones* v *Opelika*, 316 U.S. 584, 608 (1942); Justice Douglas, for the Court in *Murdock* v *Pennsylvania*, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943).

[24] E.g., Justice Felix Frankfurter, concurring in *Kovacs* v *Cooper*, 336 U.S. 77, 88-95 (1949).

[25] *Palko* v *Connecticut*, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).

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ranks first. The *Pentagon Papers* cases[26] are sufficient proof of that.

The assertion of a broad and unitary "right of privacy," however, injects an implied claim of priority that squarely conflicts with the like claim on behalf of free expression. How much of every newspaper is devoted to news items about people who have not consented to be written about?

This is only the extreme case of value-inversion. Numberless values other than freedom of expression, not self-evidently inferior to the "right" of privacy as thus far defined, come into conflict with it. However unpopular the idea may be, there *is* value in accurate decisions on credit extension, in fitting the job applicant to the right job, in limiting the opportunities of a criminal to repeat his crime. A conceptual system which, in evaluating data banks, automatically rates such values as inferior to the value of regulating the flow of information about oneself, is irrational unless the basis for the ranking is articulated and justified. That has not been done, or indeed attempted, so far as I know.

No one should disparage Professor Miller's lucid and well documented demonstration that today's computers and communications systems—to say nothing of the faster, and cheaper, and more accessible and interconnected ones that tomorrow promises (or threatens)—presage dramatic narrowing of the already narrowed zone of personal privacy: the area of individual nonaccountability, in which one can think and speak and act without having to justify to Big Brother or anyone else. Moreover, few will quarrel with Miller's warning that present law not only accords too little weight to legitimate privacy claims now, but that its inadequacy will deepen as computers proliferate and connect up to form huge pools of cradle-to-grave[27] dossiers. And I, at least, find merit in his skillfully defended proposal for a new federal commission that would keep abreast of data-processing technology and devise regulations sufficiently sophisticated to confine privacy invasions within tolerable limits.

[26] *New York Times Co.* v *United States* and *United States* v *Washington Post Co.*, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).

[27] Other terms, denoting slightly differing temporal coverages, have also been suggested: womb-to-tomb, sperm-to-worm, lust-to-dust, leer-to-bier, erection-to-resurrection.

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Yet before joining Miller and the angels in sponsoring the recommended legislation, I would like to be rid of the uncomfortable impression that it may fail to attract congressional support because it lacks adequate conceptual underpinning. It rests too heavily on an assumed priority of privacy, as defined, over other values. What is missing is a forthright grappling with the problem that now engages the attention of the more thoughtful ecologists —the significance of scale.

Ecologists, no less than privacists, confront the fact that technological advances are often attended by unforeseen costs, so that the net social advantage turns out to be less than anticipated and may even fall to or below zero. The low-priced automobile has brought air pollution, road casualties, traffic congestion, and—many believe—hypertrophy of the highway system. Advances in medicine and agronomy have contributed to the population explosion, to proliferation of geriatric problems, and probably to degradation of the human gene pool. Cheap but tasty foods bring on obesity, and labor-saving devices beget flabbiness—both of them productive of hypertension and cardio-vascular ailments. The no-return bottle, the see-through container, and other packaging conveniences have made waste disposal into a municipal bugbear. In each case, too much of a good thing has turned out to be harmful. And, because no one can easily be made to feel guilty about his own little contribution to the ecological problem —his second automobile, his third child, his choice of victuals, his happy willingness to buy the convenient no-return bottle or aluminum can along with the Coke—the problem of social controls acquires an additional and especially difficult dimension.[28]

Likewise, faster and cheaper methods of data storage, interchange, and retrieval result in huge savings to government and business, and thus to taxpapers and consumers. That is the cause of the insistent demand for bigger, faster, and more sophisticated computer hardware and accessories. The probably unwanted by-product—the possibility of comprehensive dossiers that degrade everyone's sense of personal autonomy—is rightly to be identified and feared. But the means of coping with it cannot be most effectively developed if attention is concentrated exclusively, or even

[28] For a sparkling analysis, see Thomas C. Schelling, "On the Ecology of Micromotives," *The Public Interest*, No. 25 (1971), 59.

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primarily, on the *by-product*. Similar observations could be made about wiretapping and eavesdropping, on the one hand, and the prevention and detection of crime, on the other. Both the good and the bad must be assessed, and the necessary accomodation—accomplished, so far as possible, at the legislative level rather than the judicial (or administrative) level—should only then be struck.

To facilitate this approach, the unitary concept of privacy ought to be broken down. The interest in preventing communication of *wrong* reports about oneself should be recognized as being distinct from the interest in preventing *any* reports about certain of one's actions or omissions. The place to start would be replacement of the Westin definition of privacy with a more useful one.

That would be a further forward movement, and we are ready for it. Development of a more satisfactory conceptual foundation for the law of privacy is a large undertaking, and should be preceded (a) by thorough canvass of the myriad interests that are candidates for legal protection and (b) by analysis and classification of the different regulatory approaches that might be employed. No more than the beginning of a beginning can be made here. Yet that is better than stasis; and so the following thoughts are offered for what they may be worth.

First, precision of terminology is to be desired. It will be recalled that the Westinian definition begins, "Privacy is the *claim* of individuals," etc. Whatever else privacy is, it is not a "claim." Professor Miller, in his diffident quasi-definition, speaks in terms of a "right" of privacy; but surely if we use the term "right," we must say whether we employ it in the legal sense (an interest that will be recognized and protected by courts or other official organs), or in the looser sense of "moral" right (an interest that ought to be recognized, but may ordinarily be ignored with legal impunity). The latter meaning of "right" is too vague and subjective to be very useful, and we shall disregard it; use of the former—*legal* right—would raise a further question:

Is it better, for our purposes, to describe our problems by use of a term connoting the underlying human value that is the object of our concern (privacy)—deferring judgment as to whether, how, and to what extent it should be accorded legal protection—or should we take a short cut and adopt, as our basic term, a

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phrase that *assumes* legal protection or the need for it (*right* of privacy)? To illustrate by analogy: For the purpose of devising laws for the protection of physical and mental well-being, is it better to use "*health*" as the basic term—deferring consideration of the particular legal measures that might be adopted for its protection—or to put the rabbit in the hat by using the legal term "*right to health*"?

In my opinion, the delicacy and complexity of the subject matter—and the defect of unitary definition that has already been described—dictate the need to avoid welding together the descriptive and the legal aspects of our basic term. Our basic term should refer to the interest whose protection is under consideration and should carry no legal connotation. Perhaps we could use the word "condition" and begin our definition: "Privacy is the condition enjoyed by one who can control the communication of information about himself."

Proceeding now to the need for classification of such interests —that is, to get away from unitary definition—we must, at a minimum, devise different terms to use for the two model situations outlined above (the hostage case and the defective-refrigerator case). It is tempting to suggest that they be described, respectively, as "absolute" and "contingent." For example, continuing after our initial sentence: "The condition of privacy may be absolute or contingent, depending on the degree of control one possesses. It is absolute if the person whose privacy is in question can control any communication of information about himself with reference to a particular subject matter, whatever the time or reasons and whoever the parties to the communication may be. If not absolute, the condition of privacy is contingent and exists only under some circumstances." I confess to a certain uneasiness about "absolute," since real life recognizes few absolutes. But it is the best I can do at the moment. Perhaps someone else can suggest a happier word.

It may turn out that a two-way classification is insufficient to accommodate the many different fact-situations, and that a further breakdown is called for.[29] For present purposes, however, let us stop with two categories. That is enough to show that we are now in a position to proceed more easily with the legal aspect than has

[29] See, e.g., nn. 3 and 12 above.

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heretofore been possible.

As indicated above, the main problems in protection of an "absolute" interest in privacy are to define the precise subject matter about which unauthorized communication is to be forbidden; to make the value judgment that such protection will serve the public interest; and to satisfy ourselves that the protective legal machinery will not, as an unwanted side-effect, discourage (or "chill," to use the much overworked word that is now so popular) other communications that ought *not* to be interfered with. For a limited number of subject matters, a reasonable claim can be made that these conditions are satisfied: what goes on in the marital bed, the confessional, the psychiatrist's office, the voting booth, or the jury room, for example.

The vast majority of privacy problems would of course fall into the "contingent" category.[30] We have already sketched a set of five questions (or groups of questions) that would have to be resolved in each case. There may be more. The important thing is that any given problem could be approached rationally, without the emotional burden and bias that carries over from the "absolute" situations. And it would be easier to group together those problems that involve similar privacy interests and difficulties of control, and deal with them collectively rather than one by one; contrariwise, resolution of one privacy problem would not be embarrassed by charges of inconsistency in the treatment of another that does *not* involve similar interests or control difficulties.

So much for a start. My hope is that others will examine and appraise, and perhaps carry on with development of a still more useful lexicon. Such an endeavor will not involve the scrapping of the good work by Professor Westin and his disciples that has already been done, any more than Einstein scrapped the work of Newton. It is a matter of trueing and strengthening foundations that are well laid but slightly skewed. And it is a matter of writing upon the doorposts of our house, and upon our gates, the creed of the legal scholar: Speak true, right wrong, shun cant, stick to the point—else, wherefore born?

[30] For example: wiretapping, electronic eavesdropping, surreptitious photography, optical monitoring, polygraph (lie-detector) examinations, personality profile testing, narco-analysis, and computer processing of personal dossiers.

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Roosevelt and Truman on Yalta: The Origins of the Cold War*

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Only recently has the question of the origins of the cold war seriously divided American historians, the emergence of a "revisionist" school coinciding with intensive research into primary sources. Yet, revisionists do disagree over whether there existed a discontinuity between President Roosevelt's and President Truman's policies; they disagree in their evaluations of the relative influence of economic and political considerations and in their estimates of the role of key advisers in shaping the decisions and priorities of the two presidents.

This paper will emphasize the tactics and personalities of Roosevelt and Truman, their specific responses to Soviet policy and influence. Focusing on Yalta, I shall examine the Truman administration's commitment to the agreements concluded at the conference and Roosevelt's and the State Department's responsibilities for the development of the cold war. Conceding that the trend of the Open Door ideology was inimical to accommoda-

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tion with the Soviet Union, I, nonetheless, contend that the discretion available to policy makers did not demand the specific policies adopted after April 1945 that led to the cold war. Put simply, the thesis of this paper is, to quote Lloyd C. Gardner, that "the United States was more responsible for the *way* in which the Cold War developed."[1]

At issue for American diplomats during the 1940s was how to deal with the progress and consequences of World War II. Given the Soviet Union's strategic political and geographic position and its inevitable physical presence in non-Soviet territories after the war, the development of U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe, Germany, and the Far East would influence the climate of Soviet-American relations. Indeed, the diplomacy of the Roosevelt and Truman administrations in the 1941-46 period was the product, in part, of their conceptions of the Soviet role in Eastern Europe, and especially in Poland; of Soviet involvement in the Far Eastern war and its consequences for postwar China and Japan; and of the status of postwar Germany as determined by decisions concerning the level of German reparations payments.

The dominant role of the post-New Deal presidency in the formulation of foreign policy, the consistency of Truman's policies with those of Roosevelt, and the extent to which either president determined policy or followed recommendations of ostensibly subordinate advisers, furthermore, had crucial significance for U.S.-Soviet relations. During the war, and in the postwar years, U.S. policy was made by the president or his advisers, and not simply at the major summit conferences. At best, the role of the public or of Congress had become that of a potential restraint; policy makers did operate on the premise that Congress or the public might seek to counteract policy decisions. Yet, these were possible deterrents; they did not control policy. As one result of the Executive Reorganization Act of 1939, the president had acquired a bureaucratic apparatus that increased his independence and authority. The post-New Deal president, by resorting to public relations and *fait accompli*, had, as a result, greater freedom to create public opinion and structure the policy debate.

Soviet responses, moreover, were based on an appraisal of the

[1] Lloyd C. Gardner, *Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941-1949* (Chicago, 1970), x.

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policies of the president, and not on the differing priorities of advisers, the Congress, the public, or the press. While, admittedly, the president, especially Roosevelt, might invoke public, congressional, or press opinion during negotiations with Soviet leaders, this bargaining ploy did not lead Stalin or other leaders in the Kremlin to view U.S. policy as determined by domestic considerations. Concessions might be made in the wording of communiques to make an agreement more palatable to the American public or press, but Soviet policy makers operated on the assumption that they were dealing with the president and that his policy was based upon understood commitments. For this reason, the nature of presidential leadership influenced immediate postwar relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Most significantly, the Truman administration's attempts to "undo" the Yalta commitments led to the cold war.

What was involved was not only the enigmatic and ambiguous nature of Roosevelt's policies, substantial as these ambiguities were, but the noncommitment of key personnel in the State Department to the "soft" line that Roosevelt had adopted at Yalta. A perusal of the pre-Yalta briefing papers demonstrates both the conservatism of these men on the key questions affecting U.S.-Soviet relations and their sense almost of American omniscience and omnipotence. These attitudes are dramatically revealed in their various recommendations concerning: the creation of an Allied control commission for Eastern Europe; political conditions in postwar liberated Europe; and the Tito-Subasic agreement.[2] Specifically, a November 10, 1944 memorandum of James C. Dunn, director of the office of European affairs, to then Undersecretary of State Stettinius (accompanying the briefing book that the department had prepared for the use of the secretary of state and the president) captures this sense of omniscience. In this memo, Dunn emphasized:

> You now have the policy papers on U.S. policy and attitudes toward Eastern Europe, the Balkan area, and the Near East. . . . These policy papers include the general position of the U.S. . . . and have specific

[2] See *Foreign Relations of the United States—Diplomatic Papers: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta* (Washington, D.C., 1955), 43, 93-108, 202-66 (hereafter, *Yalta Papers*).

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> recommendations with regard to the policy and attitudes we *should* pursue. . . . I think these memoranda *should be* brought to the President's attention. . . . On the trip to the [Yalta] conference would be the ideal time to bring them to his attention as there would be an opportunity to discuss these situations and the positions we *should* adopt in order to protect American interests.[3]

The reiteration of "should" conveys the concerns of key State Department personnel that their priorities were not shared by the president. The rigidity of their position, in contrast to Roosevelt's at Yalta, contained the seeds of possible conflict with the Soviet Union after Truman's accession to the presidency. Truman's limited understanding, of both international affairs and Roosevelt's specific commitments, would enable policy advisers to become policy makers after April 1945 when determining the meaning of the Yalta agreements. Thus, the State Department's briefing paper to Truman of April 13 emphasized that the stalemate over the reconstruction of the Polish provisional government stemmed from "the Soviet authorities consistently sabotaging Ambassador Harriman's efforts in the Moscow Commission to hasten the implementation of the decisions at the Crimea Conference."[4] This interpretation of Roosevelt's differences with Stalin diverged substantively from the deceased president's most recent position. In a March 29 note to Churchill, Roosevelt had contended that the Yalta agreement on Poland had represented a compromise between the Western demand for a new government and Soviet insistence that the Lublin government merely be enlarged. Roosevelt added, "but if we attempt to evade the fact that we placed, as clearly shown in the agreement, somewhat more emphasis on the Lublin Poles than on the other two groups . . . I feel we are exposing ourselves to the charge that we are attempting to go back on the Crimea decision."[5]

Nor was this April 13 briefing by State atypical. On May 12, when lend-lease to the Soviets was abruptly terminated (with Truman, despite his denial in his memoirs, having been fully

[3] *Ibid.*, 42 (emphasis added).

[4] Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs: Year of Decisions* (Garden City, N.Y., 1955), I, 15.

[5] Herbert Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought* (Princeton, 1957), 575.

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briefed by Lend-Lease Administrator Leo Crowley and Acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew),[6] the State Department also recommended reconsidering the U.S. commitment to implement the Yalta Far Eastern agreements.[7] On that same day, Truman advised the U.S. ambassador to China, Patrick Hurley, that "it was not appropriate at the present time" to fulfill the Yalta Far Eastern agreements and, therefore, that Chiang Kai-shek need not be informed of their existence.[8]

Just what agreements had been concluded at Yalta? What objectives underlay Roosevelt's policy at Yalta and how were they related to his earlier diplomacy and to U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union after April 1945? In the remainder of this paper, I intend to discuss, first, Roosevelt's pre-Yalta policy, then, the commitments he accepted at the Yalta Conference, and, lastly, the nature of Truman's commitment to the vaguely worded Yalta agreements.

I

During the war years, Roosevelt's policies toward the potential problems concerning the postwar status of Eastern Europe, Germany, and the Far East were strikingly vacillating and ambivalent. The president, like his conservative secretary of state, Cordell Hull, sought to postpone difficult political decisions until after the war. For a time, he refused even to enter serious discussions with the Soviet Union over territorial and other political matters. Roosevelt's stance on German reparations particularly dramatize this ambiguity of policy and preference for postponement. Thus, although Hull had agreed both to the principle of reparations in kind and not in money at the Moscow foreign ministers conference of October 1943 and to the establishment of an European Advisory Commission to outline Allied policy toward postwar Germany, no efforts were made to determine the level or basis of reparations payments and to develop plans for postwar occupation. In October 1944, indeed, Roosevelt halted

[6] Barton Bernstein, "American Foreign Policy and the Origins of the Cold War," in Barton Bernstein, ed., *Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration* (Chicago, 1970), 28.

[7] Tang Tsou, *America's Failure in China: 1941-1950* (Chicago, 1963), 256.

[8] Gar Alperovitz, *Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam* (New York, 1967), 96.

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any planning for postwar Germany. Significantly, while the debate between Treasury and State was raging over the level of German reparations, Roosevelt wrote to Hull that " 'I do not think that at this present stage any good purpose would be served by having the State Department or any other Department sound out the British and Russian views on the treatment of German industry.' "[9]

But a "policy of no-policy," if viable for Germany, at least during the war years, could not be sustained in every instance. Decisions had to be made early over the handling of the Italian surrender and the Allied administration of Italy until a peace treaty could be concluded. In the U.S.-British military theatre, Italy was liberated exclusively by Western troops. In this sense, Anglo-American policy provided a test of Western openness and cooperation with the Soviet Union and a possible future model for Soviet responses in Eastern Europe, which would be liberated by Soviet troops. The Italian surrender and the wartime supervision of Italian politics was directed exclusively by the United States and Great Britain. Following discussions with the Badoglio government over the terms of Italian surrender and cobelligerency, the United States and Britain simply informed the Soviet Union of the proposed terms. Before Stalin could reply and express his view that leniency was not required, Roosevelt and Churchill had already acted.

The terms of the Italian capitulation of September 3, 1943, moreover, acknowledged the Allied commander-in-chief's authority to establish a military government. In response, Stalin pressed for the creation of an Allied control commission to administer Italian political affairs, one in which the Soviet Union would have an important role. Since the Soviet request could not be denied, Roosevelt and Churchill agreed to establish a Military-Political Commission (MPC), though one stationed in Algeria and not Italy and with its authority strictly circumscribed.

Stalin sent Andrei Vyshinsky as the Soviet representative to the MPC and later protested when General Eisenhower, following Roosevelt's directions, established an Allied control commission under his command. In the end, an arrangement was reached, published in the foreign ministers' declaration on Italy of October

[9] Quoted in Diane Shaver Clemens, *Yalta* (New York, 1970), 31-34, 37-39.

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30, 1943, that led to Vyshinsky's return to Moscow, his rank being inappropriate to what was essentially an advisory position. The foreign ministers' declaration affirmed:

> [the] three Foreign Secretaries recognize that so long as active military operations continue in Italy the time at which it is possible to give full effect to the principle set above will be determined by the Commander-in-Chief [U.S.] on the basis of instructions received through the Combined Chiefs of Staff [Anglo-American]. The three Government parties to this declaration will at the request of any one of them consult on this matter.[10]

The establishment in Italy of the principle that military occupation should have precedence over political matters, including the right of military authorities to determine who should be allowed to form local governments and when normal politics might resume, provided the justification (if any were needed) for Soviet intervention in the politics of Eastern Europe. This precedent had particular importance for Soviet actions in Poland and Romania where the prewar regimes' hostility toward the Soviet Union would have complicated Soviet military occupation and military operations against Germany. Seemingly, in the various armistice agreements concluded by the Soviet Union with Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria in 1944, the Roosevelt administration accepted this consequence.[11]

These precedents made U.S. wartime policy toward Poland doubly unrealistic and provocative. Initially, difficulties stemmed from the Katyn Forest incident and from Soviet insistence on Western recognition of her territorial borders of 1941, specifically the Curzon Line. The refusal of the Polish government-in-exile (in London) either to countenance boundary changes in the east, to recognize the legitimacy of Soviet insistence on friendly relations, or to accept the Soviet direction of political developments during the course of military operations against Germany further complicated the situation. When British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden visited Washington in 1943 and informed Roosevelt of his views—that Soviet territorial demands were correct and

[10] William L. Neumann, *After Victory: Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin and the Making of the Peace* (New York, 1967), 105, 110-11; Feis, 178; Clemens, 30; Martin Herz, *Beginnings of the Cold War* (Bloomington, 1966), 114-15.

[11] Bernstein, 20.

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moderate and that the Soviets genuinely favored a strong Poland, but that Polish aspirations were the primary obstacle to good Soviet-Polish relations—Roosevelt expressed agreement, particularly on the proposed Curzon Line. Roosevelt, however, remained silent on these questions in his dealings with the London Poles. The London Poles, in turn, interpreted his silence as U.S. disapproval of the Soviet claims.[12]

Throughout 1943 and 1944, Roosevelt sustained this noncommital course, thus strengthening the resistance of the London Poles to serious negotiations and thereby contributing to the deterioration of Soviet-Polish relations. Following the Soviet incursion into Polish territory in January 1944, Roosevelt offered his good offices to Mikolajczyk, the prime minister of the London Polish government, to mediate but not guarantee a solution of the Polish border difficulty. Roosevelt abandoned this stance of studied ambiguity only on November 17, 1944, and then after Soviet troops had crossed the Curzon line (July 22) and after Moscow Radio had announced the formation of a Polish Committee on National Liberation (July 22) and the subsequent signing of a military and political agreement between this committee and the Soviet Union. At that time and with the American presidential election over, Roosevelt informed Mikolajczyk that whatever agreement the Poles and the Soviet Union concluded would be acceptable to the United States but that the United States could not guarantee Poland's frontiers.[13]

U.S. policy had not been simply the product of domestic politics; key policy advisers had continually counseled a firm stand against the Soviets and the need to sustain the London Poles. Indeed, within State, John Hickerson, deputy director of the office of European affairs, recommended, on January 8, 1945, that the United States secure the establishment of a Provisional Security Council, in which the United States would have a major voice, to supervise political developments in Eastern Europe.[14] And, on January 18, 1945, Secretary of State Stettinius made the same rec-

[12] Clemens, 14-15.

[13] *Ibid.*, 17-27; *Yalta Papers*, 208.

[14] *Ibid.*, 93-96; James MacGregor Burns, *Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom* (New York, 1970), 535-36; Gabriel Kolko, *The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945* (New York, 1968), 149; Gardner, 49.

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ommendation to Roosevelt. Significantly, Stettinius's proposal provided not only for a rotating chairmanship, thereby implying the equality of the powers, but also for establishing the headquarters in Paris.[15]

Nor was this January proposal inconsistent with Stettinius's earlier recommendations. In a memo dated November 15 and in a telegram dated November 25, 1944 discussing the crises created by Mikolajczyk's resignation from the London government and Soviet organization (and possible recognition) of the Lublin Poles, Stettinius had recommended that the United States continue to pressure Stalin to make territorial concessions to the Poles. Since the Lubin committee had "very little support inside Poland," he argued, "for the moment our best policy is to take no action but carefully watch developments."[16] And, in a December 13, 1944 letter to the U.S. ambassador to Moscow, W. Averell Harriman, advising him that the United States continued to recognize the London government, Stettinius expressed the unrealistic hopefulness on which he based U.S. policy. In an estimate predicated on a series of "ifs," Stettinius conjectured:

> *It is possible* that the present Polish Government [in London] will be unable to make any headway in solving Polish problems and therefore *may* fall. Mikolajczyk *may* then be induced to form a new Cabinet composed of persons who fully support his policies, which eventually *might* make it possible for us to take a more positive attitude in favor of the Polish Government in London.[17]

Even at this late date, Roosevelt remained unwilling to embark on a new course. Instead, on December 15, 1944, he sent a telegram to Churchill requesting his views on the possibility of Mikolajczyk's returning to power and on what actions the United States and Great Britain jointly should take in the event of Soviet recognition of the Lublin committee. On December 16, 1944, Roosevelt cabled Stalin unsuccessfully urging him not to recognize the Lublin Poles until the forthcoming Big Three meetings.[18]

Nor was Roosevelt's wartime policy toward the future Soviet

[15] *Yalta Papers*, 97-100.
[16] *Ibid.*, 209, 212.
[17] *Ibid.*, 214 (emphasis added).
[18] *Ibid.*, 216, 218.

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role in the Far East any more definite. At Teheran and in discussions with Harriman during 1944, Stalin had made known Soviet political and territorial demands in Asia; he indicated that once the Soviet Union entered the war against Japan, she would not play a secondary role. At the same time, he had expressed his deference to the U.S. desire to keep China, including her political system, intact and had denied any intent to infringe upon Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria.

Throughout, Roosevelt attempted to secure Soviet military involvement in the war against Japan. He continued to operate on the premise that U.S. policy—to make China a great power—was correct and attainable. A Sino-Soviet accord, he believed, would minimize Soviet intervention in China and force the Chinese Communists to come to terms with Chiang Kai-shek. At the same time, Roosevelt never consistently backed General Stillwell's efforts to reform the Chinese Nationalist regime or to alter its military policy. A sense of wishfulness characterized Roosevelt's estimates of the internal strength of the Nationalist regime, of the prospects for resolving the civil conflict between the Nationalists and Communists without civil war, and of the simply military consequences of Soviet involvement in the war against Japan.[19]

II

Roosevelt's decision to go to Yalta constituted, in essence, a change from wishful thinking and postponement. By early 1945, military developments, and prospective military and political developments, ensured that the Soviets would play a dominant role in Eastern Europe, that Soviet unilateral actions in Germany would complicate Allied occupation policy, and that the Soviet role in the Far East possibly could frustrate the attainment of U.S. objectives. To postpone matters to a postwar peace conference might contribute to the establishment of spheres of influence, to the breakdown of Allied unity and cooperation, and to the further radicalization of politics throughout Europe and the Far East.

Roosevelt's diplomacy at Yalta, therefore, reflected not so much overconfidence in his ability to placate Stalin through personal

[19] Tsou, 33-34, 38-39, 58-59, 74-87, 95-105, 162-68, 192-94, 244; Feis, 404; *Yalta Papers*, 378.

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diplomacy, though this was a factor, as his recognition of the weakness of the U.S. diplomatic position and the reality—even legitimacy—of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe, the Far East, and Germany. Although the language is vague, the Yalta agreements did confirm this acceptance of Soviet postwar influence and the importance of accommodation to avert disharmony and conflict.

The most troublesome issue confronting the conferees was Poland. Roosevelt's phrasing of his requests at Yalta clearly conceded the weakness of the Western bargaining position. He emphasized his need to "save face" when pressing for slight territorial concessions to the Poles from the Curzon Line, emphasized the domestic importance of the Polish-American vote when urging Stalin to make other concessions over the status of the Polish government, and requested "some gesture" to satisfy the demand of the six million Polish-Americans that the United States be "in some way involved with the question of freedom of elections." By basing his requests on American domestic political considerations, Roosevelt undermined his effect on the decisions of the conference. The final communiqué could simply be worded to gloss over what in fact had been conceded. In many respects, this was the result of the negotiations on Poland: Stalin merely agreed to a formula for the formation of a Polish provisional government and the holding of free and democratic elections under tripartite supervision that would not contradict Soviet objectives yet would enable Roosevelt and Churchill to appease the public opinion that they had so regularly cited during conference proceedings.[20]

Moreover, Roosevelt's February 6 demand that a new Polish government be established, maintaining that the Lublin government "as now composed" could not be accepted (a statement which Churchill immediately endorsed), was not pressed at the conference. The reference to Lublin "as *now* composed" and the further assurance to Stalin that the United States would never support in any way any Polish government "that would be inimical to your interests," significantly reduced the impact of this demand. Stalin replied that Poland did not involve merely honor or domestic public opinion, but the security of the Soviet Union.

[20] Clemens, 179; *Yalta Papers*, 846; Herz, 84; Burns, 584.

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Second, indirectly recalling the example of the Italian surrender, Stalin also emphasized the importance for the Red Army of secure supply lines in its advance into Germany that only a stable, non-hostile local administration could provide.[21]

The result, incorporated in the Declaration on Liberated Europe and the agreement dealing with Poland, amounted to face-saving formulas for the West. The Lublin government was not to be scrapped for a wholly new government, but rather enlarged to provide the basis for the new government. Stettinius's proposal for reorganizing the Lublin government—"fully representative Government based on all democratic forces in Poland and abroad"—was amended by Molotov to "wider democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland and abroad." And, the language of the amended Declaration on Liberated Europe, by providing for unanimity even before consultations could begin, acknowledged Soviet authority and her right to veto her allies' objections. Further, the initial State Department proposal for "appropriate machinery for the carrying out of the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration" was also amended by Molotov to provide instead that the three governments "will immediately take measures for the carrying out of mutual consultations." Nor was observation of the proposed future elections by the three governments guaranteed, since, "in effect," ambassadors alone would observe and report on elections.[22]

The Eastern European agreements, one-sided and a tacit repudiation of earlier U.S. policy, indirectly served to create the potential for subsequent U.S.-Soviet problems. The vagueness of the language, the seeming lack (at least as existing published papers of the proceedings reveal) of intensive discussion over significant changes that amounted to U.S. acceptance of the Soviet position, as well as the exclusion of State from a central negotiating role and the implicit rejection of its policy recommendations at Yalta meant that implementation of the agreements would be determined by the commitment of U.S. policy makers to accept the reality of Soviet influence and the spirit underlying the conference.

[21] *Yalta Papers*, 727-28; Clemens, 183-86.

[22] *Yalta Papers*, 977-78, 980; Clemens, 186-92, 198-99, 201-12; Burns, 584; Herz, 82, 84, 104-05; Alperovitz, 135.

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A similar situation occurred in the Yalta discussions on Germany. Most important matters involving Germany were postponed, though even then it was implicitly agreed that the Big Three would jointly determine occupation and reparations policy. The level of German reparations payments did divide the Allies at Yalta. The final agreement, though, provided for the creation of a reparations commission to discuss this question; the commission was instructed, with Roosevelt and Stalin concurring and Churchill dissenting, that during its deliberations the figure of $20 billion with one-half going to the Soviet Union should provide "the basis for discussion."[23]

At Yalta, Roosevelt had no clearly formulated German policy. Supporting simply a harsh peace, but no longer committed to dismemberment and sizable reparations, he nonetheless remained unwilling to force a dispute with Stalin and accepted the postponement of these issues. Roosevelt's agreement to a stated sum as the basis for discussion, however, could be construed as a commitment in principle to a fixed figure if not to that sum. The only merit of Roosevelt's temporizing was in avoiding division and disharmony. By not providing clear guidelines for future discussions, it served to complicate future U.S.-Soviet relations.

The Yalta discussions on the Far East were characterized by the same imprecision of agreement and absence of thorough negotiations. The general terms of Soviet involvement had tacitly been agreed to at Teheran and during discussions between Stalin and Harriman in 1944. Both Roosevelt and Stalin remained interested, nonetheless, in a more specific understanding. At Stalin's insistence, the conditions for Soviet involvement were set forth in writing at Yalta and agreed to by the three powers (though Britain did not participate in the discussions). Specifically, the Soviet Union was to receive South Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands from Japan. In addition, Russia secured "lease" rights to Port Arthur; her "pre-eminent interests" were to be safeguarded in an internationalized port of Dairen and in a "jointly operated" Sino-Soviet commission for the Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South-Manchurian Railroad; and the status of Outer Mongolia was to be "preserved." Roosevelt admitted not having discussed

[23] *Yalta Papers*, 570-72, 619, 629-30, 634; Clemens, 137-39, 141-42, 146-47, 159-65, 172.

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the matters of Outer Mongolia, the ports, or the railroads with Chiang-Kai-shek and conceded that, for the moment, military considerations required continued secrecy. Stalin then informed Roosevelt that Chinese Foreign Minister T.V. Soong was coming to Moscow in April, that it might be appropriate at that time to inform him of this matter. Ultimately, it was decided that Roosevelt would take the initiative to inform the Chinese and would make this move when so directed by Stalin, the determining factor to be military developments in Europe. In return for these concessions, Roosevelt secured two qualified Soviet commitments: to enter the war against Japan two or three months after the termination of the war in Europe and to conclude a pact of "friendship and alliance" with the Nationalist government.[24]

The Far Eastern agreements, however, had not defined the extent of the Soviet role in Manchuria, particularly in the area surrounding the ports and railroads; the reference to the "pre-eminent interests" of the Soviet Union could result in the establishment of a Soviet sphere of influence. Moreover, whether Roosevelt had accepted the German or Italian model as the basis for joint occupation policy in postwar Japan was not clear from the discussions or agreements reached at Yalta. No specific agreement had been made concerning this matter—the outright cession of South Sakhalin and the Kuriles to the Soviet Union did not establish physical occupation of Japanese territory and a right to have an equal voice in occupation policy. Roosevelt's attempt to secure Soviet involvement, however, and the spirit of mutual assistance and cooperation provided justification for Soviet insistence on equal participation in occupation policy.

In sum, at Yalta, Roosevelt adopted a conciliatory policy, accepting the reality of Soviet power and the legitimacy of her postwar involvement in Eastern Europe, Germany, and the Far East. He did not reverse this policy upon returning to Washington. Thus, in late February 1945, when Molotov forced King Michael of Romania to establish a new government, Roosevelt and Churchill only mildly protested, suggesting that consultation among the Allies might be in order. When the Soviet Union rejected this appeal by pointing out the consistency of Soviet action with the 1944 armistice agreements, Roosevelt, much to the

[24] *Yalta Papers*, 768-70, 894-95, 984.

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dismay of the State Department, refused to press the matter.[25]

Moreover, in the impasse that emerged during the Moscow discussions between Harriman, Clark Kerr, and Molotov over the reorganization of the Lublin government, Roosevelt's position diverged significantly from that of Churchill. He urged Churchill to have Mikolajczyk endorse the Yalta agreements and thereby remove what had been one basis for Soviet opposition to his inclusion in a new provisional government. At the same time, Roosevelt refused to endorse Churchill's proposal that the United States and Britain jointly demand that any Pole nominated by any one of the three governments be invited to Moscow for consultation and that the Soviet Union use her influence to prevent "any further legal or administration action [in Poland] of a fundamental character." Such demands, Roosevelt insisted, would ensure a stalemate. In his own protest to Stalin, Roosevelt instead emphasized that "while it is true that the Lublin Government is to be reorganized and its membership play a prominent role, it is to be done in such a fashion as to bring into being a new government." Despite his strongly worded protest and his insistence that the Moscow negotiations were to create a different government, Roosevelt's only concrete demand was that the Lublin Poles could not claim to reject "what Poles are to be brought to Moscow by the Commission for consultation. Can we not agree that it is up to the Commission to select the Polish leaders to come to Moscow to consult in the first instance."

By this protest, Roosevelt was not rejecting Soviet dominant interest, but dissociating the United States from acquiescence to the demands of Lublin, which would have implied recognizing its authority and its right to speak for the Polish people. In itself, this position did not contribute to the resolution of the stalemate then existing in Moscow.[26]

III

Roosevelt's death significantly changed the diplomatic setting, by introducing, for one thing, an element of uncertainty about future U.S.-Soviet relations. More important, it introduced Harry

[25] Alperovitz, 136.
[26] *Ibid.*, 248-54; Herz, 89-91

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S. Truman, a man more rigidly anti-Soviet and, given also his noninvolvement in Roosevelt's policymaking, more responsive to the suggestions of policy advisers whose recommendations had been ignored at Yalta. His personal political style would have far-reaching consequences for the Yalta understandings: Truman would not feel compelled to honor the commitments and would seek to exploit the vague language of the agreements to avoid compliance.

In part, the Truman administration in 1945 bore the legacies of Roosevelt's earlier policy of postponing and avoiding clearly defined commitments and the partial continuing of that policy at Yalta. Despite Yalta, doubt remained over Roosevelt's position on, among other things, German reparations and dismemberment, the character of the postwar governments of Eastern Europe, and the nature of the Soviet postwar role in the Far East. More important, in making concessions to the Soviet Union, Roosevelt had acted unilaterally, without securing the understanding or acquiescence of his subordinates. The imprecision of Roosevelt's administrative leadership thereby provided an opportunity for these subordinates to take advantage of the policy vacuum created by Roosevelt's death and Truman's woeful ignorance of both international politics and the Yalta commitments to secure the eventful adoption of their recommendations.

In April, Harriman had a conversation with Stalin that, because it coincided with Roosevelt's death, permitted him to affirm Truman's intention to continue the policies of his predecessor. Capitalizing on Stalin's statement of willingness to work with Truman as he had with Roosevelt, Harriman extracted from the premier a pledge to have Molotov, on his way to San Francisco, stop off in Washington to consult with Truman. Such a move, Harriman insisted, would promote collaboration. Stalin acceded. Intended as a friendly gesture, Molotov's trip was initiated to provide the opportunity for an exchange of views and a testing of cooperation.[27]

Harriman's move, though not necessarily intentionally, coincided with an intensive policy reexamination in Washington involving Truman and key advisers who had urged Truman not to compromise to reach accommodation.

[27] Herz, 94.

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Truman, in fact, adopted a less conciliatory approach in April 1945. On April 16, he and Churchill sent a joint note to Stalin outlining their proposal for resolving the Polish impasse. Their note placed the Western-oriented Polish political leaders on the same basis with the Lublin Poles. Understanding that even the vague language of the Yalta agreements did not support his position, Truman, nonetheless, remained confident that a strong stand would not precipitate a break with the Soviet Union.[28]

The same attitude also prevailed at his meeting with Molotov on April 23. Truman's language at that meeting was blunt and undiplomatic, specifically rejecting the Yugoslav formula (expanding the existing government by adding a new minister for every four already in the cabinet) as the basis for composing the new Polish provisional government. An agreement had been concluded, Truman self-righteously affirmed, and only required Soviet compliance. In response to Molotov's protests, Truman conceded the vagueness of the language of the agreements (the president had earlier been advised by Leahy, among others, that the Soviet position was consistent with the Yalta agreements). Molotov denied that any agreement had been broken and stressed the need for cooperation, to which Truman reiterated his insistence that the U.S. interpretation was the only one possible.[29]

The result of this meeting, if possibly psycholgically satisfying to the frustrated Americans, did not lead to diplomatic resolution. Responding to the April 16 note and the April 23 meeting, Stalin emphasized Poland's importance to Soviet security and protested Western efforts to dictate to the Soviet Union. Truman's refusal to accept Lublin as the core of the new government was inconsistent with the Yalta agreements. Soviet actions in Poland were comparable to those of Britain in Belgium and Greece; the Soviet Union had not sought to interfere in these countries or to ascertain whether British actions made possible representative government. The United States and Great Britain were combining against the Soviet Union and the United States was attempting to secure Soviet renunciation of her security interests.[30]

On May 19, in a seeming about-face, Truman consulted Stalin

[28] Alperovitz, 19-26, 32; Bernstein, 25; Gardner, 57, 60; Truman, 80-81.
[29] Alperovitz, 28, 33; Herz, 95-96, 109-10; Feis, 578.
[30] Alperovitz, 34; Herz, 97-98.

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on Harry Hopkins's proposed mission to Moscow for mutual consultations. Significantly, when the Hopkins mission was first considered in early May, Byrnes and the State Department opposed the idea, recognizing that it meant that Truman had decided to make some concessions to the Soviets.[31]

Truman's objectives for the Hopkins mission remain obscure. The trip did not eliminate the tensions that had surfaced in April, though an agreement worked out on the composition of the Polish provisional government did essentially follow the Yugoslav formula, and on July 5, the Truman administration did recognize the reorganized government.[32]

The Eastern European question, however, had not been amicably resolved. At Potsdam, Truman refused to recognize either the Oder-Neisse line as the western boundary of Poland or Soviet primacy in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania. In his public report of August 9 on the results of the conference, Truman declared that Bulgaria and Romania were not to be within the sphere of influence of any one power. And earlier on June 1, 12, and 14, the administration had instructed Harriman to propose to Stalin that the United States and Great Britain be accorded veto power over the actions of Soviet commanders in Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria.[33]

The Truman administration's decision to accept confrontation rather than seek accommodation also underlay its often shifting and confused, but unbending, German policy. Thus, even though, at the time, these decisions did not necessarily reflect a conscious strategy or policy, on May 10, 1945, Truman unilaterally approved Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) directive 1067 and replaced Roosevelt's representative to the Moscow Reparations Commission, Isadore Rubin, with Edwin Pauley. The vagueness of JCS 1067 and the unilateral nature of its promulgation, without consultation with the British, Russians, or French, marked a shift toward a softer policy toward Germany. The directive simply provided general discretion to U.S. military zonal authorities to determine the level of German industrial production and, indirect-

[31] Alperovitz, 69, 70-71.

[32] *Ibid.*, 72, 73, 76; Herz, 21-26, 29-30, 32-36.

[33] Alperovitz, 140-43, 147-52; Kolko, 576, 578; *Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1945* (Washington, D.C., 1961), 214 (hereafter, *Truman Papers*).

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ly thereby, German reparations payments.[34]

During the June discussions in Moscow on reparations, Pauley had adopted an uncompromising line on Soviet requests for specific agreement on German reparations levels, thereby effectively averting progress toward any agreement. The Truman delegation adopted the same stance at Potsdam, indirectly avoiding the issue of joint policy. While paying lip service to the Yalta agreement on reparations, Secretary of State Byrnes refused to respond to Soviet efforts to determine the specific reparations sum that the United States would accept. Dismissing the Yalta figure of $10 billion as "impractical," Byrnes supported a policy whereby, in Molotov's words, "each country would have a free hand in their own zone and could act entirely independently of the others." Despite Assistant Secretary of State Clayton's warning that Byrnes's insistence that reparations come from the zone of the occupying power "would be considered by the Russians as a reversal of the Yalta position," Truman did not alter this position. Potsdam, then, contributed to the division of Germany along zonal lines. In addition, Truman's willingness to reject the Yalta formulas, while publicly proclaiming his commitment to them, added the element of distrust to diplomatic relations. The further complication to joint planning provided later by French obstruction heightened this distrust. A high Soviet official told James Warburg in the summer of 1946 that "after six months of French obstruction, we began to suspect that this was a put-up job—that you did not like the bargain you had made at Potsdam and that you are letting the French get you out of it."[35]

This element of deception inherent in Truman's reparations diplomacy is elaborated in John Gimbel's study of U.S. reparations and occupation policy in Germany. Emphasizing the disparity between the administration's public position and its private actions, Gimbel points out:

A cable from the War Department to Clay on January 3, 1946 . . .

[34] Alperovitz, 79; Kolko, 512-13.

[35] Bernstein, 49; Clemens, 271; Alperovitz, 85-86, 152-58, 162-63, 166-69; Lloyd Gardner, "America and the German 'Problem,' 1945-1949," in Bernstein, ed., *Politics*, 120-22; William A. Williams, "A New View of American Omnipotence," in Robert A. Divine, ed., *Causes and Consequences of World War II* (Chicago, 1969), 329-34.

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> added that Clay's freedom of action was not limited by JCS 1067. It said that formal policy change would result in unfavorable comment in the press to the effect that the United States had abandoned its firm stand on the treatment of Germany. . . . Apparently influenced by all these pressures to hold to the original "hard" line, American officials gave out "explanations of policy" and "restatements of policy" and generally interpreted their own actions to the public and their allies as fulfillment of, rather than deviations from, the directive and the Potsdam agreement.[36]

Gimbel describes the essence of Truman's diplomatic method as a crafty attempt to have it both ways: to disown earlier concessions without accepting the responsibility of overtly repudiating them and establishing new relations. This aspect of Truman's diplomacy constituted an important element of his response to the Soviet Union and was as crucial to the deterioration of Soviet-American relations as the specific policy differences over Poland and Germany. It was revealed as well in the administration's policy toward the Yalta Far Eastern agreements.

The vague wording of the Far Eastern agreements presented formidable unresolved diplomatic problems for the entering Truman administration. On the surface, the concessions did not seem major. In fact, however, the extent of the postwar Soviet role in either China or Japan had not been clearly defined. Thus, as soon as he became president, Truman was beset by pressure from key advisers in State, the Foreign Service, and his cabinet to reappraise the Far Eastern agreements.[37] At an April 23 cabinet meeting, the president himself raised the issue of reappraisal. Distressed over Soviet actions in Eastern Europe, Truman suggested that the failure of a Yalta signatory to fulfill any of its commitments might free the other signatories from fulfilling theirs. The main opposition to this position came from the military. General George C. Marshall, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, argued that the concessions had to stand because the Far Eastern war could not be won without Soviet military assistance.[38]

[36] John Gimbel, *The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945-1949* (Stanford, 1968), 4.

[37] Feis, 639; Tsou, 254-55; Alperovitz, 94.

[38] Tsou, 255.

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While no formal decision on the concessions was reached in the cabinet then, the German surrender on May 8 led to further administration reevaluation of Yalta. During a May 11 meeting in Forrestal's office, Harriman, who was about to return to Moscow, contended that "it was time to come to a conclusion about the necessity for the early entrance of Russia into the Japanese war." He reiterated this case at State on May 12, and it was agreed that Harriman's views should be formulated precisely "for discussion with the President."[39]

On May 12, though perhaps not the consequence simply of Harriman's initiative, two actions occurred. Responding to a cable from Hurley sent on May 10 stating his view that the time had come to inform Chiang of the Yalta terms, Truman stated that "it was not appropriate at the present time" to fulfill the Yalta Far Eastern agreements and therefore Chiang ought not to be informed of their terms. Second, Acting Secretary of State Grew sent memorandums to Secretary of War Stimson and Secretary of Navy Forrestal requesting that the military services state their views on the Far Eastern agreements. The memorandums detailed the State Department's objections to the Yalta concessions as well as its suspicions of Soviet aims and questioned whether the United States should remain committed to the enactment of the Yalta terms and, if so, in whole or in part. Before informing Chiang of the Yalta concessions, Grew further suggested, the U.S. should first secure Soviet agreement to influence the Chinese Communists to achieve unity under Chiang.

In a May 21 reply, Secretary Stimson reiterated the importance of Soviet military assistance to the early defeat of Japan. Stimson went on to say that Soviet influence in the Far East was inevitable and that a Big Three conference to discuss and possibly revise the Yalta concessions would be undesirable. While remaining suspicious of Soviet objectives and committed to a policy of limiting Soviet influence, Stimson still believed that the administration could not successfully renegotiate the terms set at Yalta. Furthermore, he argued, any such effort could only delay the timing of Soviet military intervention without reducing postwar So-

[39] Alperovitz, 31-32, 95; James V. Forrestal, *The Forrestal Diaries*, ed. Walter Millis (New York, 1951), 56.

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viet influence in the area.[40] As yet committed neither to repudiation nor to fulfillment, Truman in a meeting with Soong on May 14 failed to inform him of the Yalta agreements, refusing also to respond to Soong's query about the Soviet role in the Far East. Moreover, Truman successfully dissuaded Soong from flying to Moscow to secure Soviet assistance against the Chinese Communists. Soong agreed to postpone this trip to a later date.[41]

The Hopkins mission to Moscow, however, raised anew the issue of the Yalta Far Eastern agreements. On May 28, Stalin reaffirmed his government's intention to enter the Far Eastern war and the expectation that Soviet troops would have a role in the occupation of Japan. The time was right, Stalin advised Hopkins, to initiate discussions between the Soviet Union and the Chinese Nationalists on the Yalta concessions to Russia; these talks should begin no later than July 1. The Soviet Union would be ready to enter the war against Japan by August 8, but only on the condition that a Sino-Soviet treaty had been successfully concluded by then.[42]

In response to the Hopkins mission, on June 9, Truman personally informed Soong of the Yalta provisions concerning China and urged him to initiate negotiations with the Soviet Union. Hurley also was instructed to inform Chiang Kai-shek of the Yalta terms. In a June 14 meeting with Soong, Truman specifically reported the substance of Hopkins's May 28 conversation with Stalin. Concerned about the ramifications of the Yalta concessions and the weakness of the Chinese negotiating position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, Soong then and in earlier discussions with Grew sought a definite U.S. commitment to China. First, he pressed for a U.S. pledge to cosign, and thereby to accept the obligation to act upon, any treaty concluded between China and the

[40] Alperovitz, 96, 99, 100; Tsou, 256-57; Lloyd Gardner, *Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy* (Madison, 1964), 253-54; Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson Jr., *The New World, 1939/1946* (University Park, Pa., 1962), 350-51; Kolko, 535.

[41] Alperovitz, 96-97; Kolko, 535.

[42] *Ibid.*, 547; Alperovitz, 102; Hewlett and Anderson, 351-52; Tsou, 271; Gardner, *Economic Aspects*, 255; U.S. Dept. of Defense, *The Entry of the Soviet Union into the War against Japan: Military Plans, 1941-1945* (Washington, D.C., Sept. 1955), 72; Herbert Feis, *Contest Over Japan* (New York, 1967), 13-14.

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Soviet Union. Second, he suggested that the status of Port Arthur be guaranteed by the four powers. Third, he asked Truman to define the U.S. interpretation of the Yalta provisions ceding "pre-eminent interests" to the Soviet Union in the areas surrounding the railroads and Dairen. Truman refused to consider any of these requests. Thus, as he left Washington for Moscow, Soong had no firm understanding of the extent of U.S. support for China during the ensuing negotiations.[43]

The administration's initial position during the Soong talks had been to inform the Chinese of the Yalta terms and suggest that discussions be initiated—and no more. Subsequently, in both the first phase of the Moscow negotiations (June 30-July 14) and the final stage preparatory to the conclusion of a formal treaty (August 1-14), the administration assumed an ambivalent stance, never formally denouncing Soviet demands and always refusing to clarify the U.S. position.

The administration's noncommittal position deeply troubled the Chinese throughout their difficult discussions with the Soviets. At the inception of formal talks on June 30, Stalin stipulated as the Soviet condition for a pact of friendship the resolution of outstanding Sino-Soviet differences, including Chinese acceptance of the independence of Outer Mongolia, the Soviet right to administer jointly the Manchurian railroads, and Soviet "lease" rights to and "pre-eminent interests" in Dairen and Port Arthur. During the June 30-July 14 meetings, the status of Outer Mongolia was amicably resolved. But Soong and Stalin continued to differ over Soviet rights in Dairen and Port Arthur. Seeking U.S. support for his efforts to limit Soviet demands, Soong pressed Harriman for a clarification of the U.S. interpretation of these rights. Harriman, in turn, requested advice from the Truman administration, which, on July 4, repeated its refusal to be bound by any specific interpretation of the Yalta terms on the grounds that clarification would indirectly involve the United States in the negotiations and hence implicitly bind it to fulfilling the resulting settlement. While eager to sustain its independence of the negotiations, the administration, nevertheless, did not wish to disavow interest; thus, on July 6, Secretary of State Byrnes instructed Harriman to inform the Russians that, as a sig-

[43] Gardner, *Economic Aspects*, 256; Alperovitz, 120-21; Kolko, 537.

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natory to the Yalta agreements, the United States wanted to be fully consulted before a final agreement was concluded between the Soviet Union and China.

Still pressured by Soong about America's seeming indifference to the fate of China, on July 9, Harriman again urged the administration to report its understanding of the Yalta terms, this time directly to Stalin. Simultaneously, the State Department drafted a memorandum urging U.S. support of China at the Moscow negotiations. The administration, however, made no formal decision either on the State Department's recommendation or on Harriman's request.[44] The Sino-Soviet talks finally reached a stalemate. After stressing his inability to accede to Stalin's demands on port rights, Soong broke off the negotiations on July 14 and returned to Chunking for further consultations with Chiang Kai-shek.

The United State's seeming ambivalence throughout this preliminary negotiating period was indicative not of indifference but of the desire to forestall Soviet involvement in the Far East. Since the Soviet Union had declared its unwillingness to enter the war against Japan until a treaty had been concluded with China, by stalling negotiations on that treaty, the administration could avert the inevitable extension of Soviet influence in China and Japan without formally repudiating the terms laid down at Yalta.

By June, the administration's options had increased as the result of the defeat of Germany. Thereafter, the administration operated on the premise that Soviet military involvement against Japan was not imperative. This shift was revealed on June 18 in another change of position by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who now described Soviet aid as desirable but not indispensable and recommended that the United States not bargain for Soviet involvement.[45]

With all this in mind, Truman and Byrnes discussed the Far East with Stalin and Molotov at the Potsdam Conference on July 17. First the Soviet leaders informed Truman and Byrnes of their willingness to accept Chinese control of Manchuria as well as to

[44] Truman, 315-19; Alperovitz, 123-25; Gardner, *Economic Aspects*, 256; Tsou, 274, 279.

[45] Alperovitz, 119; Tsou, 265; Hewlett and Anderson, 363-64.

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recognize the Nationalists as the sole leaders of China. In reply, Byrnes affirmed that the United States held to a strict interpretation of the Yalta terms. Then, feigning ignorance of the recently concluded Soong-Stalin talks, Byrnes sounded out Stalin about the areas of Sino-Soviet disagreement. On the basis of Stalin's reply, Byrnes and Truman concluded that the differences between the Soviet and Chinese positions were so fundamental that, at least in the immediate future, a Sino-Soviet treaty was highly unlikely.[46]

The Potsdam discussions between the U.S. and Soviet military staffs provided further assurances for the administration that a Sino-Soviet treaty was still a necessary precondition for Russia's entering the Japanese war.[47] Moreover, at Potsdam, the administration remained in contact with the Chinese Nationalists. On July 20, Chiang Kai-shek informed Truman about Soong's mission, arguing that the Chinese had bargained in good faith and could make no further concessions to secure the treaty. Truman agreed—in fact, he directed Chiang specifically to make no more concessions. Despite this, Truman insisted on the implementation of the Yalta terms and urged Chiang to have Soong return to Moscow to continue negotiations.[48]

While the administration continued formally to support the Yalta commitments, in view of the July 17 meeting with Stalin and Molotov, Truman's instructions to Chiang—if Soong followed them—would effectively stymie the conclusion of a treaty. Moreover, the successful testing of the atomic bomb led Marshall to concede to Stimson and Truman on July 23 that Soviet entry into the war against Japan was no longer necessary, but Marshall again maintained that the Soviet Union could enter anyway and obtain "virtually what they wanted in the surrender terms." Byrnes came away from the discussion hoping only that the Sino-Soviet discussions might be stalled and thereby "delay Soviet entrance and the Japanese might surrender." Finally, instead of consulting the Soviets, the administration unilaterally drafted the formal declaration demanding unconditional Japanese sur-

[46] Tsou, 268, 278; Gardner, *Economic Aspects*, 257; Kolko, 558-59; Hewlett and Anderson, 385-86.

[47] Hewlett and Anderson, 393; Kolko, 561.

[48] Tsou, 278-79, 282; Gardner, *Economic Aspects*, 258; Kolko, 560; Hewlett and Anderson, 391.

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render; it also decided unilaterally to accept the Japanese request of August 10 for clarification of the surrender terms.[49]

Moreover, once the second phase of the Sino-Soviet discussions began, the United States adopted a more rigid stance, advising the Chinese to stand firm even if that firmness prevented agreement. On August 5, Byrnes asked Harriman officially to inform Soong that the United States opposed concessions beyond those agreed to at Yalta. He specifically warned the Chinese not to make further concessions over the status of Dairen or Soviet reparations demands. The essence of this new administration position was to support the Chinese at the same time that it opposed concessions needed to conclude the treaty; only if the Soviet Union reversed its attitude and radically changed its demands would a treaty result prior to Japanese surrender.[50]

Truman's policy failed to forestall the Soviet Union's entrance into the Japanese war. Although a formal Sino-Soviet treaty had not been concluded and although the United States finally neither requested nor encouraged Soviet intervention, the Russians nonetheless declared war on Japan on August 8 and moved troops into North China and Manchuria. Simultaneously, Stalin warned Soong on August 10 that, should a formal Sino-Soviet agreement not be concluded, Chinese Communist troops would be permitted to move into Manchuria. Fearful of Soviet support of the Chinese Communists, Chiang Kai-shek acceded to the Soviet demands on the unresolved issues. The formal Sino-Soviet treaty was then quickly concluded, and its terms announced on August 14.[51]

The administration's indirect opposition to the Yalta provisions created the potential for U.S.-Soviet division once the war with Japan ended. The rapidity of the Japanese surrender and the last-minute Soviet entry into the war had complicated surrender proceedings. The administration had had little time to devise formal terms indicating to whom Japanese troops should surrender. Indeed, until Soviet entry, there had been no discussion about Soviet rights to direct or control Japan during the period of oc-

[49] Gardner, *Economic Aspects*, 258; Kolko, 560, 562; Hewlett and Anderson, 370, 381, 383, 392, 395, 397, 398; Tsou, 268; Forrestal, 78; Alperovitz, 181-82, 190-91; Feis, *Contest*, 14, 16.

[50] Hewlett and Anderson, 398; Tsou, 282-83.

[51] Feis, *Contest*, 8; Hewlett and Anderson, 403; Tsou, 269, 283; Alperovitz, 189.

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cupation. Thus, when unilaterally issuing General Order #1, the United States directed Japanese troops to surrender to the Nationalists in all areas of China south of Manchuria and to the Russians in Manchuria, Korea north of the thirty-eighth parallel, and Karafutu. These surrender orders were intended to achieve two purposes: to preclude Japanese surrender to Chinese Communist troops and to minimize the Soviet occupation role in China and Japan.[52]

Immediately, on August 16, the Soviet Union protested that these surrender provisions violated the Yalta agreements. Stalin demanded that the Soviet surrender zone include the Kuriles and Hokkaido (the northern sector of Japan). Unwilling to create the opportunity for Soviet military presence in Japan, Truman on August 18 acceded to the Soviet request for the Kuriles but not for Hokkaido. At the same time he pressed for an American air base on the Kuriles. In a sharp rejoinder on August 22, Stalin reiterated his earlier demand for Hokkaido and opposed Truman's request for the air base.

This was no mere territorial conflict; it involved the more basic question of the Truman administration's policy toward the Soviet occupation of Japan. At issue was whether the administration was formally prepared for confrontation. Truman at the time hesitated to reject the prospect of a negotiated settlement and replied to Stalin's sharp note of August 22 that the United States had not sought air base but only landing rights on the Kuriles. Truman further pointed out that the Kuriles were not Soviet territory. Yalta had only permitted Soviet occupation, he said; their final status would have to be determined at a future peace conference. On August 30, Stalin acceded to the request for landing rights. He denied, however, that the status of the Kuriles was unclear, contending that the cession had been permanent and that future peace talks would merely ratify this fact.[53]

Directly or indirectly, the objective of limiting Soviet influence in the Far East underlay administration policy toward the Yalta agreements. Truman and Byrnes cunningly, but shortsightedly, here too sought to have it both ways: to avert the effect of the agreements without formally repudiating or renegotiating them.

[52] Feis, *Contest*, 7, 17-19; Alperovitz, 189-91; Tsou, 308; Kolko, 600.
[53] *Ibid.*, 600-01; Feis, *Contest*, 19-20.

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IV

This clearly contradictory policy required the administration to continue to refrain from publishing the Yalta agreements on the Far East. Publication would have bound the administration to fulfilling them and would have established earlier U.S. insistence on Soviet involvement, negating the limited Soviet military contribution to defeating Japan. Therefore, the Truman administration neglected to publish the Far Eastern agreements on three ostensibly favorable occasions: when the Soviet Union declared war on Japan on August 8, when the Sino-Soviet treaty was announced on August 14, or when Soviet troops occupied the Kurile Islands on August 27.

The U.S. troop withdrawal that permitted Soviet occupation of the Kuriles precipitated bitter protests by conservatives in both Congress and the press, who charged that Soviet possession of these "strategic" islands would directly threaten the security of the United States and Japan.[54] In a September 4 press conference, on the eve of his departure for the London Foreign Ministers Conference, Byrnes attempted to allay this protest. The decision leading up to U.S. withdrawal, he informed the press, had resulted from "discussions" (as opposed to "agreements," he implied) conducted at Yalta, not Potsdam. Byrnes, claiming that his attendance at Yalta had provided him with "full" knowledge of these "discussions," attributed the responsibility for them to Roosevelt rather than Truman. He then announced his intention to review them at London; a final agreement on the status of the Kuriles, he concluded, could be made only at a forthcoming peace conference.[55]

Byrnes dissembled in two respects at this press conference: first, in implying that the status of the Kuriles had not yet been defined and, second, in failing to report the existence of the other Far Eastern agreements. His statements were to have serious ramifications for the Truman administration.

Byrnes's secretiveness on the second point stemmed from the administration's desire to prevent the Soviets from assuming a controlling role in China and in the occupation of Japan. This

[54] *Chicago Tribune*, Aug. 29, 1945, p. 2; Sept. 6, 1945, p. 18.

[55] *Ibid.*, Sept. 5, 1945, p. 1; *New York Times*, Sept. 5, 1945, pp. 1, 9; *New York Herald-Tribune*, Sept. 5, 1945, p. 1.

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objective necessarily conflicted with Soviet policy and contributed to the atmosphere of distrust that prevailed during the September meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London. Although Molotov then protested the unilateral character of U.S. occupation policy in Japan, demanding the establishment of an Allied control commission, Byrnes equivocated and, in the end, succeeded in postponing any final decision on Japan.[56]

This strategy and the attendant necessity not to publish the Far Eastern agreements—or even, for that matter, admit their existence—would seriously compromise the administration's position. The first public hint of the existence of the agreements occurred in November 1945 during the controversy surrounding the resignation of Hurley as U.S. ambassador to China. In resigning, Hurley charged that U.S. foreign policy had been subverted by "imperialists" and "communists" in both the State Department and the Foreign Service, charges which led to special hearings by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in December.

The tone of the committee's questioning of Hurley was sharp, at times even hostile. Attempting to defend Hurley, who had repeated his charges of employee disloyalty and insubordination, a sympathetic Senator Styles Bridges asked whether at Yalta—given the absence of Chinese representatives—any agreement concerning China had been concluded. Although he had not attended the conference, Hurley claimed knowledge about the China discussions. He added that Secretary of State Byrnes was a better authority on that subject.

In his prepared statement the next day, Byrnes dismissed Hurley's charges against the personnel of the State Department and the Foreign Service as wholly unfounded. Senator Bridges, however, was much more concerned with the Truman and Roosevelt administrations' China policy. Repeating his question of the day before, he asked Byrnes whether any agreement concerning China was concluded at Yalta in the absence and without the consent of Chiang Kai-shek. Bridges's confident tone, and the possibility that he had secured access to the Yalta text through Hurley or another source in the State Department, complicated Byrnes's reply. To admit that agreements had been concluded at Yalta without advising or consulting Chiang and had not yet been published

[56] Feis, *Contest*, 12, 28, 34-37.

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would put the administration on the defensive and possibly expose its earlier dissembling. Faced with this dilemma, Byrnes neither affirmed nor denied that an agreement had been made:

> I do not recall the various agreements [of the Yalta Conference]. It is entirely possible that some of the agreements arrived at at Yalta affected China some way or another, and I have told you that I would gladly furnish you the communique and then you could decide whether or not they affected China. If they were made they certainly were made by the heads of government and certainly only the three Governments were represented there.

Bridges then observed that had any agreement on China been concluded, the secretary could not have been unaware of its existence.[57] Thus, when the administration would publish the Far Eastern agreements, it would have to offer a convincing rationale both for its earlier failure to publish them and for Byrnes's seeming ignorance of the matter.

This situation came to pass in February 1946. The event precipitating the publication of the Far Eastern agreements was the administration's announcement in January that it had turned over to an international trusteeship certain Pacific islands the United States captured from Japan during World War II. During a January 22 press conference, Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson was asked whether the Soviet Union would similarly be required to turn over the Kuriles to an international trusteeship. In answer, Acheson pointed out that the Yalta agreements had provided only for Soviet occupation of the Kuriles; the final disposition would have to be determined at a future peace conference. Acheson conceded, however, that such a conference might simply affirm Soviet control. On January 26, Moscow Radio challenged Acheson's remarks, denying that Soviet control of these territories was temporary or that Soviet occupation was related only to the prosecution of the war against Japan.[58]

At a press conference on January 29, Byrnes announced that the Kuriles and South Sakhalin had in fact been ceded to the Soviet Union at Yalta. He further disclosed that agreements concerning Port Arthur and Dairen had also been concluded. But

[57] U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings on the Investigation of Far Eastern Policy*, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945, pp. 123-24, 231-33.

[58] *Chicago Tribune*, Jan. 23, 1946, p. 12; Jan. 27, 1946, p. 1. *Newsweek*, XXVII (Feb. 4, 1946), 46.

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these agreements would become binding only after the formal conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan.

The most dramatic aspect of Byrnes's press conference was not the disclosure of the agreements themselves but his attempts to explain the Truman administration's earlier failure to release them or indeed even to admit their existence. What Byrnes did was to tell the press that although he had been a delegate to Yalta, he had left the conference on the afternoon of February 10, before the concluding session the next day. He had not learned about the specifics of the Far Eastern agreements until August 1945, a few days after the Japanese surrender. In response to further questions, Byrnes said he did not know whether former Secretary of State Stettinius knew about the agreements or where, in fact, the text was deposited. It was not, he stated, in the State Department archives, but it might be in the White House files.[59]

Once again, Byrnes had adroitly covered his tracks. He had shifted responsibility for both the Yalta agreements and the failure to publish them to the Roosevelt administration's tactics of secrecy. His statement did, however, raise two important questions: first, had the agreements been privately concluded by Roosevelt without the knowledge of other White House or State Department personnel and, second, where was the text.

During a January 31 press conference, Truman sought to resolve these questions. The text, he claimed, had always been in the White House files, except when under review either by members of the White House staff or other administration personnel. While he had always known the whereabouts of the text, Truman said, he had not reviewed it until he began to prepare for the Potsdam Conference. Asked when the agreements would in fact be published, Truman answered that it would be necessary first to consult the British and the Russians. Most of the agreements, he added, had already been made public; the others would be disclosed at the "proper" time.[60]

The Truman administration's policy toward the Yalta Far Eastern agreements and other administration tactics strained the al-

[59] *Chicago Tribune*, Jan. 30, 1946, p. 5; U.S. Dept. of State, *Bulletin*, XIV (Feb. 10, 1946), 189-90.

[60] *Truman Papers* (1946), 102-05.

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ready uneasy relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. It was in the area of tactics and personality that the rigidity and moralistic tone of postwar U.S.-Soviet relations derived important substance, and not simply from conflicting ideologies and objectives. In this sense, the cold war was an avoidable conflict: the "way" it evolved being a product of shortsighted political leadership. The opportunities for détente provided by Yalta were effectively subverted by the Truman administration, and U.S.-Soviet relations suffered until a change in presidents brought an administration less rigidly bound to the self-righteous politics of confrontation. Eisenhower's politics remained conservative; but, with the Geneva summit conference of 1955, his presidency marked a new, less militant phase of the cold war.

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On the Implementation of the Potsdam Agreement: An Essay on U.S. Postwar German Policy*

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Historians and analysts of many persuasions have used Secretary of State James F. Byrnes's Stuttgart speech of September 6, 1946, to explain U.S. policy in Germany, in Europe, and in the cold war with the Soviet Union. They generally agree that Byrnes formally renounced the hard-line policy for Germany, the more stringent provisions of directive 1067 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the Morgenthau Plan. They agree that he called into question certain portions of the Potsdam Agreement and that he seemed unaffected by the spirit of retribution reflected in the decisions of the Potsdam Conference and in the actions of the immediate postwar occupation. They agree, also, that Byrnes made important overtures to the Germans, including proposals for increased German self-rule and eventual self-government, for parallel relaxation of occupation controls, for gradual economic recovery under peaceful conditions, and for eventual acceptance of a peaceful, democratic Germany into the United Nations.[1]

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[1] Some of the more recent and standard treatments of the general theme are: John H. Backer, *Priming the German Economy: American Occupational Policies, 1945-1948* (Durham, 1971), esp. 126-29; Herbert Feis, *From Trust to*

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When they place the Byrnes speech into broader historical context, historians generally regard it as a watershed, as a turning point, as a clarification of the past and a preview into the future. Byrnes illuminated the basic thrust and the significance of the State Department's "Statement on Reparations Settlement and Peacetime Economy of Germany" of December 12, 1945. He thus endorsed the efforts of those in Germany and in Washington who —for a variety of reasons—had tried to secure a revision of German policy.[2] Historians generally believe the speech underlined Washington's basic support for Clay's reparations and dismantling halt of May 3, 1946, and that it reinforced the American determination to continue its program of uniting the American zone with the British zone, and with the others if possible.[3]

Terror: The Onset of the Cold War, 1945-1950 (New York, 1970), esp. 156-59; Lloyd C. Gardner, "America and the German 'Problem,' 1945-1949," in Barton J. Bernstein, ed., *Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration* (Chicago, 1970), esp. 134-35; "Conference of Scholars on the Administration of Occupied Areas, 1943-1955, April 10-11, 1970, at the Harry S. Truman Library," transcript edited by Donald R. McCoy and Benedict K. Zobrist (Independence, 1970), esp. Rodney C. Loehr, 19, and Earl Ziemke, 46; Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York, 1969), esp. 260; Gerhart Binder, *Deutschland seit 1945: Eine Dokumentierte Gesamtdeutsche Geschichte in der Zeit der Teilung* (Stuttgart, 1969), esp. 194-99; Frank Spencer, "The United States and Germany in the Aftermath of the War," *International Affairs* (London), XLIV (1968), esp. 60-61; Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Vom Reich zur Bundesrepublik: Deutschland im Widerstreit der aussenpolitischen Konzeptionen in den Jahren der Besatzungsherrschaft, 1945-1949* (Neuwied, 1966), esp. 115-19; Rolf Badstübner and Siegfried Thomas, *Die Spaltung Deutschlands, 1945-1949* (Berlin, 1966), esp. 160; Rolf Badstübner, *Restauration in Westdeutschland, 1945-1949* (Berlin, 1965), esp. 229; Ferenc A. Váli, *The Quest for a United Germany* (Baltimore, 1967), esp. 17; Thilo Vogelsang, *Das geteilte Deutschland* (Munich, 1966), esp. 33; George Curry, "James F. Byrnes," in Robert Ferrell, ed., *The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy* (New York, 1965), XIV, esp. 252; Alfons Klafkowski, *The Potsdam Agreement* (Warsaw, 1963), esp. 116; Frederick H. Gareau, "Morgenthau's Plan for Industrial Disarmament in Germany," *The Western Political Quarterly*, XIV (1961), esp. 526; Harold Zink, *The United States in Germany, 1944-1955* (Princeton, 1957), esp. 93-96; Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany* (Garden City, N.Y., 1950), esp. 78-79.

[2] Backer, 129; Váli, 17; Delbert Clark, *Again the Goose Step: The Lost Fruits of Victory* (Indianapolis, 1949), 57; Zink, 206-07; Wolfgang Schlauch, "American policy toward Germany, 1945," *Journal of Contemporary History*, V (1970), 128.

[3] Gareau, 526.

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They agree, also, that Byrnes signaled a future new U.S. departure for Germany, and thus for Europe.[4] The new policy that eventually emerged was to be influenced by, among other things, Herbert Hoover's March 18, 1947 report on Germany to President Truman; by Secretary of State George C. Marshall's decision at the Moscow Conference in April 1947 to push ahead toward bizonal economic self-sufficiency; and by his announcement of the Marshall Plan for European economic recovery in June 1947. In any case, the new departure Byrnes had signaled in Stuttgart in September 1946 finally resulted in the replacement of JCS 1067 with a comprehensive directive, JCS 1779, issued to the American military governor, General Lucius D. Clay, on July 11, 1947.

Although historians agree almost universally that the Byrnes speech marks an important stage or turning point in the development of U.S. postwar policy in Europe, they differ markedly in their interpretations of its motivation, its timing, and its effect. In broad terms and in brief outline, the traditional cold-warrior interpretation of the speech is that it was a timely recognition of the stupidity of the previous hard-line policy and a necessary response to Soviet initiatives and challenges. Most immediately, it was a response to Molotov's German-policy speech of July 10, 1946 at the Paris meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers. More distantly, it was a response to Soviet unilateral reparations removals from Germany, to Soviet obstruction in the Allied Control Council in Berlin, to Soviet unilateral actions in East Germany, and to Soviet actions and propaganda designed to woo the future new Germany into the Soviet camp.[5] More generally still, according to this interpretation, the speech was a response to the Soviet design to spread its revolutionary influence into Germany, Western Europe, and throughout the world. Revisionist histori-

[4] Clay, 78-82; Gerald Freund, *Germany between Two Worlds* (New York, 1961), 8. West Germans continue to observe the Stuttgart speech as an important landmark of postwar German history. Most recently they commemorated the twenty-fifth anniversary of the speech with a large and impressive gathering in Stuttgart of former participants in the event and others. On the occasion, Dr. Walter Hallstein delivered a major commemorative address, a copy of which is in my possession. See *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, Oct. 18, 1971, p. 7, for a description.

[5] Backer, 126-29; Binder, 194-99; Feis, 156-59; Acheson, 260; Vogelsang, 33.

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ans see it otherwise, as do the East Germans and the Russians.[6] They regard it as an American initiative, as a landmark in the German phase of the Truman administration's larger postwar foreign policy thrust which began in April 1945 and eventually led to the Truman Doctrine, the policy of containment, and its many later, post-Truman "refinements" and ramifications.[7] They seem to accept Byrnes's own statement that he responded to Molotov's performance in Paris in July 1946,[8] but they interpret the speech as though it were a victory proclamation for those who wanted to rebuild Germany as a bulwark against the Soviet Union, as a free-enterprise economic system fertile for American investments and trade, and as a base for maintaining U.S. influence in European affairs.[9] In the words of one revisionist historian, "Byrnes wanted to deliver a speech that would embarrass the Russians . . . finesse the French . . . [and] smite the socialist bogeyman directly." The speech "put the U.S. on the political and ideological offensive in Germany," and it was one of the results of the Byrnes-Clay partnership that "clarified the conception of German policy, so that imperfect plans could be brought into line with overall American policy."[10]

At Stuttgart, Byrnes did, in fact, address himself to a wide range of German problems and policies. He talked about demilitarization, reparations, the level of postwar German industry and the need for its upward revision in the absence of economic unity, the economic imbalance of the four occupation zones and the need for uniform economic policies, the failure of the Allied Control

[6] For Soviet and East German views, see Richard D. Hughes, "Soviet Foreign Policy and Germany, 1945 to 1948" (Ph.D. diss., Claremont Graduate School, 1964), esp. 182; Badstübner, 229; Badstübner and Thomas, 160; Klafkowski, 116.

[7] Gardner, 134-35.

[8] James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly* (New York, 1947), 187.

[9] See Barton J. Bernstein, "American Foreign Policy and the Origins of the Cold War," in Bernstein, ed., *Politics*, esp. 49-51. See also, Thomas G. Paterson, "The Quest for Peace and Prosperity: International Trade, Communism, and the Marshall Plan," *ibid.*, 78-105, who does not mention the Byrnes speech, but gives a general discussion of the U. S. economic drives of the postwar period. But see Walter LaFeber, *American, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1966* (New York, 1967), 32-33, for a different emphasis on the Byrnes speech.

[10] Gardner, 118-19, 134. See also, Robert Murphy, *Diplomat among Warriors* (Garden City, N.Y., 1964), 251, for a reference to the Byrnes-Clay partnership.

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Council in Berlin to establish central German economic administrations, the U.S. desire for increased German self-rule and the early establishment of a provisional government on the initiative of the German minister-presidents, the U.S. determination to stay in Germany so long as an occupation force remained there, the provisional nature of the German-Polish boundary settlement at Potsdam, Allied agreement to the transfer of Koenigsberg and adjacent areas to the Soviet Union, U.S. support for annexation of the Saar, and U.S. opposition to any further encroachments on German territory or divisions thereof.[11]

I

The purpose of this paper is to present evidence suggesting that Byrnes's Stuttgart speech supports almost none of the conclusions that historians have drawn from it. It was neither a basic change in U.S. policy in Germany nor a turning point in U.S. policy toward Europe. Neither was it a U.S. cold-war maneuver against the Soviet Union. The speech was, in fact, conceived and delivered as a statement and publication of existing U.S. policy in Germany. It had three discernible purposes: (1) to match the Soviet policy statement made by Molotov in Paris on July 10, 1946, which was circulating in Germany; (2) to give American occupation officials leverage for an experiment they had developed in the field to promote the economic unity of Germany in the face of the four-power Allied Control Council's failure to do so; and (3) to break the impasse in Berlin caused by France's refusal to accept the terms and the consequences of the Potsdam Agreement's key economic and political features before French territorial claims in Germany had been fully satisfied. The third purpose—it might be noted—was more of a hope than a plan, and it proved vain indeed.

If the evidence presented is as convincing as I think it is, certain other conclusions about U.S. policy in Germany and Europe are tenable. The following—all at variance with prevailing opinion—may be suggested as particularly noteworthy. First, the U.S.

[11] U. S. Dept. of State, *Germany, 1947-1949: The Story in Documents*, Publication 3556, European and British Commonwealth Series 9 (Washington, D.C., 1950), 3-13.

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did not abandon the Potsdam Agreement in September 1946 as a basis for a German postwar settlement. Second, the U.S. had not, in fact, seriously considered basic policy revision before September 1946. Third, in September 1946, the U.S. still regarded four-power cooperation in Germany (and thus U.S.-Soviet cooperation) as a conceivable—and perhaps desirable—alternative. Fourth, France definitely, and Britain incidentally, followed courses in Germany quite independent of the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and each used the unanimity principle in the Allied Control Council to exercise influence in Germany far greater than the postwar national power they possessed would have otherwise seemed to permit. Fifth, the issues in Germany had not yet crystallized to form the basis for an East-West struggle comparable to the one that occurred later. It is, therefore, generally inaccurate, misleading, and unhistorical to speak of the contrast between an Eastern and a Western (or a Soviet and an Allied, or a Russian and a "free world") position on the issues in Germany. The Byrnes speech provides the basis for an interesting, revealing, and fascinating study of what happens when historians fall into that trap.

II

Despite its neglect by cold-war historians for more than twenty years—it has apparently also escaped the attention of revisionist historians—the evidence in support of the observations and conclusions presented above is neither sparse nor particularly illusive. The text of Byrnes's speech was adapted for public, oral presentation from a policy summary Clay had prepared and sent to the War Department on July 19, 1946 for review prior to its release in Germany.[12] Clay said he needed the summary for distribution in the military government, to the army of occupation, and possibly to the German people: "While occupied Germany is busily discussing the Molotov statement, our own Military

[12] See John Gimbel, *The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945-1949* (Stanford, 1968), 76-78, 85-87, for a summary of Clay's statement of July 19, 1946 and for a discussion of its relationship to the Byrnes speech. The two are remarkably similar in content and tone, and the speech contains a number of phrases and sentences taken *verbatim* from Clay's summary.

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Government people have no ready up-to-date summarized version of our policy or objectives which they could use in discussions with our German people."[13] I have shown elsewhere that Clay was anxious to use the statement to promote a plan to encourage and assist the Council of Minister-Presidents (*Laenderrat*) of the American zone to expand and to develop into an *ad hoc* provisional German government of all four zones, in lieu of the central German economic administrations that had been provided for in the Potsdam Agreement and the establishment of which France had blocked since Potsdam.[14]

Byrnes accepted Clay's argument for a policy statement to provide leverage for the field-level experiment. Byrnes delivered the speech in Stuttgart at the seat of the Laenderrat. Prior to the speech, he met personally with the minister-presidents of the American zone. American liaison officers then used Byrnes's visit as an opening to aid and advise Germans to call a four-zone minister-presidents' conference, which met in rump session in Bremen early in October. In a private letter to Secretary of the Treasury John W. Snyder dated three days after the speech, Byrnes admitted that his purposes were the same as Clay's:

> The Army officers in Germany in charge of administering our zone were delighted to have the Government announce its views so that they could adjust their own policies. For some time they have been complaining that they were unable to answer questions of the anti-Nazi officials they have appointed in the American zone. . . . The German officials appointed by our people . . . felt that if we were going to leave it was useless to rely upon any plan we had for restoring the economy . . . and establishing local governments. The argument was daily made that while the Soviets would remain, the Americans would leave. We had to declare our views on this problem and also on the very important boundary questions which would influence our decisions as to economic questions.[15]

Byrnes's letter to Snyder, explaining and interpreting the purposes and backgrounds of the Stuttgart visit, is an important one; it was written *before* his confrontation with Truman and Wal-

[13] Clay to Oliver P. Echols, July 19, 1946, National Archives [NA], file: WDSCA 014, Germany XI, 11 June 46—.

[14] Gimbel, 61-68, 74-76.

[15] Byrnes to John W. Snyder, Sept. 9, 1946, Truman Library, Independence, Mo., Snyder Papers, Box #15 (Germany-general, 1946-51).

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lace over the latter's Madison Square Garden speech of September 12, 1946, and it is the only record that I have found in which Byrnes refers to his own speech and its purposes and which also predates the Wallace incident. The letter's crucial significance as a document is perhaps suggested by George Curry's observation that the Stuttgart speech "was to be given added significance almost at once by the circumstances of . . . Wallace's resignation from the Truman Administration."[16] Byrnes's memoirs and Curry's treatment of the speech (Curry had access to Byrnes personally and to his papers) permit the strong conviction that Byrnes was never again able to separate in his own mind the Stuttgart speech and the Wallace incident. He probably later imagined that he had spoken frankly to the Russians in Berlin and to Wallace at home at about the same time. One may, perhaps, forgive Byrnes, who was tired, overworked, and considerably harried at the time. But commentators and historians who rely upon documentation and sources originating *after* the Wallace incident continue to be boggled by the Stuttgart speech, by the circumstances that led to its delivery, by its timing, by its effects, and by its relations to the Wallace speech. Clay had prepared a U.S. policy summary in July to match a Soviet summary released by Molotov on July 10. Clay said he needed the summary for his experiment and to clarify U.S. policy in Germany. Byrnes took Clay's summary and made a speech from it at Stuttgart. He admitted to Snyder three days later that he did it for essentially the same reasons that Clay had wanted to do it himself in July. Since then, the speech has been interpreted as a turning point in American policy toward Germany, as a landmark in the American decision to rebuild Germany, and as an important element in the cold war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Although I am not prepared to analyze it in detail, I might hazard the observation that the impact of the Wallace speech and Byrnes's reaction to it quickly enmeshed the Stuttgart speech in a domestic political dispute over the proper U.S. posture toward the Soviet Union. Because the dispute was to continue for many years, the Stuttgart speech also continued to serve as illumination, documentation, and ammunition for the domestic political debate. Its real origins, its references (direct and implied) to the deep and

[16] Curry, 252.

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inherent complexities of the postwar German settlement, and its primary purpose to achieve the implementation of the Potsdam Agreement as a working basis for the German occupation have been largely ignored and thus forgotten.

III

In addition to its other purposes—to match Molotov and to provide leverage for Clay's experiment—the Byrnes speech was an attempt to break the impasse in the Allied Control Council in Berlin. Although the three purposes are separated here for discussion, they are, in fact, closely linked by their similar primary objective: the implementation of the economic provisions of the Potsdam Agreement by the establishment of central German economic administrations and the achievement of German economic unity.

From the close of the Potsdam Conference until about the end of 1946, the officials responsible for policy and administration in Germany demonstrated their almost universal agreement that four-power control in Germany and the implementation of the Potsdam Agreement were being blocked primarily by France. At the same time, either by inference or by direct statement, they absolved the Soviet Union of responsibility in this matter—even though, from time to time, some expressed doubts about Soviet sincerity and many admitted that Soviet negotiators in Germany and elsewhere drove a hard bargain. General Clay, who was perhaps in the best position to know the situation, made the point on September 24, 1945 when he asked for authority to establish central German economic administrations for the American, British, and Soviet zones of occupation.[17] During his and Robert Murphy's conferences in Washington early in November 1945, he repeated his conclusion that France was the chief obstacle to four-power cooperation, and he defended his position vigorously against attempts by State Department representatives to shift the responsibility to the Soviet Union.[18] He had not changed his

[17] Murphy to SecState, Sept. 29, 1945, in U.S. Dept. of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945* (Washington, D.C., 1968), III, 879 (hereafter this series is cited as *FR*).

[18] Memorandum, J. H. Hilldring to assistant secretary of war, 7 Nov. 1945, Subj: Subjects Discussed with General Clay in Washington (1 Nov. to 5 Nov.

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mind on May 26, 1946, despite the fact that he had halted dismantling in the U.S. zone three weeks earlier. Contrary to Clay's own memoirs, and contrary to an enormous quantity of literature which asserts otherwise, the dismantling stop of May 3, 1946 was not directed solely at the Soviet Union or the East.[19] In any case, Clay's telegram of May 26, 1946 to the War Department described the stalemate in the Allied Control Council, observed that the zones had become like airtight compartments, recommended alternatives for possible solution of the impasse, and predicted British acceptance, difficulty from the Russians on details, and strong resistance from the French.[20] On September 21, 1946, in correspondence with James Warburg, Clay continued to blame France "for our failure to reach a working agreement in Germany."[21] In addition, there is published and unpublished evidence that on many occasions in 1947 and early 1948 Clay tried, in vain, to set the historical record straight. One example may be worthy of quotation because it is dated at about the time of the Moscow Conference: "General Clay and his assistants on the Control Council told me that the Russians are tough horse-traders . . . but that we are negotiating with them daily on a basis of reasonable give and take and are not faring too badly. The French, with their demand for the Saar and the internationalization of the Ruhr, are far more intransigent."[22]

Clay's judgment that France had caused the impasse in Germany prior to Byrnes's Stuttgart speech was shared almost universally by the people in positions to observe and know the situation. Byron Price, whom Truman had sent to Germany on a special mission in the fall of 1945, reported on November 9, 1945 that "as a result of the French attitude, Germany is not being treated as an economic unit. . . . If France is really bent on the dismemberment of Germany . . . she should be made to acknowledge that policy before the world. . . ."[23] After Clay's visit and

1945), with attached "Resume of Meeting at State Department 3 November 1945," NA, file: ASW 370.8, Germany—Control Council.

[19] See Gimbel, 57-61, for discussion.

[20] Clay, 73-78; OMGUS to AGWAR, May 26, 1946, NA, file: OMGUS, 177-3/3.

[21] James P. Warburg, *Germany, Key to Peace* (Cambridge, 1953), 31.

[22] Arthur L. Mayer, "Winter of Discontent," *The New Republic*, CXVI (Mar. 10, 1947), 19.

[23] U.S. Dept. of State, *Bulletin*, XIII (Dec. 2, 1945), esp. 889.

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after seeing the Price report, Secretary of War Robert Patterson, on November 21, 1945, wrote to Byrnes that "there is grave danger of a breakdown of the provisions of the Berlin Protocol with respect to treatment of Germany as an economic unit. Should the French continue to impede development of central German agencies, particularly in the fields of finance, transport, communications, foreign trade and industry, the very basis of quadripartite administration in Germany might well be jeopardized."[24] Late in December 1945, Patterson reported to Dean Acheson that the War Department was "gravely disturbed" by the continued French refusal to treat Germany as an economic unit.[25] John J. McCloy, the assistant secretary of war directly responsible for occupied areas, returned from a month's inspection tour in the field to tell the Academy of Political Science in New York in January 1946 that "the difficulty we are now encountering in our attempt to achieve a central machinery for the nation-wide services, contrary to the general conception, does not emanate from the Soviet Union but from France. . . . The French have been reluctant to permit any form of central administration which would include all areas of the West."[26] General O. P. Echols, who had been Clay's chief of staff in Berlin and was later director of the War Department's Civil Affairs Division, testified before the Kilgore Committee on April 5, 1946 and identified France as the chief stumbling block to four-power cooperation.[27] McCloy's successor, Howard C. Petersen, told an audience in June 1946 that "the four powers have not been able to agree because of French and, to a lesser extent, Russian objections to the formation of central administrative agencies contemplated at Potsdam." He added, later in the speech, that "all of the planning on reparations . . . and the restoration of German economy are based upon treating Germany as an economic unit."[28]

State Department officials were fully aware of the situation as

[24] Patterson to SecState, Nov. 21, 1945, *FR* (1945), III, 908-09.

[25] Patterson to Acheson, Dec. 28, 1945, *FR* (1945), III, 922-23.

[26] John J. McCloy, "American Occupation Policies in Germany," *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science*, XXI (1946), 550.

[27] U. S. Senate, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, *Hearings* . . . , 80th Cong., 1st Sess., Apr. 5, 1946, p. 25797.

[28] Speech by Howard C. Petersen to Chamber of Commerce, Columbus, Ohio, June 24, 1946, NA, file: ASW 350.001, Box 12, RG 107.

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the army judged it, and there are adequate documents attesting to their knowledge. The records are confusing, however, because the State Department—for reasons that I am as yet unable to sort out completely—was reluctant to admit or refused to act upon the truth as they knew it.[29] I have noted that State Department representatives tried to shift the blame for the four-power difficulties in Berlin onto the Soviet Union when Clay and Murphy tried to generate pressure on France during their Washington visit early in November 1945. There is sketchy evidence that someone in the State Department objected because Byron Price, in his report to Truman on November 9, 1945, had assigned so much responsibility to France.[30] There is substantial evidence that the State Department delayed, procrastinated, resisted, and apparently never went further than a mild, formal protest each time the army asked for diplomatic pressure and/or economic and political sanctions against France. Particularly revealing in this respect is a footnote in *Foreign Relations* recording that in April 1946 Acheson objected to specific economic sanctions the army had asked the U.S. to apply against France and that H. Freeman Matthews had informed the War Department that:

> further pressure will be brought to bear on the French Government in the course of the present economic and financial negotiations. The French representatives will be informed that in connection with these negotiations, our attitude on economic assistance will be influenced by the French position on central agencies. In addition . . . the responsible officers of the Department continue in their day-to-day contacts with the French Embassy to impress upon the French authorities the grave concern which we feel in the continued delay in the establishment of central agencies.[31]

This was hardly the kind of "pressure" the army had in mind, and it was certainly insufficient to move France. Furthermore, as William Clayton made clear a week later in internal discussions on U.S. credits to France, the State Department was less

[29] See Louis J. Halle, *The Cold War as History* (New York, 1967), 38, for the testimony that "there was no time when the danger from the Soviet Union was not a topic of anxious conversation among officers of the State Department; and by the winter of 1944-1945, as the day of victory approached, it became a predominant theme in Washington."

[30] Correspondence in Truman Library, OF 198 (1945-May 1950).

[31] *FR* (1946), V, 540, n.86.

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than serious about even these half-hearted pressures: "Mr. Clayton said that for political reasons the State Department feels that as liberal assistance as is reasonably possible should be given to France at this time." Later in the discussion, he said that "coal is such a critical item that it must be assumed that the French will get the coal they need."[32] Acheson, Matthews, and Clayton were, in fact, reflecting policy that the State Department repeated to Ambassador Caffrey in Paris as early as March 1, 1946, when it advised him that France "should not be pressed to a point where there is real danger of Bidault's resignation and of a split in the coalition government which could rightly or wrongly be attributed to our intervention and which would have wide political ramifications in France."[33]

Faced with the reality of French intransigence, pushed hard by Clay and the War Department to do something, yet determined to keep pressure on France to a minimum, Byrnes often pretended that there was more agreement with France than there was and the Department generally played down the importance of French initiatives for the German problem. This may be the constellation of factors that explains why State Department representatives read with apparent interest and satisfaction the messages of warning and impending error that came from George F. Kennan in Moscow whenever he applied his philosophy of history to specific events and issues in Germany.[34] The State Department's priorities and difficulties in all of this are illuminated brightly by two messages of May 9, 1946 from Acheson and Hilldring to Byrnes, who was in Paris. The messages outlined a plan "designed to avoid threatened breakup of ACC, to remove principal blocks to reparation program, and above all, to put Soviet protestations of loyalty to Potsdam to final test in order to gauge their willingness to live up to the substance as well as letter of Potsdam and fix blame for breach of Potsdam on Soviets in case they fail to meet this test." Although designed to test the Russians, the plan contained the admission "that France as non-signatory of Potsdam Protocol, is under no obligation to as-

[32] Minutes of . . . National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems, Apr. 25, 1946, *FR* (1946), V, 432-33.

[33] *FR* (1946), V, 511, n.50.

[34] See especially, Kennan to SecState, Mar. 6, 1946, *FR* (1946), V, 516-20.

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sent to central German agencies and that central German agencies would in any event be unable to operate successfully without agreed quadripartite control and direction." The authors of the plan attenuated the possible impact of their admission by speculating that France would be more likely to agree to Allied quadripartite agencies than to central German agencies. Moreover, they failed to mention that such French agreement would not break the impasse in the Allied Control Council.[35] Allied central agencies, as such, would not have satisfied the French demand for the annexation of the Saar and the separation of the Ruhr and the Rhineland before France would agree to economic cooperation among the zones. The French claims were, after all, the crux of the matter.

Within the State Department there was knowledge of the situation as the army judged it; the record shows that Acheson observed to Secretary of War Patterson on December 12, 1945 that French proposals regarding the Saar, the Ruhr, and the Rhineland would require reexamination and possible amendment of the Potsdam Agreement.[36] Throughout October, November, and December 1945, Robert Murphy, the State Department's political adviser in Berlin, reported and commented on the French vetoes of the various attempts by the Allied Control Council to implement the Potsdam Agreement.[37] The U.S. ambassador to France, Jefferson Caffrey, made similar reports and in November notified Washington that a discussion with an official of the French foreign office showed "clearly that [central German administrations] was not a point on which they [the French] were now prepared to give way."[38] Murphy's reports went on into the new year, and late in February 1946, he reported continued French intransigence regarding Germany and suggested "that the time is overdue when a firmer and more aggressive stand should be taken."[39] By April, Murphy referred to the impasse as "French sabotage of the Potsdam decision," and he predicted that the stale-

[35] *FR* (1946), V, 549-55.

[36] Acheson to Patterson, Dec. 12, 1945, *FR* (1945), III, 919.

[37] See, for examples, Murphy to SecState, Oct. 20, 1945, Oct. 28, 1945, Nov. 24, 1945, *FR* (1945), III, 884-85, 887-88, 911, n. 74, and 921, n. 88.

[38] Caffrey to Clayton, Nov. 8, 1945, *FR* (1945), III, 1540-41.

[39] Murphy to SecState, Feb. 24, 1946, *FR* (1946), V, 505-07. But see Kennan's reaction to Murphy's cable, *ibid.*, 516-20; "I would by no means accept it

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mate would result in the U.S. financing German reparations.[40] A month later, he reported no change in the French position on central German administrations. In addition, he said the French member of the Allied Control Council had stated that his government would remain opposed to central agencies until the Ruhr, Rhineland, and related issues were settled.[41] Particularly noteworthy in the French statement is the omission of any reference to the Saar. It serves notice that France regarded Byrnes's promise to support French claims for annexation of the Saar to be insufficient to satisify French demands in western Germany. In July, Murphy corrected Byrnes's misapprehension that Bidault had agreed to the establishment of central German administrations, and he noted that the French position was the same as it had been for many months.[42] On July 15, in a radio report to the American people on the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris, Byrnes had said "the French Government, which had previously opposed the establishment of central administrative agencies, indicated its interest to accept our proposal [to instruct the Control Council to establish them] when we suggested that the Saar be excluded from the jurisdiction of these agencies."[43] Significantly, the State Department's reply to Murphy's correction admitted that there may not have been a meeting of minds; but it said that an "effort should be made to minimize if not obviate this difference." Byrnes reportedly hoped that a *modus vivendi* could be achieved "if we avoid clash on verbal differences."[44] But right up to the eve of the Stuttgart speech, Murphy continued to report as before. Late in August, he said the U.S., British, and Russian representatives in Berlin continued to agree on the need to establish central German administrations as provided by the Potsdam Agreement. They had, meanwhile, rejected a French proposal, presented to the Control Council on August 10, 1946, calling for Allied agencies.[45] The proposal was a transparent French

as foregone conclusion that Russians have really been eager, up to this time, to see central German administrative agencies established."

[40] Murphy to SecState, Apr. 4, 1946, *FR* (1946), V, 536-37.

[41] Murphy to SecState, May 6, 1946, *FR* (1946), V, 547-48.

[42] Murphy to SecState, July 18, 1946, *FR* (1946), V, 577-78.

[43] U.S. Dept. of State, *Bulletin*, XV (July 28, 1946), esp. 171.

[44] Cohen to Murphy, July 19, 1946, *FR* (1946), V, 579-80.

[45] Murphy to SecState, Aug 29, 1946, *FR* (1946), V, 595-96.

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attempt to find a substitute for, or to delay the acceptance of, Byrnes's invitation to all the zones to join with the U.S. zone. According to Murphy, the British expressed skepticism; Clay said he could not agree to transitory measures; and the Soviet representative observed that the proposal was not in accord with the Potsdam Agreement and that since the proposal assumed the separation of the Saar from Germany, it was beyond the competence of the Allied Control Council.[46]

Byrnes, himself, frequently admitted and referred to the fact that France had blocked the implementation of the key features of the Potsdam Agreement. His wish to "avoid clash on verbal differences" is one thing. But he had admitted it more directly many times before and after July 1946. In a press conference on January 29, 1946, he had told reporters that transfer of the occupation from military to civilian control "was dependent upon how soon we can get France to agree to central administrative agencies."[47] On February 1, 1946, he had written Bidault asking for French review of its policy on central German administrative agencies, saying that failure to establish them would make it "impossible to administer Germany as an economic unit" and thus would lead to other undesirable consequences.[48] When Bidault's answer showed France firm in its policy, Byrnes had replied that "the resolution of this problem stands as the most pressing task confronting the Occupying Powers."[49] If he were being honest with Bidault, the implication is clear that even Byrnes considered nothing the Russians were doing in Germany to be as serious an obstacle as the French opposition to central German administrative agencies.

Despite his public pretense in July 1946 that agreement had been reached with France, Byrnes knew better, and he admitted it to Murphy immediately. On July 24, Byrnes presented to the French ambassador in Washington a detailed listing of specific French policies and practices that were contrary to agreed Allied objectives in Germany. He observed that "these actions by the French authorities lead the American Government to conclude that the French Government is adopting a policy of unilateral exploitation of the economic resources of Germany," and he concluded with

[46] *Ibid.*, 595.
[47] U.S. Dept. of State, *Bulletin*, XIV (Feb. 10, 1947), 197.
[48] SecState to Caffery, Feb. 1, 1946, *FR* (1946), V, 496-98, esp. 497.
[49] SecState to Ambassador Bonnet, Mar. 22, 1946, *FR* (1946), V, 529.

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an urgent request for assurances that French policies in Germany "will promptly be replaced with actions consonant with our agreed objectives."[50] The French reply—more than five weeks in coming—made no mention of a change in French policies. Its lack of urgency, its content, and its tone could hardly have satisfied Byrnes.[51]

IV

Thus, it seems reasonably clear that Byrnes delivered his Stuttgart speech in the knowledge of French disregard for the Potsdam Agreement, of continued French opposition to the implementation of the Potsdam Agreement, and of recent French rejection of his invitation to join its zone with that of the U.S.—coupled with a transparent attempt to delay the merger and/or frustrate its acceptance by the Russians (the British had already agreed). The temptation is great to comment that Byrnes seemed to have been impelled by the hope—in the fashion of Wilson at Versailles—that public exposure of the problems in Old Europe might help to make them disappear. But Clay's arguments in support of his field-level experiment were persuasive. Furthermore, Byrnes may have reached the point where he was willing to try any new approach—short of applying the kind of real pressure that was needed. Nothing else had worked—not persuasion, not pretense, not self-delusion, not mild protests, not stronger protests, not credits to France, not cheap Ruhr coal for France, not Clay's dismantling halt, and not the 25-40 year treaty of guarantees.

It is not my purpose to deny or minimize the difficulties in Germany occasioned by Russia's interest in collecting reparations of $10 billion, in maintaining power in central Europe, in promoting a social and economic revolution in Germany, and in providing for its own—and Poland's—future security. Neither is it my purpose to deny the personal and fundamental differences between Byrnes and Molotov in the Council of Foreign Ministers, especially in London in 1945 and in Paris in 1946.[52] It is my

[50] SecState to Ambassador Bonnet, July 24, 1946, *FR* (1946), V, 582-84.

[51] Ambassador Bonnet to SecState, Aug. 30, 1946, *FR* (1946), V, 596-600. I have not had access to records that would, perhaps, document Byrnes's actual response.

[52] But see Eugene V. Rostow, "The Partition of Germany and the Unity of

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purpose, however, to show that the Stuttgart speech was not a hard-line anti-Soviet speech directed at Russia's policies in Germany. An item-by-item analysis of the speech will show this to be the case. Such an analysis cannot be presented here, but I should like to point out that the item usually singled out as most clearly meant for Soviet ears—the temporary nature of the Polish-German boundary—is nothing more than a commentary by Byrnes on the provisions of the Potsdam Agreement.[53] Byrnes, in fact, went even further than the Potsdam Agreement by *adding* a pledge of U.S. support for the final settlement of the boundary in Poland's favor. The real purpose of the Polish-German boundary discussion in the speech—as the context in which it is found shows and as Murphy intimates in his memoirs[54]—was to explain, justify, and soften for France the U.S. decision, which had already been made in Washington, to support French claims for annexation of the Saar, but not for separation of the Ruhr and the Rhineland. In the other section of the speech usually cited as being anti-Soviet in tone and intent, Byrnes dwelled on the failure of the Allied Control Council to establish central German economic administrations, and the consequences thereof, and listed the specific agencies he considered essential.[55] The inference is always made that Byrnes was accusing the Soviet Union of blocking the effort, but the evidence demolishes that inference as utterly without foundation.

V

Although cold-war historians have not generally recognized

Europe," *The Virginia Quarterly Review*, XXIII (1947), 18-33, for the argument that the proposals on Germany made by Molotov and Byrnes in 1946 were essentially the same, except for those on the Saar and except that each of them made a bid for German support for his own side.

[53] See especially, Feis, 158; Byrnes, 192; Badstübner, 229; and Klafkowski, 116, 138.

[54] Murphy, 302-03. Lloyd C. Gardner, *Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy 1941-1949* (Chicago, 1970), 254-55; and Walter Vogel, "Deutschland, Europa und die Umgestaltung der amerikanischen Sicherheitspolitik 1945-1949," *Vierteljahrshefte fuer Zeitgeschichte*, XIX (1971), 69, n. 16, have also understood Murphy's discussion in this way.

[55] See especially, Backer, 128; Binder, 195; and Frederick H. Hartmann, *Germany between East and West: The Reunification Problem* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1965), 40.

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France as the object of Byrnes's Stuttgart speech, the French government and the French public did so at the time.[56] The French press reacted most sharply and critically, and within three days of the speech, the French minister in Washington was at the State Department with the news that the French reception "had been extremely adverse," that Byrnes's promises did not satisfy France's security requirements, and that Bidault wanted to talk with Bevin and Molotov before he decided what he should do next.[57]

Torn between what he knew to be necessary for the successful implementation of the Potsdam Agreement, on the one hand, and the State Department's determination not to press France too hard, on the other; torn between the advice he got from Clay and the War Department and the advice he got from the State Department, Byrnes floundered badly. Later he muddied the waters for future researchers.[58] In a conversation with Bidault on September 23, 1946, Byrnes said he was disappointed by the adverse French response to his Stuttgart speech, and he observed that "he had not blamed France for holding up the establishment of Central Administrative Agencies though this was of course the fact." He also complained that Bidault had not made political use of the American proposal for a 25-40 year treaty, a treaty that "Clemenceau had failed to get from Wilson."[59] The significance of his complaint is further clarified by the record of French-American talks in Washington a day later. The Americans said "the French had not taken seriously our security offer, an offer which was revolutionary from the point of view of traditional American policy."[60] In an address before the American Club in Paris on October 3, 1946, Byrnes tried to allay French fears and to reduce the public clamor aroused by his visit to Germany, and in the hope that pretense might become reality, he revived the practice of pretending that agreement existed. He said he recognized French security needs, he referred to his pledge that the

[56] See *The New Statesman and Nation*, XXXII (Sept. 14, 1946), 181; for the observation that Byrnes had created unanimity in French opinion, from the right wing to the communists.

[57] Memorandum of conversation, Sept. 9, 1946, *FR* (1946), V, 603-04.

[58] See, for example, Byrnes, 193.

[59] Memorandum of conversation between Byrnes and Bidault, Sept. 24, 1946, *FR* (1946), V, 607-10, esp. 609.

[60] Memorandum of conversation, Sept. 24, 1946, *FR* (1946), V, 693-94.

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U.S. would remain in Europe, and—according to his memoirs—he "urged upon the French the value of our proposed forty-year treaty."[61] But the speech itself contains the remark that Bidault and Bevin had accepted the treaty in principle and that only the Soviets had not.[62] Until the records were published recently, curious historians could only wonder why the French needed more urging, since Bidault had already accepted in principle. Now we know that Britain had not given the proposal *serious* study[63] and that Bidault had only promised to study it further, then hedged in that promise with a discussion of French territorial claims and other things.[64] Nevertheless, no less a master than Herbert Feis—apparently relying on Byrnes—has written recently that before the Paris Conference of 1946 "Bevin and Bidault had said quickly that they would recommend acceptance, with minor amendments" and that at Paris "Bidault's response was favorable" and "Bevin was enthusiastic."[65] That, it may be suggested, is adequate testimony on how muddy the waters are.

Some of the reasons cold-war historians have been led astray in their interpretations of the Byrnes speech are implied in the discussion so far. But they are illustrated even more clearly by records of the so called Meader Committee's attempt late in 1946 to investigate the military government in Germany.[66] After hearing testimony in August 1946 about troop behavior, black marketeering, corruption, and other scandals from Colonel Francis P. Miller, an intelligence officer recently returned from Germany, the Meader Committee decided to investigate the military government. Truman and Acting Chairman Kilgore apparently

[61] Byrnes, 193.

[62] *Vital Speeches*, XIII (Oct. 15, 1946), 4.

[63] U. S. Delegation Record, Apr. 29, 1946, *FR* (1946), II, 169-70.

[64] Caffrey to SecState, Apr. 15, 1946, *FR* (1946), II, 56-58. See also, Andre Geraud, "Can France Again be a Great Power?" *Foreign Affairs*, XXVI (Oct. 1947), 32, for the French view that "to quote as an alternative to international control the four-Power treaty of guarantee offered by Mr. Byrnes last year is to shirk the real issue." Vandenberg, in his report to the Senate on the Paris meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, said that the treaty "seems to attract relatively little interest"; *Vital Speeches*, XII (Aug. 1, 1946), 618.

[65] Feis, 130-31.

[66] The committee was the U.S. Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense. Its chairman in 1946 was James M. Mead of New York, who resigned on September 26, 1946; Harley M. Kilgore of West Virginia became acting chairman. It was popularly called the Meader Committee, after George Meader, its chief counsel.

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reached an understanding that the committee would not go into the question of four-power cooperation in Germany, but George Meader probed to that depth very quickly. The State Department (and apparently the White House) tried to stop him, and that effort led to some rather revealing exchanges. Meader interviewed Byrnes in Paris in October 1946 and came away "amazed that he would say that we did not dare to tell the people the truth because it would be distorted by the Russians, playing upon the people's fears."[67] Among other things, Byrnes told Meader that the chief problem of the occupation in Germany was the failure to achieve economic unity and that France had been the major obstacle. But he warned of possible disastrous political consequences in France, should the committee conduct a public investigation of that subject.

The basis for the State Department's objection to the Meader Committee investigation was revealed in broader scope by John H. Hilldring less than two weeks later. Hilldring was in a position to know. He had been the director of the War Department's Civil Affairs Division until early in 1946, when he moved over to the Department of State to become assistant secretary of state for occupied areas. Explaining to a Meader staff member why the committee should drop its investigation of four-power relationships in Germany, Hilldring reportedly said that one of the first things the committee would learn was that the German economy was suffering mainly because the occupation authorities had shipped to France "every extra ton of coal" mined in Germany. Hilldring implied that this was being done as a result of a policy decision on the "highest levels" to restore the French economy and thus prevent the Communist party from gaining control in the French parliament. He said that if the committee investigated the matter in public, it would embarrass the president and the U.S. government.[68] Three days later Hilldring wrote Meader person-

[67] George Meader, Memorandum of conversation with James Byrnes in Paris, Oct. 13, 1946, NA, RG 46, SEN 79A-F30, National Defense Committee, OP-58, Box 1010. Historians might also be surprised by Byrnes's remarks, if they previously took seriously the chapter of his memoirs in which he discourses at length on the need to build a people's foreign policy and concludes with: "Let there be light—and lots of it!"; Byrnes, chap. 12 and p. 256.

[68] Memorandum, [Wilbur D.] Sparks to Meader, Oct. 25, 1946, NA, RG 46, SEN 79A-F30, National Defense Committee, OP-58, Box 994.

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ally: "I know you will be aware of the international political problems presented by the agreement to invite France to participate in the occupation of Germany. It is the understanding of the Department that political questions of this sort were not to be inquired into by the Committee. . . ."[69]

The records and the circumstances of the Meader Committee's attempted investigation point toward what appears to have been a longstanding State Department objective: to accommodate France's economic and political recovery and, if necessary, to conceal or minimize the fact of French obstruction in Germany in the interests of that policy. Byrnes's Stuttgart speech—though its references to France and French policy were veiled, indirect, and sometimes cryptic—was one of the few times a member of the U.S. government broke ranks and tried to expose the issues as they related to Germany and the implementation of the Potsdam Agreement, rather than as they related to France, French recovery, and the State Department's priority. The French press and the French government immediately recognized the speech for what it was and reacted accordingly. The American press and public—perhaps distracted by the Wallace incident at home—did not, and neither have cold-war historians. In any case, Byrnes's "mistake" was not to be repeated again.

VI

As 1946 came to a close and 1947 began, a perceptible change took place in the explanations offered for the German problem. What authoritative observers had previously denied directly or implicitly and what a few had only suspected or hinted at in 1946 —except, of course, for George Kennan and others—became asserted truth in 1947 and later: Russia was responsible for the breakdown of four-power cooperation in Germany and for the failure to implement the Potsdam Agreement. France was off the hook. The development of such a switch—like the development of any idea—is perhaps impossible to trace with precision, but it seems fairly certain that it was affected by the French response to the Byrnes speech, by the congressional elections of November 1946, by the existence of a Republican Congress anxious to

[69] Hildring to Meader, Oct. 28, 1946, *ibid.*, Box 1011.

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assert itself, by the U.S. decision to sponsor a European recovery program and the Russian decision not to participate on U.S. terms, and by the public debates on the Truman Doctrine, Interim Aid for Europe, and the Marshall Plan.

Edwin Pauley, Truman's personal representative for reparations since early 1945; John H. Hilldring, the assistant secretary of state for occupied areas; and Howard C. Petersen, the assistant secretary of the army responsible for occupied areas, each illustrated the switch in his own fashion. In late 1946, Pauley wrote that the failure to treat Germany as an economic unit had been a problem, but that "a far more serious breach of the spirit, if not the letter, of the Protocol lies in the decision of Soviet Russia . . . to collect reparations from current production."[70] By February 12, 1947, in a remarkably cogent analysis of the German reparations issue and a defense of the Potsdam reparations settlement before the National Press Club in Washington, Pauley failed to mention what Murphy had once called the "French sabotage of the Potsdam decision" and concluded that the reason for the lack of progress was "the delay that has been experienced in persuading our Soviet friends to accept the principle—agreed by all at Potsdam—that Germany should be operated as an economic unit."[71] Hilldring, who had told the Meader Committee otherwise late in October 1946, explained to the House Appropriations Committee in February 1947 that the delays in German economic development were caused by "the disinclination of the Soviets to live up to the agreement [on economic cooperation] in Germany."[72] Howard C. Petersen gave similar testimony at the same hearing, and in June, he reversed the position he had taken a year earlier in his speech in Columbus, Ohio, when he told a Senate committee that "the main stumbling block [to currency reform in Germany] has been that the Soviets are unwilling to agree to a central administrative agency. . . ."[73]

[70] Edwin W. Pauley, "Reparations and World War III," *The American Mercury*, LXIII (1946), 654-60, esp. 658.

[71] U.S. House, *Congressional Record*, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., Feb. 17, 1947, pp. A558-60.

[72] U.S. House, Committee on Appropriations, *Hearings . . . on First Deficiency . . . for 1947*, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., Feb. 25, 1947, p. 761.

[73] U.S. Senate, *Occupation Currency Transactions. Hearings before the Committee on Appropriations, Armed Services, and Banking and Currency*, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., June 1947, p. 28.

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Secretary of State George C. Marshall expressed himself in similar fashion for the first time in April 1947, and the new viewpoints soon became commonplace. On returning from the Moscow Conference, Marshall told the American people in a radio address that "the unwillingness of the Soviet authorities to cooperate in establishing a balanced economy for Germany as agreed upon at Potsdam has been the most serious check on the development of a self-supporting Germany." He said, further, that the Soviet attack on the amalgamation of the British and American zones as a violation of the Potsdam Agreement and as a step in the division of Germany ignored "the plain fact that [Russian] refusal to carry out that agreement was the sole cause of the merger."[74] George Kennan, now in a position to act on German affairs rather than to protest about them from Moscow, said on May 6, 1947 that the Russians had refused to agree to restore the German economy and that "we cannot wait for Russian agreement to achieve that restoration."[75] Edward S. Mason, one of Marshall's advisers at the Moscow Conference, wrote during the summer of 1947 that "at Moscow the Soviet Government in effect repudiated Potsdam," leaving his readers to infer that no serious problems existed before.[76] In September, the State Department released to the press a recent note to the Soviet Union saying, in part, that the revised bizonal level of industry was needed to relieve the heavy financial burden of the occupation borne by the U.S. and caused by "the failure of the Soviet Government to implement the Berlin Agreement."[77] The State Department also prepared for the Herter Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee a report which, among many other things, reportedly charged the Russians with being "the principal obstructions" in Berlin and with "blocking the treatment of Germany as an economic whole."[78]

As the nation and the Congress debated the Marshall Plan for

[74] U.S. Dept. of State, *Germany, 1947-1949*, 57-63, esp. 59.

[75] George F. Kennan, *Memoirs, 1925-1950* (Boston, 1967), 333-35.

[76] Edward S. Mason, "Reflections on the Moscow Conference," *International Organization*, I (1947), 475-87, esp. 481. Mason protected himself by referring to the agreement of the "signatory powers" at Potsdam, and he thus reveals even more clearly to the historian how deliberate the distortion was.

[77] U.S. Dept. of State, *Bulletin*, XVII (Sept. 14, 1947), 530-31.

[78] According to Raymond J. Blair in *Washington Post*, Sept. 7, 1947, Truman Library, DNC Clippings, Box 157.

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European economic recovery, the idea that Russia had blocked progress in Germany and in Europe apparently became fixed permanently. Marshall testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in November, saying "the war ended with the armies of the major allies meeting in the heart of [the European community of nations]. The policies of three of them have been directed to the restoration of that European community. It is now clear that only one power, the Soviet Union, does not for its own reasons share this aim."[79] It might be observed that France—one of the three—was thus transformed by Marshall from the negative, obstructionist power it had been in the fall of 1946 in Germany (which Marshall and others repeatedly described as the *key* to European recovery) into a positive force in the restoration of the European community. Senator Arthur Vandenberg, speaking on the Senate floor in December in opposition to an attempt to stop by congressional action the dismantling of factories in Germany, protested nevertheless that "it does not disturb me in the slightest that this would be a unilateral breach of the Potsdam agreement, because in my book the Potsdam agreement was breached long ago by Soviet Russia. . . . I think the Potsdam agreement became a scrap of paper a long time ago as a result of Soviet repudiation of many of its obligations."[80] Vandenberg, it might be observed, had been in Paris and in Stuttgart with Byrnes in September 1946. He had also conferred frequently—both personally and as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—with Marshall after the latter's speech at Harvard University in June 1947. On January 5, 1948, Charles E. Bohlen told a Wisconsin audience that "the Soviet Union, at first by devious means and later openly," had blocked the revival of Europe, which the Western democracies had sought.[81] Later in January, Marshall told an audience of businessmen in Pittsburgh that "the refusal of the Soviets to cooperate in establishing a unified economy for Germany invalidated the level of industry and reparation calculations made at Potsdam." [82] A day earlier, Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall had testified in the Senate Foreign Relations

[79] U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Hearings . . . Emergency Foreign Aid*, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., Nov. 10, 1947, p. 3.

[80] U.S. Senate, *Congressional Record*, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., Dec. 19, 1947, pp. 11680, 11682.

[81] U.S. Dept. of State, *Bulletin*, XVIII (Jan. 18, 1948), 78-82, esp. 79.

[82] George C. Marshall, "The Stake of the Businessman in the European Re-

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Committee that "the Soviets have prevented economic and political unity with the western zones."[83] State Department notes to the Soviet Union in February and March 1948—both published at the time—continued to stress Soviet responsibility for the failure to treat Germany as an economic unit.[84] The assistant secretary of state for economic affairs, Willard L. Thorp, repeated the idea in the *New York Herald Tribune Forum* on March 6, 1948,[85] and Charles E. Saltzman, the assistant secretary of state for occupied areas, wrote in July 1948 that Soviet obstructionism caused the failure of Potsdam.[86] The list could be extended on and on, but the point is made. It is perhaps sufficient to note here that not even General Clay was immune to the trend of the times. On January 22, 1948, he told a committee of the House:

> It became evident at the very early stages in the game that our objectives in Germany were considerably different from some of those of the other occupying powers. The result was that everything conducive to constructive government presented to the Allied Council was blocked by representatives of the Soviet Government, so that operations under the quadripartite agreement for Germany have been impossible.[87]

Though one detects in the first sentence a veiled reference to his recollection of the many problems he had had with France, Clay nevertheless singled out the Soviet Union as the troublemaker, as was the custom.

It would be tedious, and it is unnecessary, to go into greater detail than I did in the opening paragraphs to explain how writings on the cold war have for some twenty years reflected and responded to the official American position toward the Soviet Union. Except for the recent contributions of three German historians, Walter Vogel, Thilo Vogelsang, and Ernst Deuerlein, all

covery Program," Speech delivered before the Pittsburgh Chamber of Commerce, Jan. 15, 1948, Truman Library, Holland Papers (Marshall Plan).

[83] U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings . . . European Economic Recovery, 1948*, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., Jan. 14, 1948, p. 445.

[84] U.S. Dept. of State, *Bulletin*, XVIII (Feb. 29, 1948), 286; (Apr. 4, 1948), 457-59.

[85] *Ibid.*, XVIII (Mar. 14, 1948), 354.

[86] Charles E. Saltzman, "The Problem of German Recovery," *The Annals*, CCLVIII (1948), 74-78.

[87] U.S. House, Committee on Appropriations, *Hearings before the Subcommittee . . . on First Deficiency Appropriation Bill for 1948*, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., Jan. 22, 1948, p. 573.

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of whom recognize French obstruction as a significant stumbling block to Allied cooperation in Germany and assign to that fact its proper meaning, historians continue to repeat the cold-war debate in all its flavor.[88] Among the more recent examples is John Backer, who writes that "there were many indications that the Soviet Union had no intention of living up to [the Potsdam agreements on economic unity and central administrations] in the foreseeable future."[89] Another recent example is Wolfgang Schlauch, who argues that the U.S. changed economic course as early as December 1945 to permit German recovery. He writes:

> Moscow's unbending attitude at Allied conferences, its determination to prevent Germany from being treated as a genuine economic unit, and to bring the Soviet zone within its satellite system, above all, the realization by the United States that a restored Germany was essential not only for the economic restoration of Western Europe but also for inhibiting the spread of communism, necessitated a policy revision.[90]

A final example is Lloyd C. Gardner, who—in the fashion of the revisionists—relies heavily upon the rich materials of the cold-war debate, but tends to regard them as jaundiced—jaundiced not so much because they are unhistorical, but because they cover up the more fundamental American counterrevolutionary goals that antedated the cold war in Germany and in the world.[91]

Perhaps most interesting to historians, and more significant for their illustration of how deeply cold-war assumptions and the cold-war mentality pervade scholarship, are those researchers who have discovered the unhistorical nature of certain facets of the cold-war debate, but who are unable or unwilling to relate their findings to their conclusions. One recent example is Jens Hacker, who discusses the French vetoes in the Control Council, then dismisses them with the assertion that the Soviets would have used the central administrations for their own purposes any-

[88] Vogel, 64-82; Thilo Vogelsang, "Die Bemuehungen um eine deutsche Zentralverwaltung, 1945/46," *Vierteljahrshefte fuer Zeitgeschichte*, XVIII (1970), 510-28; and Ernst Deuerlein, "Frankreichs Obstruktion deutscher Zentralverwaltungen 1945," *Deutschland-Archiv*, IV (1971), 466-91.

[89] Backer, 129-30.

[90] Schlauch, 128.

[91] Gardner, "America and the German 'Problem,'" 113, 146. I have discussed Gardner's treatment of the German occupation more fully in "Cold War: German Front," *The Maryland Historian*, II (1971), 41-55.

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way.[92] Another is Robert Cecil, who questions the validity of assertions such as Hacker's, but writes, nevertheless, that "French intransigence . . . had the . . . ill effect of contributing to worsening relations between the Americans and the Russians, who mistakenly believed they knew a satellite when they saw one."[93] Then there is Gardner, who recognizes the French role in Germany and even notes in passing that the Byrnes speech also had a French focus. Nevertheless, he constructs his analysis of the issues in the familiar terms of the cold-war contest between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, between East and West. He notes that Americans exerted pressure on France to cooperate on central administrations, "but if a split did develop with Russia over reparations it was important to keep Britain and France in line with American policy," which Gardner assumes to have been in opposition to the Potsdam Agreement.[94] France's early German policy is thus comparable to the pathetic maneuverings of a small rabbit that is pursued and eventually eaten by the eagle. A last, precious example for the purposes of this paper is from Herbert Feis: "France's refusal to permit central economic agencies to operate, France's restrictions on trade between its zone and others, and France's requisitions of German products, *gave the Russians a reason, which they did not need,* for defending their refusal to allow exports from the East zone to the West."[95] Feis implies that France was unnecessary to Russia's large policy; Gardner implies that France was but an early nuisance to America's larger policy; both imply that what we know about France may add some new and interesting facets, but that these do not change the basic history of the cold war waged by the United States and the Soviet Union in Germany. This article suggests otherwise.

[92] Jens Hacker, *Sowjetunion und DDR zum Potsdamer Abkommen* (Köln, 1969), 126. The idea has a long history in the literature of the American occupation. Clay, 40, mentions it as a French idea. But see Tilman Pünder, *Das Bizonale Interregnum: Die Geschichte des Vereinigten Wirtschaftsgebiets, 1946-1949* (Waiblingen, 1966), 54-55, for the observation that the question of Russian intent must remain open, since French vetoes made it unnecessary for the Soviets to take a position.

[93] Robert Cecil, "Potsdam and its Legends," *International Affairs* (London), XLVI (1970), 460.

[94] Gardner, "America and the German 'Problem,' " 129.

[95] Feis, 58-59 (emphasis added).

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On the Two Diverging-Sector Model of Social Development

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A very old Egyptian proverb has it that "Egypt is the mother of the world"; but then, as Oscar Wilde pointed out, "All women become like their mothers. That is their tragedy." The hypothesis put forward here is that ancient Egypt represents the social pattern toward which the contemporary world is moving. More precisely, it represents the earliest and clearest example of the two diverging-sector society.

Sector *E* represents the everyday world and is the one that immediately strikes the visitor: the poor hygiene, the slums, the dirty streets, the broken pavements. There is nothing peculiar to Egypt in all this; it shares these symptoms with other underdeveloped parts of the world. But the other sector, *T*, is represented by that marvel of technology and engineering, the pyramids, man's earliest, most grandiose, and probably most durable large-scale artifact.

Today the advanced part of the world, led by its most technologically and economically developed society, the United States, is following the ancient Egyptian model. The *E* sector is steadily deteriorating: witness the increasingly dirty streets and spreading potholes, the declining hygienic standards, the creeping slums, the shoddy buildings, the power blackouts and water shortages, and the paralyzed public transport of New York and

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other large cities. The T sector, on the other hand, registers a continuous and dazzlingly rapid advance: the splitting of the atom is followed by the cracking of the genetic code, the computer explosion, the supersonic planes, and the spaceships that carry men to the moon and back, right on schedule. The diverging growth paths traced by the two sectors can be expressed in the following formulas:

$$(1) \quad T_t = T_o\,(1 + r)^t \quad \text{where } r > 0$$
$$(2) \quad E_t = E_o\,(1 + s)^t \quad \text{where } 0 < s > -1$$

(The subscripts t and o denote later and earlier periods, respectively, and r and s are growth rates.)

The model is subject to the constraint that while $T \times r$ may exceed $E \times s$ it can do so by only a very small amount.

The interrelationship between the sectors can be shown by the following simplified matrix; the figures used are, of course, purely illustrative:

		Used by T	Used by E
Supplied by	T	5	1
	E	5	10

This matrix brings out the fact that the T sector draws very heavily on the E sector as well as on itself: it needs manpower, scarce skills, and high quality materials that have to be supplied by specialized branches in the E sector in addition to those provided by one subsector of T to another. In the table, T receives 5 units from E and another 5 from itself and supplies E with only 1; conversely, E receives 1 from T and 10 from itself and supplies T with 5.

Returning to history, we learn from Herodotus that "One hundred thousand men labored constantly, and were relieved every three months by a fresh lot" on the Great Pyramid,[1] and from the estimates of an American civil engineer that the total labor

[1] Herodotus, *Persian Wars*, Book II, Chap. 124. If we assume that in the fourth millenium BC, Egypt had a population of 2 million (as compared to 7-8 million in the first century AD and 3-3.5 million in 1800) and that the labor force was, therefore, about 700,000, the Great Pyramid occupied about one-seventh of the total labor force.

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put into that pyramid was 1.2 billion man-hours.[2] One can also safely assume that Egypt's very best engineers, architects, and administrators worked on the project. And there is no need to enumerate the skills and resources absorbed by the *T* sector in the United States.

Of course, the process is not unidirectional. Techniques learned in the building of the pyramids no doubt helped develop irrigation and other construction work. And who will say that, in the United States, there has been no spin-off or fallout or technological transfer from the *T* to the *E* sector? But the two formulas and the table show clearly both the widening gap between the sectors and the main direction of the flow of resources between them. Whether we shall derive from our *T* sector as much spiritual comfort and foreign exchange as Egypt has from its pyramids, only time can tell.

[2] *New York Times*, Oct. 5, 1952. Assuming that each man worked for 2,000 hours a year, 100,000 men would have completed the Great Pyramid in six years. Herodotus says it took twenty years, but one must allow for interruptions and disorganization.

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Book Reviews

China & Russia: The "Great Game" *by O. Edmund Clubb. New York, Columbia University Press, 1971.—xii, 578 pp. $12.95.*

Few areas of Soviet policy have been subjected to such sparse scholarly examination as that of relations with China. Even in comparatively recent years with the rapid expansion of polemics between the two Communist regimes, the rise in mutual tensions, the border clashes of 1969, and the increasing impact upon the world balance of the Sino-Soviet split, most Sino-Soviet studies have been ephemeral in nature and have tended to concentrate (without great success) on the evolution of polemics between the Communist parties of the two states, without serious study of the manner in which Russia and China have interacted in the past quarter-millenium.

It is in my opinion quite impossible to grasp either the depth or the breadth of the present Sino-Soviet crisis without careful examination of the lengthy history of interaction between the two peoples, a process which has been continuous and marked by repeated violent eruptions since a minor encounter of Cossacks and Manchus along the Amur in the mid-1640s.

The great service of Mr. Clubb's study is that it presents in one continuous narrative an excellent and concise summary of the relations of the two countries with, of course, considerable emphasis on the origins of the present sharply exacerbated quarrel. Because of Mr. Clubb's natural emphasis on governmental relations, some parts of the picture are necessarily skimped—in particular the tortured course of conflict within the

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Communist movement, the frequent clashes over doctrine and tactics between Mao Tse-tung and his group and the Russian-oriented members of the party. Without more of this background, the Russian decision, for example, to channel aid to China in the late 1930s exclusively through Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist government; the significance of Stalin's efforts at the end of 1945 and early in 1946 to work out a deal with Chiang Kai-shek which would, in effect, have given the Nationalists and the Soviets a condominium in Manchuria; and, indeed, Stalin's effort to persuade the Chinese Communists to join Chiang Kai-shek in a coalition government (not mentioned by Mr. Clubb) can not be seen in appropriate perspective.

Mr. Clubb suggests that the Korean war came as no surprise to Peking. He may be right, but it is worth noting that in the past two or three years there have been frequent statements by Chinese officials suggesting that they were not apprised of the fact that war was about to break out and that, in fact, the war was instigated by the Russians with hostile intent so far as China was concerned, that the Russians employed the war as a device, among other things, to impair the prospects of the U.S. and China entering into normal relations.

Much light on the reality, as opposed to the appearance, of Sino-Soviet relations was cast by the polemics between Khrushchev and the Chinese. Not all of these revelations have been utilized in this study. For example, there is no mention of Khrushchev's critical revelation that had it not been for the intense hostility of the United States, Russia and China would have broken at the time of Mao's coming into power or during the Mao-Stalin negotiations of 1949-50 because of Stalin's overbearing treatment of the Chinese and his insistence upon relegating to them a quasi-colonial status. Premier Tsedenbal's statement to me that immediately on coming to power Mao demanded of Stalin that Outer Mongolia be returned to the Chinese sphere of interest also has a bearing on the inward nature of Sino-Soviet relations from the very moment of Mao's proclamation of his regime on October 1, 1949.

The events of 1971-72, the great gambit of President Nixon and his successful visit to Peking, suggest that the intense danger of triple confrontation in Asia, remarked by Mr. Clubb, may now for some time recede. It would appear that rather than opting, as he was inclined to anticipate, for a gradual and modified rapprochement with Moscow, the Chinese leadership has embarked on the more complex but possibly more rewarding course of a modified rapprochement with the United States. Should this rapprochement prove stable, there would clearly arise on the Asian mainland an entirely new balance of power in which not only

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would the long Sino-Soviet frontier be affected but such states as Japan and India would clearly be compelled to reconsider their present alignments.

It may well be that we now stand on the threshold of a whole new epoch in Chinese and Russian relations which will require even more intensive examination of antecedents, particularly those pertinent to the emerging triangle U.S.-China-USSR.

HARRISON E. SALISBURY
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The Struggle for the Middle East: The Soviet Union in the Mediterranean, 1958-1968 *by Walter Laqueur. New York, The Macmillan Company, under the auspices of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1969.—viii, 360 pp. $7.95.*

Soviet Russia and the Middle East *by Aaron S. Klieman. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970.—vi, 107 pp. $2.45.*

In September 1955, in a marked departure from Stalin's earlier position, his successors embarked upon a policy of active involvement in the affairs of the Arab East and, subsequently, of Turkey and Iran. It could have been expected that this dramatic shift would receive a great deal of scholarly attention in the West, for it affected a region which was regarded as vital in the cold-war competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. Surprisingly, however, this was not the case. Only a handful of Western scholars established expertise in the field of Moscow's relations with Middle Eastern countries and Walter Laqueur, director of the Institutute of Contemporary History in London, occupies a prominent place in their ranks. His latest book represents an effort to update earlier works and, like the monograph by Aaron Klieman of Tel Aviv University, constitutes a new attempt to shed light on the intricacies of the Soviet position in the Middle East.

Among the cardinal issues to which both authors address themselves are: the problem of the importance of the Middle East in international politics and the related problem of Soviet motivations in that region. They differ in their conclusions and, in so doing, underscore the prevailing division of scholarly opinion on these issues. To illustrate: Klieman argues that "a strong position in the Arab world has become of primary importance for Soviet strategic, economic and foreign policies, and it will

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be safeguarded . . . whether against Israel, the United States . . . or against the Arabs themselves" (p. v).

These are strong words and one may legitimately wonder why the USSR should wish to cling to its positions against the possible opposition of all the other participants in Middle Eastern affairs. According to Klieman, "much of the answer lies in the fact that this region, more than any other from the contemporary global perspective, has a commanding geopolitical position" (p. 24). He cites such traditionally emphasized factors as the area's oil resources, the Suez Canal, and "internal sea lanes, land routes, and air corridors [which] form a transportation grid linking Europe with the unexploited Asian and African continents." Barring a major war between the superpowers, "control of this grid enables any nation to demonstrate the credibility of its power before any ally, antagonist, or neutral party" (p. 25).

Laqueur disagrees. To him the Middle East is no longer "intrinsically one of the most important areas in world affairs. It has long ceased to be a crossroads, its military bases are no longer needed, it has no important natural resources other than oil, but there is no lack of oil elsewhere in the world" (pp. 3-4). For this reason, the USSR has become involved in the affairs of the Middle East "not because it is intrinsically important, but because it is so weak" (p. 4). Laqueur's arguments are definitely more persuasive, for Klieman's thesis is based on the assumption that the advent of nuclear weapons and sophisticated means of delivery have not significantly affected the traditional "geo-political" role of the Middle East in world affairs.

What were some of Moscow's motives for embarking upon and persisting in the course of active participation in the affairs of the highly volatile and politically unstable Middle East? According to Klieman, "superpower status implies, no less than thermonuclear strength, an ability to affect events and decisions in any part of the globe" (p. 25). In the light of the American experience in Vietnam, this proposition must be rejected as untenable. In addition, Klieman notes, "neutralization, amity, an explicit client relationship, or ultimately direct control, all contribute to the defensive security and economic progress of the Russian homeland" (p. 86). Since no one, except the United States and, possibly, China, can seriously challenge Soviet security and since none of the above items constitute a defense against sophisticated nuclear delivery systems, these assumptions, too, are rather questionable.

On the surface, Laqueur's explanation appears more plausible. Having moved into the Middle East for what at the time were considered valid strategic, political, and economic reasons, the USSR could not later re-

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treat for fear of losing prestige and exposing weakness vis-à-vis the United States. Moreover, "the Soviet leaders still feel they have to expand their sphere of influence . . . empire building is a self-generating business" (p. 187). Laqueur is right in noting that extrication from burdensome international involvements is no mean task—the agony of U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam amply illustrates that. It is not, however, an impossible task; it simply requires statesmanship of a high order.

It would thus appear that few valid rational reasons can be cited in support of the continuation of Moscow's large-scale involvement in the Middle East. Nevertheless, having maneuvered himself into a situation where a retreat would unquestionably constitute a most serious political setback, Brezhnev, both authors feel, may be expected to adhere to his "adventurist" policy.

OLES M. SMOLANSKY
Lehigh University

Integration and Disintegration in NATO: Processes of Alliance Cohesion and Prospects for Atlantic Community *by Francis A. Beer. Columbus, Ohio State University Press, 1970.—xii, 330 pp. $10.00.*

NATO: The Transatlantic Bargain *by Harlan Cleveland. New York, Harper & Row, 1970.—204 pp. $6.95.*

These two works on Nato present an interesting contrast in several ways. One is by an outsider looking in, wearing his academic spectacles. The other is by an insider, a practitioner, who clearly enunciates his intention to write a policy-oriented book, not a research monograph. For the latter, Harlan Cleveland, who was the United States permanent representative to the North Atlantic Council from 1965 to 1969, the glass is half full and gradually filling further, while to the young functionalist scholar, Professor Francis Beer, it is half empty and getting emptier.

The American ambassador (now president of the University of Hawaii) intended to write, not about a grand design, "but about a series of tough-minded bargains arrived at through a process called consultation" (p. ix). For him NATO is a regional security system, a "relationship best seen as *a strong presumption of cooperation in the event of trouble*—or in the event of negotiations that affect all the members" (p. 10, his italics). He recognizes that the reasons for acting together may be different for different members and for different times, but that there are almost always advantages. Thus he concentrates on the process of

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political consultation and in doing so gives the most detailed information to date on that elusive and usually unpublicized activity in NATO.

Professor Beer, on the other hand, holds NATO up to a model of an emerging supranational organization and finds it falling short in almost every respect. At the same time he tends to reify NATO and to personify something called NATO's leadership or (at the end of the book) NATO's leader, which must sound unreal to those who have been intimately involved in the multifaceted "relationship" having the shorthand name of "NATO." Judging the achievements of NATO in such functionalist terms as "authority," "legitimacy," and "spill-over," he concludes as he starts, that NATO touches the most sensitive, most political aspects of its members' concerns and that the looked-for integration has not, for the most part, occurred. True, he admits that NATO can be credited with such "useful services" as providing a "link in the bilateral and multilateral system of international communication" and has successfully signaled to the Soviet Union the allies' intent to defend themselves against attack. One wonders whether an expanding organization or its existing, manifest functions are more highly valued.

This approach seems wooden, probably inevitably so, compared to the narrative of one who has been an enthusiastic participant. Although Professor Beer declared his intention to analyze a *process*, the subsequent chapters tend more to concentrate on structure. Thus his discussion of consultation tells us far less about how it works than Cleveland's chapter on what is presumably the same subject. The reason may be that for the functionalist, the triumph of the technical expert over the politician is implicitly good, while the representative of the United States government will give priority to the political aspects of NATO. However, the two authors are in substantial agreement that a notable failure in NATO has been the missed opportunities for more coordinated arms production and logistics. And both of them—for different reasons—give bad marks to the members for not expanding NATO's concerns beyond its treaty limits. This self-constraint may, contrary to their views, be one of the reasons for NATO's secret sources of strength.

It is risky to write about an organization which has indeed changed over time and not always in the direction of disintegration. Professor Beer's manuscript must have been substantially finished prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, for he mentions the event only twice and without evaluation. Cleveland, on the other hand, gives a vivid account of its impact on NATO, an impact which may not prove in the end to have caused as dramatic a change in the members' perspectives as appeared at the time, but which did produce closer cooperation in foreign policy. Nor does Professor Beer pay much atten-

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tion to what has become a main preoccupation of NATO, the promotion of detente, a subject which figures very largely in Mr. Cleveland's book.

If the reader interested in NATO and multiateral diplomacy wants to be told "how it really was" inside the organization, he will get valuable insights from Cleveland. If he wants to have an analysis of a "failure" in integration, Beer has provided such information, most of it accurate.

ANNETTE BAKER FOX
Columbia University

The End of Glory: An Interpretation of the Origins of World War II *by Laurence Lafore. Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott Company, 1970.—vii, 280 pp. $5.95.*

"It is the oddest and most basic issue of the Second World War that it was made possible by the extreme timidity of the very kinds of people whose bellicosity had caused the first." This quotation sums up the author's thesis in this brief but perceptive review and analysis of the oft-told story of the twenty-year truce that separates the two world wars. For those wars constitute a unit, two stages in the transition from the age of Europe's dominance of the world to the present condition.

The most significant occurrences of the First World War were the Russian Revolution and the American intervention; Britain was no longer the arbitral, peripheral power, that role having passed overseas. But the ensuing Russian chaos and America's failure to acknowledge the implications of American power obscured reality. Britain and France, suicidally at odds, strove to make the pre-1914 system function. For a brief period, the second half of the twenties, it was even possible to entertain the illusion that success had crowned the endeavor. But Locarno, and the spirit of Locarno, were illusions that the advent of economic crisis effectively dispelled: "In the 1930s, the procedures and agencies through which authority had been exercised and order maintained in the world for four hundred years stopped working" and "the traditional forms of international relations were lifeless."

The quandary of France, ending in her abdication, and the inept British policy of appeasement were the concrete manifestations of Europe's illness. Those countries' efforts to save the peace contributed to its termination, and when it came to the final test, they "were rescued by the English Channel and the power of Russia and America." Yet, in the last analysis, Hitler, apparently so different, committed a similar mistake.

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His insane ambition "was, as much as the formalism of Daladier and Chamberlain or the chivalry of Churchill and de Gaulle, an epilogue to a long millennium."

It is possible to take issue with some judgments in this book: a somewhat flippant appraisal of Mussolini, an insufficient emphasis on the difficulties of Barthou's attempt to reassert French leadership in organizing Europe. These are minor points in a balanced treatment. One cannot resist the temptation to point out that a comparable tale is currently unfolding, the issue of whether the superpowers that have emerged from the two world wars will show a better apprehension of their responsibilities than their predecessors in the seats of power. But a longer perspective is needed before a similar assessment is possible.

René Albrecht-Carrié
Rockford College

Organized Complexity: Empirical Theories of Political Development *by Ronald D. Brunner and Garry D. Brewer. New York, The Free Press, 1971.—xvii, 190 pp. $7.00.*

Brunner and Brewer have developed a methodologically ambitious model for relating economic change to popular political support for governments in developing areas subject to the discipline of democratic elections. The model gets at popular support by breaking the society into urban and rural sectors and examining changes in urban and rural product on an annual basis, against a background of changes in gross national product, total government expenditures, and the allocation of those expenditures to the two sectors. Their central proposition is: "Support for the government increases when the rate of change of per capita consumption exceeds the expected rate. Support for the government decreases when the rate of change of per capita consumption falls below the expected rate" (p. 19). They then modify the starkness of their hypothesis by reference to the possibility of different political reactions to similar marginal changes in per capita consumption, the degree to which the political process penetrates into the society, the degree of political participation, and the size of "committed reservoirs of support in each sector" relatively insensitive to short-run changes in per capita consumption.

The model is then applied to the political vicissitudes of Turkey from 1950 to 1960 and the Philippines from 1951 to 1961. In Turkey, we are dealing with the political consequences of the 1954 sharp decline in GNP (and, especially, in rural output and income), its sluggish subsequent recovery, and with the consequent decline in support for the Democratic

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party in the election of 1957; in the Philippines, with the post-Magsaysay weakening of the Nacionalista party and its defeat in 1961 by Macapagal and the Liberals.

The authors isolate with clarity the extent to which the model succeeds and fails to "explain" the election returns. In the case of the Turkish elections of 1954 and 1957, the direction of the model's movement is right; but it underestimates the degree of support in the first case and overestimates in the second. In the case of the Philippines, the model again underestimates the size of the fluctuations. The model is then used to measure the sensitivity of the standard of living and support for the government to birth control programs, austerity programs, changes in urban tax policy, and shifts in political priority (resource allocations) in favor of each of the two sectors.

This imaginative exercise in method is beset by a good many limitations, which the authors detail. Among them are some severe weaknesses in the basic data. The most profound weakness, however, is in the basic concept. Surely, in democratic societies—whether advanced or developing—short-run changes in per capita consumption have their consequences at the polls; and these have been recognized from, say, the occasion in 1833 when William Mathews observed to a parliamentary commission that "you cannot get them to talk politics so long as they are well employed" to Mr. Nixon's chapter on the campaign of 1960 in his *Six Crises*. Many years ago, in *British Economy of the Nineteenth Century* (Oxford, 1948, Chap. V), I produced a "Social Tension Chart" for Britain in the years 1790-1850 by uniting an index of business cycles and the wheat price, which reflected quite accurately the well known periods of unrest in those years. But the political process is seized, at any moment in time, of longer-run issues as well. The banners raised at Peterloo in 1819 reflected not only the cry of cyclical depression ("A fair-day's wages for a fair-day's work") but also demands for repeal of the Corn Laws and electoral reform ("Equal Representation or Death"). These longer-run structural questions—for which there are equivalents in almost every democratic election—cannot safely be ignored; nor can the personalities of the candidates; nor can the question of inflation, with which the Brunner-Brewer model does not adequately deal.

Moreover, the model does not capture one of the most fundamental dilemmas of a political leader in a developing nation: the choice between investment (and future standards of living) and current allocations to urban or rural consumption. It is a subtle dilemma, because certain kinds of investment are recognized by the electorate as of value to them even before they yield their pay-off in higher output and consumption.

I share the authors' respect for the concept of "organized complexity"

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developed by Warren Weaver; and model-building related closely to empirical data is, surely, important intellectual business. But their model requires quite a lot more complexity before it can successfully grip the important set of relations they have chosen to explore.

W. W. ROSTOW
University of Texas at Austin

Socialist Management and Planning: Topics in Comparative Socialist Economics *by Nicolas Spulber. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1971.—xviii, 235 pp. $10.00.*

This is an informative volume, well filled with detail about recent changes in the socialist countries (including China as well as Eastern Europe), with special reference to changes in planning and management under the reforms of economic mechanism of the last decade. It can perhaps be said to be, both in design and execution, richer in description than in analysis or in novel judgments and ideas. As a survey it is objective and impartial in the main, without much indication either of sympathy or antipathy, and its cited literature is fairly comprehensive and balanced as between East and West.

The work opens with a chapter on the "Scope and Logic of Economic Reforms," approached from the standpoint of *control systems*, the functions these perform and their relation to centralized planning, countries of the socialist camp being distinguished according as their mechanisms of planning and control conform to three main types. There follows a study of investment policies and of so called "Catching-up Strategies." Part 2 deals with the level of, and compares the progress of, collectivization in the various countries of Eastern Europe other than the USSR. There then follow a series of informative chapters about foreign trade and the CEMA (or Comecon). Concluding chapters deal with "inter-country conflicts" (e.g., the Soviet-Yugoslav rift of the fifties and socio-economic aspects of the Sino-Soviet conflict in the sixties) and the controversial issue of so called "convergence," while an appendix affords a ten-page survey of available literature on the subjects covered in the work. The book is well produced; there are, however, no footnotes, all notes being placed at the end (but with indication of the pages referred to), and there is an index.

MAURICE DOBB
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Europe in the Russian Mirror: Four Lectures in Economic History *by Alexander Gerschenkron. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970.— ix, 158 pp. $4.95.*

Kliuchevskii was probably the first to suggest that the universality of generalizations about European history might be verified by comparison with the peculiar experience of Russia. In *Europe in the Russian Mirror: Four Lectures in Economic History*, the McArthur Lectures for 1968, Alexander Gerschenkron continues to pursue one aspect of this theme by asking, "What light, if any, is cast by the study of Russian economic history on some selected issues that have preoccupied students of West European economic history?" (p. 1). Selecting the Weber hypothesis as his first model, he strongly and rightly criticizes the facile attempts to identify the Old Believers with the Protestant spirit. Their social position rather than their religious beliefs forced them to organize economically for survival. Active entrepreneurs in the early nineteenth century, the Old Believers rapidly faded from the scene during the great spurt of industrialization at the end of the century. Gerschenkron presents a lively portrait of Yuri Krizhanich in order to reinforce his thesis on the irrelevance of religious beliefs to visions of economic development (Krizhanich was a Catholic) and also to introduce his second model, mercantilism (Krizhanich anticipated Peter I). Russian mercantilism shared with its European counterpart a subordination of economics to state power, but deviated from the model to the degree that economic backwardness impelled the state to substitute its initiative and energy for the missing ingredients in the Russian institutional structure and social life. Thus, Gerschenkron concludes in his familiar but suggestive manner that underdeveloped countries have obeyed and will continue to obey the law of substitution rather than follow a fixed pattern of development by stages. Throughout the book the author displays the urbanity of style and polemical zest that we have come to recognize as his hallmark. Given the form and purpose of these lectures, one can hardly expect exhaustive references, but there are two notable exceptions in the discussion on the Old Believers, the works of P. G. Ryndziunskii and William L. Blackwell. What we now need are studies of the dynamic interplay between the deviant behavior of various groups of entrepreneurs, Jews, Armenians, Slavophils and state peasants, and the officially acceptable economic activity of the state. Only then will a more complete picture be available of the fatally uneven development of Imperial Russian industrialization.

ALFRED J. RIEBER
University of Pennsylvania

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Russia from 1812 to 1945: A History *by Graham Stephenson. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1970.—467 pp. $10.95.*

I cannot see that the publication of this unimaginative and grossly inaccurate work—I hesitate to call it a history—serves any useful purpose. My best advice is that the potential reader turn to something else and avoid substituting for his ignorance of Russia—the author deliberately aims the book at the illiterate—the mass of error and distortion and misunderstanding with which this so called history abounds. Where could he have found all his misinformation? The first two-thirds of the book follow H. Seton-Watson's *The Russian Empire 1801-1917* so closely that one wonders whether Mr. Stephenson has read anything else. For the period 1800 to 1917, he might have consulted the works of Pushkarev, Karpovich, and Harcave, and the great body of monographic literature with which he is manifestly unfamiliar. For the years to the end of World War II, he should get acquainted with the writings of Treadgold, von Laue, Clark, Fuller, Werth, and others. Apparently none of the historical journals was available to him.

I can think of no work on the subject in English so poorly written. The frequent misuse of words is shocking: *inflammable* for *inflammatory* (p. 127), *apt* for *likely* (pp. 99, 239), *revenge* for *avenge* (p. 179), *further* for *farther* (pp. 240, 371), *envisaged* for *envisioned* (p. 322), *effected* for *affected* (p. 243), and *badly* for *bad* (p. 239). Incomplete sentences, comma splices, and split infinitives appear with monotonous and irritating frequency to suggest either slovenly writing or careless copy editing or both. Overuse of the passive voice will lull many readers to sleep. One finds relief from the insufferably dull style only in the *petites histoires* that occasionally enliven the narrative.

There is space to point out only a few of the grossest errors. It is not so that the Old Believers were non-Orthodox (p. 64). To say that "the bonds of serfdom had been strengthened during the eighteenth century with the intention of compensating the nobility for their lack of political power" (p. 24) is far wide of the mark. Speransky's Plan of 1809 did not lie "unpublished and unknown in the imperial archives until 1905" (p. 44); Polish revolutionaries published it in 1831. The author's innocence of the emancipation of the serfs in 1861 is astonishing; to insist that "the emancipation law kept the peasant tied to the soil" (p. 80) is to ignore the fact that the peasant was not tied to the soil either before or after emancipation. It is ridiculous to discuss Reutern's financial reforms as "pointless" (p. 121) because the public had no control over the budget. Mr. Stephenson repeatedly confuses Slavophilism with pan-Slavism (pp. 126, 253, 254, 255). Pisarev was something more than "a

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beatnik" (p. 153), and to refer to the members of the Land and Freedom movement as "beatniks" (p. 169) is to inspire a prejudice against them they surely do not deserve. That Lenin took up Marxism "to revenge [*sic.*] his brother" (p. 179) is fiction. The decision to industrialize was not Witte's (p. 180); he had as many predecessors to pave the way as did Peter in Westernization. To identify Witte as a forerunner of Stalin (pp. 185, 187, 189, 192) is fanciful. To insist that on the eve of World War I "literacy was not widespread" (p. 195) is misleading. The author mistakes the Quadruple Alliance for the Holy Alliance (pp. 238, 249). The eight-hour day was abolished, not introduced, in 1940 (p. 422).

The "Select Bibliography" is too skimpy to be of any value to anyone and abounds in incorrect titles and publication dates. The index has so many omissions and errors as to be worthless.

With the fine record that Praeger has maintained in the publication of Russian studies, it is indeed unfortunate that the house has allowed this work to appear.

MELVIN C. WREN
University of Toledo

The Organs of Soviet Administration of Justice: Their History and Operation *by Samuel Kucherov. Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1970.—xxiv, 754 pp. $28.80.*

Dr. Kucherov was a lawyer in Russia before 1917, and in the intervening years, many of which he has spent working for the Library of Congress, he has not ceased to study the development of Soviet law in the light of its prerevolutionary Russian heritage. His earlier work, *Courts, Lawyers and Trials Under the Last Three Tsars* (1953), is a short but important contribution—indeed, the only substantial English-language contribution—to our knowledge of the great law reform movement in Russia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Now he has produced a mammoth volume on the first half-century of Soviet legal development, focusing on the system of courts, legal personnel (including chapters on legal education, professional and lay judges, the investigative agencies, the procuracy, and the legal profession), and certain aspects of criminal and civil procedure.

The book is of very uneven quality, and it is marred by an incredible number of mistranslations, misquotations, exaggerations, typographical errors, and obscure polemical passages. Also some parts appear to have been written several years before publication and have not been brought up to date. The whole work badly needs to be edited, not to mention

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proofread. It is much too long. Nevertheless, it contains many parts that are not only valuable but also fascinating. There is much new material, and many comparisons with the past that will challenge the reader to further thought and study. Also, when one has finished reading it one has a lively sense of the Soviet legal system—seen, to be sure, from a particular perspective but seen as a whole and in its development.

The perspective is that of the tradition of Western liberalism that pervaded the Russian bar in the two generations before the revolution. From that perspective, there is nothing essentially non-Western in the Soviet system of administration of justice except its susceptibility to infringement at the hands of a repressive regime (cf. p. xvii). The new system grew out of the ruins of the old. The author rejoices at the signs that members of the Soviet bar, like their predecessors of a century ago, are now beginning to defend vigorously persons accused of political crimes. He sees parallels between the Comrades' Courts and the prerevolutionary justices of the peace, and this helps him, apparently, to appreciate the good things in the system of Comrades' Courts and to minimize its potential dangers. On the whole, however, he deplores and disparages Soviet legal developments. At times he is very bitter indeed in his denunciation. He says, for example, that the reason Soviet higher education is specialized is that "the State has no use for generally educated persons" (p. 310). He believes that protests and demonstrations within the Soviet Union in recent years are the dawn of a "mutiny against socialism in the name of freedom" (in the words of Alexander Hertzen's prophecy of 1860)—or "if not yet against socialism itself . . . against its tyranny"; and that until the downfall of the Communist regime there can be no independence of the judiciary (p. 715).

Despite these repeated strictures, Dr. Kucherov writes painstakingly and often sympathetically of the development of the Soviet system of administration of justice, and this reader, at least, came away with a heightened awareness of its positive achievements and not only of its inadequacies.

HAROLD J. BERMAN
Harvard University

East Germany *by David Childs. New York, Frederick A. Praeger 1969.—286 pp. $7.50.*

Germany: Illusions and Dilemmas *by Carl Landauer. New York, Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1969.—vi, 360 pp. $8.95.*

Contemporary Germany, East and West, so often distorted in popular

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"007" accounts and polemical treatises, has seldom received the serious scholarly attention students of contemporary history, politics, and international relations require. Both books under review attempt to redress the balance in favor of scholarship. The authors' roles appear to be reversed: David Childs, one of that remarkable breed of learned English journalists, has written a scholarly book; Carl Landauer, professor emeritus of economics at Berkeley, has ventured into the province of journalism. Accordingly, Childs's study of East Germany is matter-of-fact and well researched, whereas Landauer's account of West Germany is impressionistic and his search for an appropriate American foreign policy never rises above traditional State Department imagination.

Childs posits a rather even-handed thesis suggesting that "it is neither that the rulers of East Germany are misunderstood, kindly, 'liberals,' nor is it that they are hard-hearted, orthodox, Stalinists. It is that the DDR, its politics and society, are a good deal more complicated than most people in the West imagine" (pp. 15-16). Both the novice and the informed reader can learn a great deal from Childs's attempt to substitute subtlety for the cold war rhetoric so dear to both East German and Western writers on the subject. In recounting the history of the DDR, Childs reclaims the abortive opposition of 1956 around Professor Wolfgang Harich of Humboldt University as a possible reforming influence on the present and future generation of professionals and bureaucrats. The Harich group proposed the elasticizing and revitalizing of official Marxism-Leninism by injecting the ideas of Trotsky, Bukharin, Luxemburg, and Kautsky and the experiences of the Poles, Yugoslavs, and Chinese. It argued for an economic policy emphasizing the improvement of living standards, worker participation in industrial decisionmaking, and an end to land collectivization. Dramatically, it championed a cultural and intellectual thaw based on the abolition of the secret police and secret trials. One other vignette in Childs's historical treatment deserves comment. He characterizes the building of the Berlin wall as a desperate move to stem the flow of refugees (then 207,026) attributable mainly to the disastrous agricultural collectivization policy. At the same time he accepts the "germ of truth" in East German justifications for the wall: continuous activities by agents from West Berlin, Western recruitment of East German labor, Adenauer's hard line on the national and defense issues and social-democratic concurrence, and the negative effect of the U-2 incident and the Bay of Pigs invasion. In drawing a balance sheet on the DDR today, Childs finds that, on the positive side, it is a land of opportunity for young people; differences between the best-off and the poorest are much smaller than in Western Europe, the USSR, or the U.S.; there is more religious freedom than anywhere else in Eastern

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Europe; there has been an "economic miracle" placing the DDR among the ten leading industrial nations of the world; the population gets a far more realistic view of Britain than the British do of the DDR; and much progress has been made in realizing the formal equality of women. On the negative side Childs includes the regime's Stalinist relations with its cultural elite and its distrust of the people, the robot-like character of the SED and its satellite parties, and the considerable lag between consumer production and housing and the capital goods sector. In his final speculation about the future of the DDR, Childs gives way to a rosy optimism: "Whatever happens in East Germany as a result of the Czechoslovak crisis, there, as in the U.S.S.R., the new rising elite of able, thoughtful, flexible, and technically competent young people are slowly replacing the old guard. They are a group largely unburdened by the mistakes and animosities of the past, an elite better able to carry on a dialogue between the rulers and the ruled" (p. 275). That a rigid and totalitarian bureaucracy can be transformed by a generational changing of the guard is debatable. Childs admits that these young cadres have been nurtured in the bosom of the SED to which they owe their positions. Furthermore, without some fundamentally new ideas the restructuring of East German society seems unthinkable. In short, Childs's will to believe is not convincing; in East Germany as in Soviet Russia future improvements in living standards to equal those of the West could take place without a substantial change in the system.

Carl Landauer's book is less about the Federal Republic and more about what policy the United States ought to pursue toward that country given some of its illusions and dilemmas. The most serious dilemmas one encounters in Landauer's journey through contemporary West Germany arise from the absence of a peace movement, the colorlessness of the SPD, and the student revolt. Other than these troubles, West Germany appears to be the best of all possible worlds. Indeed, the differences between the "two zones" of Germany are subsumed under the rubrics "freedom" and "unfreedom," which are used to conjure up an overwhelming psychological need by West Germans to share their freedom with those on the other side of the wall. Herein lies the root of the West Germans' illusion—that Bonn is the only legitimate government—which it is the task of American policy to remove. In helping Germany to give up this illusion, the United States must make up for the resulting psychological loss by strong guarantees including military presence and a revival of NATO, lest the Germans look elsewhere for protection. To play their proper role, Landauer counsels, the American people will have to adjust their sights and "realize that they can only in a more restricted sense [focusing on Europe] fulfill the role which they have assumed—not al-

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ways consistently, to be sure—since World War II, and in a sense since 1917, that of protector of human freedom against aggression on the international scene" (p. 198). The moldiness of these ideas is self-evident; the reasons for this book remain a mystery.

HELMUT GRUBER
Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn

Public Opinion in Occupied Germany: The OMGUS Surveys, 1945-1949 *edited by Anna J. Merritt and Richard L. Merritt with a Foreword by Frederick W. Williams. Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1970.— xxii, 328 pp. $7.95.*

Less than six months after the unconditional surrender of Hitler's Germany, the Office of Military Government of the United States for Germany (OMGUS) set up an Opinion Survey Section in order to gather information on the political perspectives of the Germans under the military administration. During the following four years the section conducted 72 major and many more restricted surveys.

The volume under review first describes the procedures followed in taking the opinion poll; sampling and field work posed special problems in the chaotic situation of postwar Germany. The book further provides for a general analysis of popular reactions to the issues raised by the questionnaires, which had to be carefully prepared.

The major portion of the volume is devoted to an examination of 191 reports summarizing the results of the opinion polls on a great variety of questions. Popular attitudes toward the denazification program, the Nuremberg trials, economic conditions, European unity, democracy, the Berlin Air Lift, the new Constitution, and others were among the topics of these popular surveys.

Certain attitudes which became more distinct when West Germany regained her sovereignty already had appeared in those early years when the German people still lived under the traumatic effect of the collapse of the Third Reich. For instance, in May 1948, 96 per cent of respondents in Darmstadt and West Berlin expressed the hope that Germany would be united again. But they refused to demand reunification at any price. Eighty-five per cent in Darmstadt and 78 per cent in West Berlin did not favor a united Germany if the union could be achieved only under Soviet influence.

In August 1949, 46 per cent of respondents in the American Zone opposed the withdrawal of occupying forces and only 34 per cent were in favor. Polls taken in 1946 and 1948 on anti-Semitism revealed a

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slight decrease from 21 per cent to 19 per cent of anti-Semites, and from 18 per cent to 14 per cent for intense anti-Semites. Germans between the ages of fifteen and nineteen showed stronger anti-Semitic attitudes than other age groups.

These surveys constitute historic source material on political and other attitudes of the Germans during the occupation period. Without their publication by the editors, they would probably have remained lost to future historians. The editorial comments and analyses greatly add to the value of the reports, and are based on contemporary impressions gained by their authors. Both the organization and layout of the book are praiseworthy.

FERENC A. VÁLI
University of Massachusetts

Inside the Third Reich: Memoirs *by Albert Speer, translated by Richard and Clara Winston, with an introduction by Eugene Davidson. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1970.—xviii, 596 pp. $12.50.*

Albert Speer came into Adolf Hitler's life at the age of 28 with a roll of architectural blueprints under his arm. That was in 1933 when the new chancellor of the German Reich, suffering from what Speer now calls "architectural megalomania," was, in Hitler's own words, "looking for someone to whom I could entrust my building plans . . . someone who will be able to continue after my death with the authority I have conferred on him." He was fascinated by Speer's work, to such an extent that, when the Nuremberg Party Congress area was being designed, one of Hitler's adjutants grumbled to Speer: "You and your goddamned plans! . . . The Fuehrer didn't close an eye last night, he was so excited." Later, when Speer made a scale model of part of Hitler's projected New Berlin, one of his associates said, "Do you know what you are? You are Hitler's unrequited love!"

Hitler's attention soon turned from building to destroying, but Speer was not left behind. His talents were simply employed differently, and it was he, as Reich minister for armaments and munitions, who increased the production of weapons and aircraft fourfold, munitions threefold, and tanks sixfold between the early spring of 1942 and the summer of 1944. Since these weapons of war were turned out for the most part by slave labor, the men who were responsible for their procurement and use were subsequently tried at Nuremberg. Fritz Sauckel, who supplied the labor force Speer needed by rounding up able-bodied males in occu-

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pied countries and shipping them to Germany, was sentenced to death by hanging. Speer, by an exercise of judicial logic that seemed questionable to some members of the prosecution, was, instead, given twenty years imprisonment. He served his term in Spandau fortress, where he set about writing his memoirs, finishing the first draft in December 1954. Reworked after his release in October 1966, his autobiography has become an international best-seller and has doubtless restored Speer's fortune.

There can be no question that the book deserves the attention it has received. It is by far the most informative volume about Nazi Germany that we have had from the pen of an insider. It is full of incisive sketches of the men around Hitler, of details of the cabals and conspiracies formed among them and the bureaucratic rivalries that complicated the business of the Reich, and of descriptions of the intermittent clashes, reminiscent of the middle ages, between the dictator's courtiers and those powerful and jealous provincial vassals, the *Gauleiter*. Moreover, it provides us with one of the most effective accounts yet written of Hitler's personal deterioration as the war went on and of the growth of that paranoiac feeling of betrayal which led him to turn against all those who served him.

Despite these virtues, it is an evasive book. Although written with what appears to be an engaging candor, it is rarely candid about the things on which its author will be judged by any thoughtful reader. Speer talks a good deal about the guilt he incurred by being part of a regime that committed dreadful crimes, but he does this in a very general way and never admits any personal complicity. He skirts the question of slave labor delicately, seeking to create the impression that he really opposed resorting to such means but was powerless to prevent Sauckel from forcing foreign laborers upon him. This explanation will not withstand any critical investigation. Nor will Speer's intimation that he was ignorant of what went on in the SS camps satisfy any but the most gullible. As for his attempt to associate himself with the resistance movement, what it really boils down to is that on occasion he thought that it might be necessary to kill Hitler and that he devised some rather clever ways of accomplishing this, but that a smile from the Fuehrer or the gift of a signed photograph always drove these insubstantial projects from his mind.

In October 1944, Speer jokingly showed Hitler a translation of an article in the British newspaper *The Observer* in which the writer said:

> [Speer] symbolizes a type which is becoming increasingly important in all belligerent countries: the pure technician, the classless bright young man without background, with no other original aim than to make his way in the world and no other means than his technical and managerial ability. It is the lack of psychological and spiritual ballast, and the ease with which he

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> handles the terrifying technical and organizational machinery of our age, which makes this slight type go extremely far these days. . . . This is their age; the Hitlers and Himmlers we may get rid of, but the Speers, whatever happens to this particular special man, will long be with us.

John Kenneth Galbraith has written scornfully that Speer was not a technician at all, nor was he apolitical, and that his posing as such is merely part of an elaborate form of self-vindication. However that may be, there was some truth in *The Observer* article, at least with respect to Speer's potential for survival. Perhaps even Hitler recognized this. Speer tells us that "Hitler read the long commentary straight through, folded the sheet, and handed it back to me without a word but with great respect."

GORDON A. CRAIG
Stanford University

The Face of the Third Reich: Portraits of the Nazi Leadership *by Joachim C. Fest, translated by Michael Bullock. New York, Pantheon Books, 1970.—xiii, 402 pp. $10.00.*

The German Resistance to Hitler *by Hermann Graml, Hans Mommsen, Hans-Joachim Reichardt, and Ernest Wolf. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1970.—xx, 271 pp. $7.95.*

Mr. Fest's book is a series of capsule biographies of important Nazi leaders. He believes that these biographies illustrate a set of more or less common psychological traits to be found in the rulers of the Third Reich. Thus, Hitler's personal failure in private life, we are told, was characteristic of many Nazi leaders, and caused them to engage in a fanatic search for public prestige and power. Hitler's inability to establish intimate relationships with individuals was sublimated, according to Mr. Fest, into an erotic passion for the masses, whom he symbolically seduced through his intense and neurotic speech-dramas. Indeed, Mr. Fest does not hesitate to say (using the remarks of a witness) that Hitler's exhaustion and depression after a speech were really examples of *post coitum triste* (p. 36)! We are told that Hans Frank, the butcher of Poland, was an example of the kind of Nazi who became a brute through a need to overcompensate for inner weakness. (If this is true, then the meek shall certainly inherit the earth!) Rudolf Hoess, the commander of Auschwitz, is presented as a not untypical example of a kind of Nazi split personality: in the midst of the blood of his victims he remained a good bourgeois and family man. Himmler, of course, is seen as the model for this sort of "passionless murder" (p. 279) and subli-

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mated bureaucratic villainy. Mr. Fest argues that both Himmler, and the crude sensualist and power seeker Goering, illustrate the commonly expressed Nazi need to submit oneself totally to the authority of a self-chosen superior. In this analysis, Hitler becomes the ultimate in father figures. We are not spared the usual comments on the "over-compensation" of the brilliant cripple Goebbels.

Fest's book makes fine bedside reading for those who know little of the essential biographical facts of the leading Nazis. But the psychologizing is definitely the work of an amateur, and even if it were more than that it could not explain what Mr. Fest evidently thinks it does—the reasons for the success of the Nazis. For that, one still requires the social, political, and economic history of the Weimar Republic.

The essays in the *German Resistance to Hitler* are a significant contribution to a somewhat overrated topic. Three of the essays deal with the conservative resistance groups around Carl Goerdeler and Count von Stauffenberg, and one essay deals with the resistance from the Left. The latter shows that there were more acts of resistance on the Left than is usually supposed. But it also shows that such resistance was confined to shortlived anti-Nazi publications which reached almost no one. This essay remains a dreary testimony to both the ideological hairsplitting of the German Left even in mortal crisis and the efficiency of the Gestapo which had little trouble with resistance groups of any variety.

The essays on the resistance of conservative groups to the Nazis are largely exercises in analysis, not of concrete acts of resistance—of which there were very few—but of the thought of conservative opponents of the Third Reich. Their ideas were far more unreal than those of the Left. The conservative opponents of the regime seem to have been totally unequipped to understand what had happened to Germany. As for their plans for Germany's future, these are ludicrous when they are not something worse, repetitions of many of the illusions that led ultraconservatives to support Hitler in the early thirties. Thus the conservative resistors agreed: postwar Germany must dominate the East; Communism must be eradicated; authoritarianism is the "German way"; the Left must be disciplined; and, of course, the Weimar Republic and the Versailles Treaty were shameful blots on Germany's honor and traditions and must not be repeated.

The German Resistance to Hitler is a valuable book. Its main lesson, however, must be inferred. There was no resistance to the Nazis worthy of the name, for if radical right-wing extremism is to be successfully resisted, this must happen before it seizes power.

JOHN WEISS
Herbert H. Lehman College, City University of New York

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Economic Policy and Planning in the Netherlands, 1950-1965 *by James Goodear Abert. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1969. —xv, 282 pp. $10.00.*

Economic fashions change, but Dutch planning is like a well tailored Scottish suit: everybody likes it, regardless of fashion it looks fine, but somehow it is not quite the thing for foreigners.

The Dutch economy is relatively trouble free. Dutch economic policy is consistent, yet flexible. Economic planning is technically elegant and the forecasts prepared by the Central Planning Bureau as well as the bureau's technical opinions on policy matters are regarded with respect by the government, by business, and by labor. While playing an important role, the Central Planning Bureau does not try to assume the role of a superministry or to replace democratic decisionmaking by a technocratic device. Though the government is committed to active direction of economic matters, ample scope is left for free enterprise.

Dutch economic policy strives to maintain full employment, price stability, and a satisfactory balance of payments equilibrium and to promote an equitable income distribution and a satisfactory growth rate. To achieve these goals the government manipulates the general wage rate, indirect taxes and subsidies, direct taxes, government expenditures on goods and services, and utilizes monetary policy instruments. The goals and the instruments are shared with many of the European and non-European "free world" countries. What is specifically Dutch is economic management by social consensus which leads to quasi-voluntary sacrifices of specific interests by powerful socio-economic groups and permits a high degree of policy coordination.

The interest groups, represented by employer and employee organizations, are brought together in the Foundation of Labor and in the Social and Economic Council; the latter institution, the more important of the two, also gives voice to the government, to consumers, and to independent experts. The Central Planning Bureau is a strictly technical institution, providing information on the likely future course of events and exploring the probable consequences of alternate courses of action and of alternate policies. The final voice rests with the parliament, but since the party lines often cut across economic interests (denominational parties play a key role in Dutch politics) and since virtually all governments represent party coalitions, the nonparliamentary institutions play a key role.

Dutch economic policies and especially economic planning have been much discussed, and any book on the subject inevitably covers some familiar territory. Abert's contribution lies in his showing how the politics dovetail with economic policymaking and economic policymak-

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ing with planning. His is a book in *political economy*, a subject which requires familiarity with economics as well as with political science and which, for all its importance, is all too much neglected by practitioners of both disciplines.

The book is clear and concise. It contains a rigorous presentation of the econometric models used by the Dutch planners, but it can be read with pleasure and profit by those lacking formal training in economics. It is an enlightening book, yet at the end the question of "exportability" of the Dutch approach remains open. The political conditions and the institutional system reflect the country's peculiar conditions. The effects of policy measures on the development of the Dutch economy are difficult to gauge: there is evidence that until 1962 government intervention more often than not aggravated cyclical swings. And the much praised incomes policy collapsed in 1964 when the government found it impossible to hold the wage line. Lastly, it is even uncertain to what extent the policy makers benefited from and were guided by the work of the Central Planning Bureau. But perhaps it is a virtue of Abert's book that it raises so many doubts. Despite all the formidable technical machinery and the substantial body of theoretical and factual knowledge at their disposal, economists still do not know well how an economy runs, and they know even less how to run it.

STANISLAW WELLISZ
Columbia University

Trieste, 1941-1954: The Ethnic, Political, and Ideological Struggle *by Bogdan C. Novak. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1970. —xx, 526 pp. $16.50.*

Professor Novak thoroughly examines the Italo-Yugoslav border dispute of 1941-54 in its ethnic, political, and ideological aspects. The area in question was the Julian Region; the center of the struggle was the city of Trieste, strategically located on the northern Adriatic. Both the region and the city were peopled by Slavs, Italians, and Germans who vigorously expressed their nationalism and ideologies in a variety of tongues. To complicate matters further, settlement of the dispute and disposition of the Free Territory of Trieste became an issue between East and West. The great powers knew that the Italo-Yugoslav border, once drawn, would mark the Western democracies from the Soviet bloc. The Soviet Union, therefore, supported the Yugoslav claims to Trieste, while the West took measures to prevent communism's westward expansion.

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Hence not only ideology but East-West rivalry profoundly influenced the solution of the Trieste problem. Each side used the appeals of nationalism and ideology to solicit support for its cause. Yugoslavia played the tunes of national consciousness to the Slovenes and Croats living in the region, expecting them to respond by uniting with the homeland, and piped the virtues of socialism to Italian workers as preferable to those of capitalist Italy. But Italians tended to side with Italy and not all Slovenes and Croats supported Yugoslavia. In the end, nationalism proved stronger than economics in Triestine politics.

Professor Novak looks at his subject dispassionately. He surveys the demography, economy, and history of the area, emphasizing Italo-Slav political conflicts between 1914-41. Within the region itself—as in Yugoslavia proper—the four years after 1941 were marked not only by the Axis occupation but also by resistance to that occupation. The flow of events on the diplomatic front—insofar as they affected the future of the Julian Region and the city of Trieste—increased with the victories of Tito and Yugoslavia and came to a floodtide after the Anglo-American triumph in Italy. The author meticulously documents all these developments. In fact, he provides an almost daily account of events from the time Trieste was liberated by Allied forces in 1945 through the establishment of the Free Territory of Trieste in 1947 until the final settlement in 1954. Professor Novak's study is unique in that he emphasizes internal affairs and uses international affairs only to illuminate and help the reader comprehend the issues as they arose within the Free Territory of Trieste itself.

Until the British, Italian, United States, and Yugoslav archives are opened, *Trieste, 1941-1954* will remain the standard work on the subject and will provide a sound basis for the study of postwar European history and politics. The comprehensive bibliography will prove particularly useful to scholars.

J. B. HOPTNER
Northern Illinois University

Diplomat in Paris, 1936-1939: Memoirs of Juliusz Lukasiewicz, Ambassador of Poland *edited by Wacław Jędrzejewicz. New York, Columbia University Press, 1970.—xxiv, 408 pp. $12.50.*

Professor Jędrzejewicz deserves the appreciation of all students of European diplomatic history for his contributions to our knowledge of international problems concerning Poland. After having published *Poland in*

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the British Parliament, 1939-1945 and *Papers and Memoirs of Józef Lipski*, he has now made available in English an equally important collection of documents and memoirs of the Polish ambassador to France in the crucial period between 1936 and 1939. The materials are carefully arranged, supplemented by explanatory notes, and footnoted by references to relevant British, French, and Polish documents as well as to the memoir literature of statesmen who participated in the historical events preceding the outbreak of war.

Polish-French relations played a cardinal role in the system of European security during the interwar period. Sealed by an alliance dating back to 1921, they had been, however, put to the first test at Locarno in October 1925. From then on, they never regained a sense of complete mutual trust, as first France saw in Poland an obstacle to her cooperation with Stresemann's Germany and later Poland observed with suspicion France's lukewarm attitude toward Hitler's Germany.

Ambassador Lukasiewicz took his post in Paris in March 1936 and represented his country's policy under adverse circumstances. First he had to negotiate with the government of the Popular Front, which had little sympathy for the policy of the "colonels' " government in Warsaw and, then, in the fateful year preceding the German invasion of Poland, his principal official contacts were with the sinister George Bonnet and the weak Edouard Daladier. Lukasiewicz was a proud representative of a proud country, a skillful and determined diplomat who interpreted Beck's policy with convincing forcefulness. Just as in the pre-Munich crisis he did not hesitate to defend Beck's aggressive claims against Czechoslovakia on the Těšín territory, he was equally firm when Poland's fateful hour struck one year later. On both occasions, his regular conversations with Bonnet add new evidence of the latter's duplicity and manipulative qualities.

The last chapter, which records the intricate negotiations of Polish diplomats in West Europe concerning the successor to President Mościcki, who was interned in Romania, is melancholy testimony to the squabbles of political emigrees on matters of historical significance.

One would have preferred to read the text of the original documents in places where Ambassador Lukasiewicz supplants them with *post festum* memoirs or articles; however, in their absence (they might have been destroyed during the war), Professor Jędrzejewicz's volume is indispensable to the study of French-Polish relations in the three years before the outbreak of World War Two.

JOSEF KORBEL
University of Denver

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Agrarian Reform and Peasant Revolution in Spain: Origins of the Civil War *by Edward E. Malefakis. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1970.—xx, 469 pp. $15.00.*

This book is in two parts of which the first ("Land Tenure and Rural Social Structure") is both briefer and, presumably, less directly relevant to readers of the present review. Its merits should nevertheless be underlined, for it will form the starting point of subsequent work in this by no means exhausted field. Appendix A ("Sources of Information of Modern Spanish Land Tenure") will be a particularly indispensable guide to further research.

The main part of the book—let it be said at once that it is the best work on the subject so far—deals with two chief questions: the nature of Spanish agrarian revolutionary movements (especially the relative role of Anarchists and Socialists) and the failure of the Second Republic to deal effectively with the agrarian problem. The author does not discuss at length why so large a part of the Spanish rural population became and remained socially revolutionary, a problem on which comparative work on Italy, for example, might throw some light. His basic argument that industrialization provided the safety valve of emigration probably does not exhaust the problem, but the suggestion (following Macdonald on Italy in *Economic History Review*, XVI [1961], 61) of an inverse correlation between emigration and organized labor militancy, seems well taken. There is room for further argument, especially since Malefakis's documentation seems stronger for southern Spain than for other parts of the country.

Given the endemic force of agrarian revolutionism, Malefakis concentrates on its actual movements, establishing (to no great surprise) the ineffectiveness of rural anarchism, even at its peak, but also its relative decline and the generally unsuspected rise and strength of the Socialist peasant organization. His discussion is original and convincing. It appears that the UGT grew more rapidly than the CNT after 1931 and remained much larger until the civil war. Anarchist strength was concentrated in Catalonia-Aragon, its old Andalusian rural centers declining notably.

The failure of the Republic in agrarian matters raises problems of very general interest for students of social change and revolution, which Malefakis discusses lucidly and skeptically. Liberal land reform was bound to fail, partly because "agrarian reform is both peripheral to and presents a great dilemma for the liberal philosophy that has traditionally inspired the bourgeois Left in capitalist societies" (p. 393), partly because the monarchy did not fall by a revolution but by "a mysterious shift in opinion that created an anti-monarchical consensus" (p. 396). Hence,

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the Republic's leaders were not embarked on the normal progression of revolutionary politics, and the mass rural uprisings they expected, and which might have forced them to act, did not occur in 1931-32. Not until after 1933 could the peasants be again moved into action by revolutionary leaders or their own experience. When the Republic's leaders shifted to the left after 1934, they provoked a powerful backlash. In 1936, caught between this and what was now a spontaneous social insurrection, their failure was patent. Under the circumstances, the author argues, it was unavoidable. Conversely the revolutionary solution failed, because "the Left Marxist or Anarchosyndicalist emphasis on unremitting revolutionary action" (p. 396) was equally impracticable. An anarchic rising of the poor after 1934 would produce only civil war. One may add to Malefakis's argument that the civil war did indeed produce social revolution (including the revival of anarchism), but under conditions which doomed it both to failure and defeat.

This thesis will be much debated. Whatever the outcome of the debate, Malefakis's book, a major contribution to the study of the Spanish Republic, will be required reading by students of social change. It is an important book and can be strongly recommended.

E. J. Hobsbawm
University of London

Revolution and Church: The Early History of Christian Democracy, 1789-1901 *by Hans Maier, translated by Emily M. Schossberger. Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1969.— xiv, 326 pp. $10.00.*

The emergence of a special form of democracy out of Christian inspiration in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Europe has been the object of special interest in the work of such scholars as Rohden, Gurian, Roger, Hours, Biton, Vaussard, and Forgarty. Hans Maier's volume adds to this constellation of research an excellent monograph on the prehistory and early history of Christian democracy in France. It complements existing studies by clearly establishing that the origin of Christian democracy in France is to be found in the French Revolution.

The book opens with an overview of Christian democracy in contemporary Europe and a brief analysis of the dilemmas and discontinuities that beset the movement, particularly after World War II. The seeds of the present problems of Christian democracy are traced back to its early history in France, the proving ground in the nineteenth century for the first

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attempt to relate church and democracy (p. 42) and to bring forth the revolutionary content of religiosity. Yet, Maier demonstrates, Christian democracy failed to sink roots in France all through the nineteenth century, due to the unresolved struggle between the Church and modern society's democratic ethos. The Church never developed a comprehensive theology of the revolution; the rapprochement with society could only take the form of ambivalent political involvement that did not meet with the expectations of the masses nor with the reason of state of the Church's hierarchs. It would take two wars and half a century before a totally new situation, supported by a multiplicity of voluntary associations, would make it possible for the Christian Democratic parties to dominate the scene of Catholic Europe during our times.

The author traces the contrapuntal effect of the revolution's attempt to regain some of the politico-religious unity that had characterized the French landscape in prerevolutionary times, through the ambivalence of the traditional as well as the liberal ideologies of leading thinkers such as de Maistre, de Bonald, Lammenais, and Buchez, to the *ralliement* and the metamorphosis of the concept of Christian democracy into the Catholic social movement and the pronouncements of Leo XIII.

Although the documentation of the various phases is rich, its presentation proceeds heavily and at times discontinuously. While the period between 1789 and 1850 is pretty well covered, the author makes hardly any reference to the events that occurred between 1850 and 1891, which are of crucial significance for the appreciation of the *ralliement*. Undoubtedly the most important of these events was the loss of the Papal States, which precipitated the new posture of the Church with respect to Catholic participation in political life in general. The same can be said concerning the Church's condemnation of *modernisme social.*

The opening chapter, "Christian Democracy: Past and Present," represents too remote a theoretical statement to go with the following four chapters; expanded and integrated with the historical portion of the volume, it would have made an excellent concluding summary, pointing to further research to develop the author's conceptual grasp of commonalities and differences between notions such as political Catholicism, Catholic politics, liberal Catholicism, social Catholicism, and Christian democracy, which occur repeatedly in the text.

To the historian and the social scientist, the volume represents a valuable analysis of the changed position of the Church after the French Revolution and of its attempt to adapt to the modern democratic state by inspiring a special form of democracy which, though partisan in appearance, had societywide orientations. The extensive analogies to the contemporary stance of the Church vis-à-vis the modern version of social

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revolution are all too obvious to need mention.

Editorially the volume leaves much to be desired, particularly in the way the footnotes and cross-references are organized and indexed. The bibliography omits or misplaces some of the most important references found in the text, while the last sentence of the volume could use one or two additional words (p. 297). These shortcomings are but a small price the reader will willingly pay for an illuminating analysis of a crucial period of political modernization in the Catholic Church.

ROCCO CAPORALE
The Claremont Colleges

Louis XIV and Twenty Million Frenchmen *by Pierre Goubert, translated by Anne Carter. New York, Pantheon Books, 1970.—350 pp. $7.95.*

Mémoires for the Instruction of the Dauphin *by Louis XIV, introduction, translation, and notes by Paul Sonnino. New York, The Free Press, 1970.—281 pp. $7.95.*

A work allegedly written by Louis XIV and another written by a modern historian about Louis and his subjects might be expected to have quite different points of view. Louis XIV and his ghost writers (*sic*) wrote the *Mémoires* to immortalize the Sun King and to instruct future French sovereigns about how to govern. These *Mémoires* are very important for understanding Louis's mental world and the image he wished to project for all time. They were written during a critical period of development in the French state and, indeed, in the development of military and bureaucratic institutions which would be models for contemporary states in Europe and elsewhere.

By contrast, the modern historian Pierre Goubert synthesizes the political and social developments of over a half-century of French history, while Louis treats only a few years in the 1660s. Goubert's purpose is to interest the general reader in the historical problem of how the aims of Louis's state accorded or conflicted with the basic conditions of life in French society. This brilliant essay combines the results of recent research in demographic and social history with the work of older political and diplomatic historians. The development of the state, as such, is not Goubert's subject, nor are the religious and psychological conditions which linked social and economic developments to the state. The great distance between the peasantry and the state was bridged by taxes for

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Goubert, the one link which both royal officials and the peasants took very seriously.

Each author has his own conceits which he more or less consciously plays on the reader. For example, Louis XIV takes credit for many of the policies and decisions that were in fact made by Mazarin, Colbert, and Louvois. But Louis can never be taken at his word, which is the principal lesson that can be drawn from the *Mémoires* by those who seek to write the political and administrative history of the reign.

In the school of historical demography led by Goubert one of the conceits is to make generalizations about twenty million Frenchmen by extrapolating from evidence painstakingly collected about a few thousand. But on a more fundamental level, each author attempts to instruct the reader by evoking other historical ages and other men of power. The didactic element is very clear in both works. Louis XIV consciously imitates the classics, especially Plutarch and Caesar, in order to create the impression that he also possesses heroic qualities as supreme governor of France and that consequently his name will rank among the greatest rulers of all time. Louis's tone is magisterial. In sharp contrast, the tone of Goubert's work is populistic, witty, and peppered with contemporary *topoi*. Instead of harking back to Alexander the Great, Goubert looks forward to comment on twentieth-century political leaders; for example, "Louis XIV had just celebrated his seventieth birthday, an unusual age for the period and an age at which, even in the twentieth century, all but such men as believe themselves possessed of a mission are thinking seriously of retirement" (p. 253). The unsubtle allusion to de Gaulle is designed to reflect negatively from Louis XIV to the general, both popularly supposed to have been enthralled with divine ambitions. In Louis's *Mémoires*, however, the allusion to the ancient conquering hero is positive and designed to raise him to greater stature.

Condemned also for his expansionist policies by Goubert, Louis XIV is nevertheless exonerated from other tragedies which befell the French during his reign. Formerly, republican and liberal historians delighted in blaming the long wars of Louis XIV for the severe depression of the late seventeenth century, but Goubert will have none of this. Instead of attributing this depression and the famine and misery which brought death to hundreds of thousands to the war and its concomitant high taxes, Goubert demonstrates that these conditions must have been caused by something much more "fundamental" than the state and its wars. Indeed, the analysis of mortality, marriage, and birth statistics, as well as grain prices, suggests that no matter how oppressive the state may have appeared to some of Louis's opponents, especially to aristocrats, even in its heyday under the Sun King the state lacked the totali-

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tarian power needed to intervene in the private lives of all Frenchmen.

But are these really Louis XIV's *Mémoires?* Scholars have delighted in producing different editions and in quarreling about which parts were actually submitted to the king for revision. Paul Sonnino, the translator of this publication, demonstrates superb scholarship on these matters in an article, "Louis XIV's Memoirs," published in *French Historical Studies* (1964, 303-37). Since his purpose here is to present Louis to the more general reader of political thought and history, he does not undertake to consider which parts are authentically by Louis XIV. The reader should, therefore, be wary about attributing some passages to Louis, since Sonnino has included parts which either the king or his assistants specifically decided to delete. The proof for the existence of God (p. 59), for example, was deleted in the seventeenth century by one of Louis's assistants, according to J. Longnon (*Mémoires,* Paris, 1927). This proof argues that many things exist which cannot be seen, a self-evident proposition, and that though we may not see God, He exists, a position that scarcely accords with other evidence about the religious beliefs of Louis XIV. Did a ghost writer propose this passage to Louis, who then chose to delete it? Sonnino is very helpful in presenting as much of the material as possible, for from reading it scholars can grasp the ideas of intellectuals who surrounded Louis and who worked under his direct supervision on the *Mémoires,* but a note of warning should have been added about some of the major variations in the texts. Nevertheless, this careful translation, which captures so well the mood of the original French, makes a valuable addition to the general reading available to all those interested in the seventeenth century and in the political thought of men of power.

Goubert's description of the Sun King accords quite well, alas, too well, with that of the *Mémoires,* but Louis himself must be held responsible. The Sun King projected an image of himself which historians have generally preferred to extol or to damn, instead of seeking to discern the real Louis who worked so hard to conceal his own beliefs and feelings. To appear in the tradition of Alexander the Great was undoubtedly desirable for a ruler in the seventeenth century. It is less so in the twentieth century, Goubert implicitly argues. The latter's account of Louis's life is drawn largely from E. Lavisse's great *Histoire de France* (Paris, 1908). American scholars, notably John B. Wolf (*Louis XIV,* New York, 1968) and John Rule (ed., *Louis XIV and the Craft of Kingship,* Columbus, 1969) have recently gone behind this older description of the king and drastically revised the Lavisse account. The French edition of Goubert's book reviewed here was published before these works; hence it would be unfair to criticize him for holding to the

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older view of the king's life and thought. But at the same time it is fair to say that the stereotype of Louis better served Goubert's purposes than the Louis described by American scholars, for once locked into his own times the king's behavior takes on a quality and complexity which does not permit clever analogies across centuries. The lucid, refreshing analysis of French society is Goubert's contribution, and it is a great one indeed.

OREST RANUM
The Johns Hopkins University

The Emerging City: Paris in the Age of Louis XIV *by Leon Bernard. Durham, N. C., Duke University Press, 1970.—viii, 326 pp. $10.00.*

Two books on seventeenth-century Paris have recently appeared in the United States, reflecting both the revival of interest in the age of Louis XIV and the growing concern with urban problems. Orest Ranum's *Paris in the Age of Absolutism* was published in 1968 and Leon Bernard's *The Emerging City* only two years later. Both are works of synthesis intended to appeal to the general reader interested in French history or in Paris. Ranum emphasizes the first half of the century and frequently diverges from urban to national history; Bernard concentrates on the latter half of the century and hews closely to the line of conventional urban history. He presents in readable and systematic form a summary of existing knowledge on a number of aspects of Parisian life in the age of Louis XIV: population growth, building construction, administration, transportation, street lighting, police and crime, charity and health care, pollution, education, provisioning, and—rather strangely—the theater, although other cultural forms are omitted. His book reveals a complex world of privilege, fiercely guarded private and corporate rights, and constantly encroaching government regulations and financial exactions. It reveals also a world of violence, brutality, and inhumanity, untouched by the refinement and elegance commonly associated with the reign of the Sun King. The book should be especially useful as a companion volume to literary or artistic studies of the seventeenth century and as an engaging but often, since the supporting monographs have yet to be written, superficial introduction into seventeenth-century urban problems in the continent's largest city.

I would question some of Bernard's judgments and emphases. The book is overly devoted to institutional history, too little to the realities of existence in seventeenth-century Paris; his sources, perhaps, offered

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him no other course. He underestimates the detrimental effect of the deflection of Louis's interests from Paris to Versailles. He does less than justice to the influence of Colbert on the Paris of his time. He probably exaggerates the beneficial consequences of the establishment of the office of lieutenant of police in 1667. In comparing the changes effected in Paris of the seventeenth century with those of the Second Empire in the nineteenth, he magnifies the former and depreciates the latter. Bernard insists at both the beginning and the end of his book on the long continuity of urban change in Paris, and he holds that Napoleon III and Baron Haussmann were not as revolutionary as people have been led to believe—chiefly by me in *Napoleon III and the Rebuilding of Paris*. They should, he maintains, be seen as "links in a chain which stretches back to the seventeenth century and forward to the present day urbanists." In that earlier century authoritites were already concerned with problems that plagued Paris in the nineteenth century, and they began to do something about them. But Napoleon III and Haussmann were more than links in a chain. The changes they effected are without comparison in any pair of decades before or since, even in the age of Louis XIV.

DAVID H. PINKNEY
University of Washington

The Court and the Country: The Beginning of the English Revolution *by Perez Zagorin. New York, Atheneum, 1970.—xiv, 366 pp. $10.00.*

Orange and Stuart, 1641-1672 *by Pieter Geyl, translated by Arnold Pomerans. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1969.—xii, 443 pp. $8.95.*

Of these two books, Perez Zagorin's is vastly more significant. It is a bold and, in many respects, persuasive effort at reinterpreting the causes of the English Revolution. Zagorin emphatically rejects both the Marxist and the Puritan explanations of this crisis. He is particularly unhappy with the view, articulated by Tawney, Hill, and Stone, that the revolution was a class struggle between rising gentry and merchants and declining aristocrats. Indeed he questions whether the seventeenth century was a period of major social change. As for religion, he roundly denies Walzer's revolution of the Puritan saints. Instead, he sees the crisis as a narrowly political-constitutional fissure within the English ruling caste. As his title indicates, Zagorin finds this ruling caste to have been divided

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from the 1620s onward into two distinct camps, the ins and the outs, the courtiers with government jobs and their "country" critics, untainted by influence and corruption. There is no meaningful economic or social differentiation between court and country, for both groups consisted of affluent peers, gentry, and merchants. He grants that the court was associated with Establishment Anglicanism and the country with Puritanism, but this religous division was not functional. Religious issues neither caused nor shaped the crisis. The revolution described by Zagorin is scarcely a revolution at all, for according to him, both courtiers and countrymen were staunch conservatives trying to defend the existing social order.

It was H. R. Trevor-Roper who first popularized the court-versus-country concept, but Zagorin's formulation of the conflict is far more satisfactory. He emphasizes the flimsiness of the royal bureaucratic apparatus, not (as Trevor-Roper tried to do) the court's aggrandizing wealth and effectiveness. Zagorin argues that Charles I's patronage powers were attentuated at best and that the stupidity and greed of Buckingham, Laud, and Wentworth reduced the court to a nullity by 1640. Zagorin does not explore the reasons why the Stuarts were never able to create and sell offices wholesale in the French manner, nor why they made such a mess of selling titles of nobility, nor why the centralized bureaucracy grew increasingly feeble in England at the very time it was growing stronger in most continental states. He is much more interested in tracing the rise of a national "country" opposition to the king. Parliament was the center of country strength, and Zagorin devotes a great deal of his narration to Parliament, especially in 1641-42. Surprisingly little is said about county politics, about the doings of those truly country gentry who joined the opposition to the king without coming to Westminster. Zagorin tends to view events through the eyes of the parliamentary diarist Sir Simonds D'Ewes, one of the most conservative adherents of the country party. Neither D'Ewes nor Zagorin gives adequate attention to the role of the London crowd, so crucial in 1641-42, nor to the outpouring of religious enthusiasm in the sermons and pamphlets of these years—asserting a religious dynamic which cannot be found in the parliamentary debates. Thus Zagorin's approach has severe limitations. Nor is his scholarship quite up to date, for he ignores several important studies published three or four years before his own. Nonetheless this is a fresh, vigorous, and stimulating book and deserves a wide audience, even though it is by no means the last word on the subject.

By contrast, the late Pieter Geyl's narration of the love-hate relationship between the princely houses of Orange and Stuart is strictly for specialists only. Originally published in 1939 in Dutch, Geyl's book has now

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been translated into English by Arnold Pomerans. The title is misleading, for Geyl is really concerned with Dutch domestic party struggles, and the Stuarts enter his narrative only marginally. He has chosen to treat the period in which the Oranges were generally clients of the Stuarts and stops short of the years 1672-89, in which William III turned the tables on Charles II and James II. The book is no work of art; it is disjointed, shapeless, and clogged with details. One may wonder whether such a minor piece, even by a scholar of Geyl's renown, deserves this resurrection.

RICHARD S. DUNN
University of Pennsylvania

Colonial Issues in British Politics, 1945-1961: From 'Colonial Development' to 'Wind of Change' *by David Goldsworthy. London, Oxford University Press, 1971.—xi, 425 pp. $14.50.*

The purpose of this monograph sounds straightforward enough: to consider "the impact of colonial events and problems on British domestic politics, and conversely the impact of domestic politics on the course of colonial policy, in the period leading up to British decolonization" (p. vii). But, at least as handled here, the subject proves remarkably elusive. In the end, one acquires a reasonably good impression of the role of colonial issues in Parliament during this period, but one has not learned very much about British politics in any more comprehensive or profound sense.

Some additional light is shed on the reasons for the inability of successive British governments to do much more than follow events in the colonies and the general unwillingness of British politicians to attempt anything like a stemming of the nationalist tide, let alone make any serious effort at slower or more rationally planned decolonization. But these were scarcely mysterious matters anyhow, and the additional light reveals for the most part a familiar landscape.

The difficulty is certainly not all of the author's making. Although he could and did interview former colonial and commonwealth secretaries, much of the historical record is of course not yet open to scrutiny. Thus such questions as the reasons for Arthur Creech Jones's aborted career—he could not find a safe seat in Parliament after his defeat in the general election of 1950—go unanswered. But the author's view sometimes appears unnecessarily limited; for instance, in analyzing the sharply increasing restiveness of the Labour party's left wing during 1950 and

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1951, he sticks to colonial issues to such an extent that the wrenching disputes over the future of socialism and the bitter disillusionment with the Labour government's domestic and foreign policy performance—which were the main features of the party's history in those years, and which account for the Left's obstreperousness—go practically unnoticed.

Questions of scope and context aside, does one need the full armament of scholarly research to reveal so obvious a fact as the tendency for Labour M.P.s to raise more questions in Parliament than Conservatives concerning the rights of colonial peoples (p. 85)? In fairness, this appears to be one of the instances of which Goldsworthy himself says that "some commonsense impressions are borne out." And it should be added that these banalities are offset by more interesting passages, such as a good description of that extraordinary organization, the Fabian Colonial Bureau. Toward the close of the volume there is less plodding, more clarity and succinctness; and the author's judgments are sensible and fair minded throughout.

The sober fact of the matter would seem to be that colonial issues had very little impact on British domestic politics, and vice versa. The reason is not far to seek, although Goldsworthy relegates it to a brief appendix on "Public Opinion on Colonial Affairs." The British electorate generally knew and cared little about the subject. In 1951, 59 per cent could not name a single British colony. Not until after Goldsworthy's period did colonial issues, in the indirect form of colored immigration to the United Kingdom, suddenly count for something in British politics.

RICHARD W. LYMAN
Stanford University

The Sociology of British Communism *by Kenneth Newton. London, The Penguin Press, 1969.—viii, 214 pp. $7.50.*

Sociology, which by definition is the science of society or the study of "the forms, institutions and functions of human groups," has fallen into disrepute because, in large measure, academic sociologists and Ph.D.s have substituted interviews and statistics for an intimate knowledge of the motions of the particular groups under study. And *The Sociology of British Communism* by Kenneth Newton is no exception.

Within the 140 pages of text and graphs (exclusive of appendixes and charts), there are 573 footnotes consisting of actual quotations or paraphrases from over 500 books and periodicals, in addition to a sizable number of excerpts from interviews. Naturally, one can glean from these

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footnotes a vast amount of information, truncated as it may be, as well as become acquainted superficially with a vast bibliography. What the reader of this book learns about the British Communist party from this sociological method is, however, at best very little, and even that little is not new.

Besides, in the Communist world, it is impossible to gain an accurate picture of the inner workings of the apparatus from the printed word or even from interviews. And Mr. Newton apparently realizes this when on a number of occasions he concludes in a vein similar to the one on page 140: "Throughout this study it has been continually stressed and emphasized that the quantity and quality of data about the B.C.P. [British Communist Party] is far from satisfactory and that few hard and dependable conclusions can be drawn." Then why, one may ask, the book?

Just one subject handled by Mr. Newton indicates very well the difficulty if not the impossibility of arriving at an accurate estimate of the workings of the inner core of the party—namely the subject of "democratic centralism" and therefore the question of totalitarianism. Mr. Newton is completely in error when by a complex method of juggling quotations, interviews, and debates, he concludes that "democratic centralism" is as democratic a procedure as that practiced in the Labor party or the Conservative party. And to affirm this assertion, Mr. Newton maintains: "Perhaps the only conclusion to draw is that one ought not to assert or assume that the Party is totalitarian until it is proven to be so. This study has not been able to collect the necessary data to prove this . . ." (p. 102). It might well have occurred to Mr. Newton that the fault lies in his methodology and not with his conclusion.

Mr. Newton might have been saved from making so many misjudgments if he had interviewed Jack Murphy, a long and intimate friend of mine until his death about four years ago. Mr. Murphy was one of the organizers of the B.C.P., a long-time member of its Politburo as well as a member of the Executive Committee of the Communist International and, of course, a leading member of the "steel-hardened cadres." He could have given Mr. Newton real insight into the inner workings of the top echelons of the B.C.P. Why wasn't he interviewed?

The book under review was, in a somewhat less expanded form, submitted as a Ph.D. thesis in 1965. It was obviously a thesis built with the aid of many hundreds of index cards collected over a period of years and juggled into a consecutive series of brief and staccato paragraphs. Perhaps it should have remained a Ph.D. thesis.

EARL BROWDER
Princeton, New Jersey

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Province of Freedom: A History of Sierra Leone, 1787-1870 *by John Peterson. Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1969. —354 pp. $11.00.*

The Province of Freedom, as conceived by Granville Sharp and his co-visionaries of the Clapham sect, was to afford man the opportunity to rectify the debased image which the institution of the trans-Atlantic slave trade had imposed upon slave and master alike. The ideals proposed for the community failed to take root in Sierra Leone, and even the adaptability of the "settlers" and "recaptives" which brought new hope by 1850 proved short lived. From the start of the experiment, only a small percentage of the eligible were willing to forego a certainty of discrimination in Great Britain for a spurious freedom elsewhere; and even with replenishment of the dying community with "citizens" from the Americas and from captured slave ships (not to discount the rational adaptations to circumstances made by administrators, missionaries, and the "Liberated Africans"), the Province of Freedom became a colony, rather than the intended community of free and industrious agriculturalists.

Professor Peterson has, however, written a book of success, built upon initial and sporadic setbacks; and in this endeavor, he has assessed quite lucidly the resourcefulness of a people who used cultural and ethnic heterogeneity to surmount the limitations imposed by alien benefactors who found it difficult to realize that "white man's fashion no fit for black man" (p. 236). The book's appended bibliography of primary sources could be used to enhance the objective "rewriting" of African history; in addition, the book affords deep insights into the personalities and backgrounds of black leaders and the institutions which were developed to adapt to a harsh environment and to conflicting expectations—a case study of strategies for self-determination, of the forces that influence the shaping of alternatives, and of the consequences of specific courses of action. Peterson's book is a documentary reminder that Africans, like Europeans, can assert an independence of will in seeking to realize their own personalities and aspirations.

Unfortunately, this book focuses upon only one of the ethnic groups which constitute Sierra Leone society. It is an excellent account of a group who, while retaining an important role in Sierra Leone affairs, have yet to project a satisfactory transition—as they did while "settlers" and "Liberated Africans" during the nineteenth century—from being Creoles to becoming Sierra Leoneans. The author cannot be blamed for this choice; but scholars must assume a responsibility for providing a comparable and eloquent presentation of the other and more numerous ethnic groups who must have exhibited resilience and innovative skills in

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accommodating themselves to the socio-cultural threats imposed upon them by interfering aliens, including the "Creoles." Should the focus by a Peter Kup, an Arthur Porter, a Kenneth Little, a Michael Banton—or even a Christopher Fyfe—suffice to satisify the need for an integrated assessment of the Sierra Leone experience? I sincerely hope not!

GEORGE O. ROBERTS
University of California, Irvine

African Elite: The Big Men of a Small Town *by Joan Vincent. New York, Columbia University Press, 1971.—x, 309 pp. $11.00.*

"The study of local level politics is becoming the meeting ground of social anthropology and political science in modern Africa"; thus Joan Vincent, assistant professor of anthropology at Barnard College, begins her very able analysis of the history and social organization of the parish of Gondo in eastern Uganda. She is quite right; a number of recent studies of African grass-roots politics, concerned with processes of decision-making, entrepreneurialism, and the emergence of elites, rather than with any kind of enduring "structure," have added greatly to our understanding of such processes, and the book under review is a useful addition to the genre.

Gondo parish (in Uganda local-government language, parishes are administrative units; they have nothing to do with churches) is centered on a decaying township of that name, but most of its inhabitants are peasant cultivators or fishermen. It has always been a tribally mixed community; and Professor Vincent emphasises that, socially, "ethnicity" hardly matters. The people of Gondo are not "tribesmen in town"; they are rather what she calls a "participant citizenry," in whose complex interrelationships tribal identity plays little or no part. The author justly stresses the importance of such polyethnic communities (where they exist) as bases for the development of nationalistic as opposed to "tribal" ideologies.

Her main aim is to identify the real leaders of the local community, the people with power and influence in it, the "Big Men." These are the "elite" of her title, and the strategic importance of such men in the context of rural development and change in Africa is now being increasingly, if belatedly, recognized. It is these people, rather than the various categories of "outsiders" (government officials, chiefs, missionaries, and so on), who are the real entrepreneurs and mediators of change.

The big men in Gondo do not constitute a class; the same man may be one and not be one at different times, and being big is very much a matter

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of degree. So although the biggest men are easily enough identified, as are the mass of ordinary peasants, it is a little difficult to determine just where the line should be drawn between the big and the not-big. Professor Vincent simply designates as Gondo's big men the ten householders most often named as such, over a period of time, by a sample of over 140 respondents. The figure ten seems rather arbitrary, but then so no doubt would any other figure. In fact the man with the lowest poll (16 votes) who is *included* among the elite received (according to the table, pp. 278-79) the same number of votes as another who is *excluded* (though the latter is credited with only 15 votes—in most cases the votes recorded do not appear to add up to the totals shown). And these are followed at only a few votes remove by a long line of runners-up. But wherever the line is drawn, it is clear that an elite status is recognized.

It is clear, too, that only those who have certain qualifications can occupy it. Apart from the imprecise, but no doubt indispensable, qualities of popularity, intelligence, and initiative, big men must be men of mature years (the average age of the ten was 58), and they must be married, preferably polygynously. They must have a firm stake in the land —nine out of the ten owned the land they cultivated—and they must actively work it, or have others work it for them. This they do partly by being wealthy enough to hold effective work parties, participants in which are rewarded with beer. They will probably be among the minority who own plows, and they will have enough millet and wives to process it, to provide plenty of beer for work parties, for hospitality, and for sale if they wish. Being able to count on neighborly support for agricultural work means that they will, as patrons, have a more or less fluid group of dependants or "clients." Intensive work is needed in the fields at particular times; and unless a man can count on the help of a regular group of workers (for whose assistance other big men are likely to be competing at times of agricultural crisis), production will suffer, and he is likely to fall behind in the prestige stakes. The cycle itself is largely traditional; wealth, power, and influence serve to generate and sustain further wealth, power, and influence. The rich tend to get richer, or at least to stay rich; the poor to remain poor. As Professor Vincent points out, the local belief in neighborly equality is a myth.

These then are the men who count in village affairs, both as respected members of the community in traditional, and therefore conservative, terms and also as persons having contacts with the outside world and so as innovators, "the cutting edge of societal change," as Professor Vincent puts it. It is through them, not through the official administrative structure, that the demands which emanate from the country's administrative and commercial center filter down to the ordinary peasant at

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the bottom. The importance of this village elite is obvious, once it has been pointed out, and the author's demonstration of it, grounded in a comprehensive analysis of the community's political, economic, and historical setting, is entirely convincing.

One would have thought that her study should be of special interest and importance for administrators, development officers, and others who are practically concerned with agricultural and economic progress. So it would be if it were written in plain English, but alas, it is not. Some of it (I suspect most of it) was presented as a doctoral dissertation at Columbia University, and the stigmata of the academic thesis are all too plain. Current social science models and terminology—parameters, open-ended networks, status sets and sequences, quasi-groups, spiralism, and so on—all make their bow and then, mostly, disappear. Although Professor Vincent can write clearly when she wants to, we are faced all too often with sentences like this: "Their [the parish's boundaries'] delineation is arbitrary with respect to the internal structure of the community, having its meaning in the organization of the external structure" (p. 7). This means, roughly, that community relationships don't stop at the parish boundary, which is imposed from outside. Other examples could be quoted. Sometimes terms are used rather idiosyncratically: *ecology* (p. 59), for instance, and (even more) *office* (p. 158), where "office incumbents" are taken to include "specialist craftsmen and traders," a usage which, whatever the precedent for it, seems misleading to say the least. But even though some social anthropologists would perhaps have liked to hear Professor Vincent's parishioners speak up a little more for themselves, she has written a scholarly and important book. Those who make the effort to study it with the attention it deserves (and demands) will be rewarded.

JOHN BEATTIE
Institute of Social Anthropology, Oxford

Change at Shebika: Report from a North African Village *by Jean Duvignaud, translated by Frances Frenaye. New York, Pantheon Books, 1970.—xiii, 303 pp. $6.95.*

Change at Shebika is a difficult book to categorize. It is appealing, relevant, committed, well written, insightful, and somehow illusory. It is a hodgepodge of personality sketches, journal entries, fragments of conversation, analyses of villagers and investigators alike, anthropological generalizations, political stances—the author is a member of the French intelligentsia of the Left—and references to intellectual battles of the

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quartier Latin that seem out of place in a study of a Tunisian village in which a *fellah* will spend hours hoeing around an olive tree for enough tobacco for three cigarettes.

Shebika is an isolated village of between two and three hundred inhabitants in the steppe land of southwestern Tunisia. Its inhabitants are *fellahin* who work land owned, for the most part, by outsiders: nearby villagers, local miners, and Saharan nomads who, the author claims, are the most "modern" of the landowners. The people of Shebika, like villagers throughout the Maghrib, are "tugged at by at least three conflicting forces: that of the system of large-scale exploitation of the land . . ., that of modern economy, and that of stagnation in the precarious equilibrium of poverty" (p. 91). They were the uncomprehending victims of this tug of war, but, in part through the questions put them by Duvignaud and his researchers, they came to a social awareness—and an *expectation*—that was most dramatically expressed by their resistance to an order to build a government guest house when they themselves needed—and expected—improvements in their own homes. The birth of social awareness inevitably carries with it the frustration of impotence; at Shebika the greater world was not able to provide the villagers with what they now felt was their inalienable right.

Change at Shebika is the book of a modern romantic who bemoans the advent of alienation in this desolate village—an alienation that results, to be sure, from the incursion of the modern world, including the author himself and his already alienated Tunisian students: "Nothing has much meaning at Shebika, now that they have been told that everything must change, even if the change is invisible . . ." (p. 21). One wonders whether anything ever had much meaning—in the author's sense of the word—at Shebika or will ever have much meaning—again in the author's sense—if visible change comes to the village. The irony of the book—and perhaps the best case for reading it—is that despite the author's sensitivity to the miserable condition of the villagers, he himself has never been able to cast off the intellectual trappings of his own alienation and penetrate to theirs.

VINCENT CRAPANZANO
Princeton University

Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria, *1954-1968 by William B. Quandt. Cambridge, Mass., The M.I.T. Press, 1969.—xvii, 313 pp. $8.95.*

This is one of the most useful books yet to appear on Algerian politics

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and makes serious contributions to our general understanding of revolutionary leadership and intra-elite politics throughout the third world. Rather than presenting a general history of the creation and consolidation of the Algerian state, the book limits itself to analyzing the major sorts of Algerian political elites, tracing their entrance into politics and explaining the conflicts among them—first for positions as spokesmen for the Muslim population within a French Algeria, then for control of the revolution, and finally for leadership of an independent Algeria.

Quandt divides his subjects into five groups: the liberal politicians, the radical politicians, the revolutionaries, the military, and the intellectuals. (The last two groups are in turn subdivided into *maquisards* and professional soldiers and ideologists and technicians, divisions which became of considerable importance once these groups come to power.) Quandt sees each group entering politics through "a discontinuous process of political socialization" whereby it undergoes different socializing experiences from its predecessors and reacts sharply against their failures to achieve their political goals. Contrary to common expectation, Quandt finds that the situation leading to the revolution and the conduct of the revolution itself exacerbated rather than diminished the divisions among the elite. These divisions, never well hidden, came to the fore when Ben Bella attempted to consolidate his power with the help of the military by squeezing out the politicians and revolutionaries, only to find himself ousted by the professional military, which has since ruled with increasing reliance on the intellectual technicians. Quandt emphasizes quite properly the intellectual and ideological heterogeneity of the revolution's leaders and argues forcefully that personality conflicts were of considerably more moment than ideology, most ideological statements being little more than a "mask for manoeuvers of various groups within the elite." Motivation of large groups of political actors is extremely difficult to assess, and Quandt is not entirely convincing in his attempts to explain the importance of personality quarrels in terms of an honor-conscious Algerian political culture. One would like to know more about the choice matrix for individuals at various strategic points in their careers. What specifically were the rewards and penalties for changing sides or for losing office? For a political process full of such comings and goings from power, one would like to know what people did, how they lived, when out of power and not in jail. Under just what conditions could one afford to be concerned about honor? Data for answering such questions are understandably hard to come by in any political situation, and doubly so in the case of Algeria. Certainly, when more material becomes available and

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fuller accounts can be written, they will rely heavily on the basic work of this useful book.

WILLIAM J. FOLTZ
Yale University

Communist China and Latin America, *1959-1967 by Cecil Johnson. New York, Columbia University Press, 1970.—viii, 324 pp. $9.95.*

There is a modest and unfortunately still growing number of books in Latin American studies that read like beefed-up and footnoted intelligence reports. Some are, in fact, the bastard children of the furtive union of professors with their government. Others, like the book under consideration, are the product of more conventional academic research. But whatever their origins, books of this sort usually deal in some fashion with "Communism in the hemisphere," are written in a style only once removed from bureaucratic memos, are laced with long quotations from the documents and newspapers of "the other side," are innocent of both the architecture and techniques of social science, and are presented in quasi-narrative style bereft of the sense of time that informs traditional historical writing. Although Professor Johnson occasionally tries to rise above this genre, I am afraid that his book must be numbered among the members of this unhappy family.

In the preface, the author sets out the five objectives of his study, here restated as questions: (1) Why are the Chinese interested in Latin America? (2) What is their "dialectical concept of the nature of reality"? (3) What is their concept of "people's war"? (4) How do they perceive and relate to Cuba? (5) What pro-Chinese parties and movements have they "established"? In chapter one, in what is admittedly an attempt to justify writing at such length on the Chinese in Latin America, he lists some of their commercial, cultural, and propaganda activities in the hemisphere from 1959 through 1967. It is really not a very extensive or sinister list—hardly enough to frighten even Governor Rockefeller—amounting to perhaps one-ten-thousandth of the aggregate activity carried on by the United States in the same area during the same period. Chapters two and three are devoted, respectively, to an analysis of the "Ideological Framework for Chinese Foreign Policy" and "The Chinese Concept of People's War." I do not know how China specialists would rate these chapters, but they seemed acceptably done—if repetitive—to a nonexpert. Chapter four is a "Comparative Analysis of the Chinese and Cuban Concepts of People's War," concentrating very heavily on a

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comparison of the thought of Mao and Debray. It seems thin and dated, not only because it ends in 1967 and has been bypassed by events in Latin America, but because fuller and more multifaceted treatments of the same materials are available elsewhere. Chapter five deals with "Sino-Cuban Relations," and then chapters six through eight deal with the "Pro-Chinese Parties" of Brazil, Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, and other countries. The book ends with a short conclusion.

What is so disheartening about the materials presented is that after several hours of reading one doesn't come away with anything that can be called new knowledge or new insight. The materials on Chinese theory and practice are treated very competently elsewhere, and the materials on Latin America are thin and of secondary importance even within the limited context of "subversion in the hemisphere." Of course if you don't know anything about the Peru-China Friendship Association (and if you care), you will get a few words and perhaps even a reference in this book. But if you are convinced that scholarly books in the social sciences should extend one's understanding at least one silly millimeter past "the facts" into an appreciation of more general aspects of the human condition, then books of this sort are a waste of time for all except those who are intensely curious about the bits and pieces of the limited Chinese presence in the hemisphere.

Let me be a bit more specific: In this day and age isn't it fair to expect a book on this topic, written by a professional political scientist and published by a major university press, to advance our understanding of the fragment of the Latin American Left that ostensibly takes its cues from Maoist thought and the Chinese experience? Why should such "foreign" ideas be attractive to even a minority on the Left? What ideological gaps are filled and what psychological needs are met by the Chinese experience as perceived and interpreted by certain Latins? What do their perceptions and uses of the Chinese experience tell us about their own political milieu and about their search for a viable ideology of development and change? Tough questions? Of course, but the kind of questions that at least justify the use of scarce scholarly resources when an honest attempt is being made to answer them.

When the author does venture a millimeter away from his analysis of documents and newspapers, he is, alas, at his most fatuous. Consider one of his major conclusions when he attempts to assess Chinese chances of increasing their influence in the hemisphere:

> The propensity of Latins to settle their political differences by resorting to armed force is a part of their political culture that could redound to the benefit of the Chinese. Since winning their independence from Spain and Portugal in the nineteenth century, they have often managed their political affairs in

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> accordance with the principle that political power grows out of the barrel of a gun. In making the latter statement, I am not suggesting, of course, that they have consciously followed the famous Maoist maxim, but I am contending that their frequent use of armed force in the political realm would predispose them to follow the path of armed struggle advocated by the Chinese. Certainly they would be more inclined to do so than are some other peoples, such as the Dutch or the Scandinavians (p. 287).

Without using bad language, what is one to say to a scholar who makes such statements in this day and age?

RICHARD R. FAGEN
Stanford University

The Colonial Heritage of Latin America: Essays on Economic Dependence in Perspective *by Stanley J. Stein and Barbara H. Stein. New York, Oxford University Press, 1970.—viii, 222 pp. $5.00.*

This book's subtitle might better have been "Two Historians in Search of a Framework, with a Presentist Perspective." The book raises such basic questions as "To what end history?" or "What questions do historians ask?" and forces an examination of the import of the proposition, almost an ethical tenet, "Each era rewrites history."

This brief book masterfully synthesizes data on most main themes of the societal structures and interrelations of that vast system, the Spanish empire, from its beginning to its end. The weightings given various institutions (economic, political, administrative, social, religious) seem basically correct—for any interpretation. So also does treating Spain and its colonialist competitors as parts of a larger system which was generating industrial capitalism. Unusual historical sources provide apt quotations at chapter heads illuminating this evolving panorama. One learns much from this compendious, tightly argued section.

The second section and short epilogue concerning the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, respectively, are increasingly synoptic, despite a manifoldly more complex reality. Oversimplification and almost misrepresentation result in the discussion of racism and in exaggerated contrasts to the United States (e.g., pp. 126-37). An index follows a bibliography uncoordinated with the text and unusable for specific reference; footnotes are absent.

The problem of the book is interpretation. The interpretive framework derives from "dependency theory"—apparently borrowed from today's plethora of Latin American dependency theorists, uncritical, for exam-

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ple, of its moral and metaphysical overtones. Generally, the "theory" serves only moderately well for neocolonialism, which by definition involves a "dependency." But the Steins impose it also not only on the colonial relationship—in significant respects, such as sovereignty, quite different from neocolonialism—but, far worse, on international relationships around 1500. Is it legitimate to apply a concept specifically developed for elaborated capitalist-imperialist forms to economies scarcely having begun to transform ("develop" in our presentist, ethnocentric language) from a feudal societal system? The Steins force us to regard Spain and England of 1500 as if they were Hispaniola and England in 1850.

Thus their historical interpretation is committed to morals and models whose presentism and, at worst, also ethnocentrism and metaphysical unilinearity are encoded in the concept "modernization" (see, pp. 88, 113, 136, 189). The modernization concept leads them to misrepresent U.S. "modernity" (e.g., p. 189) and to condemn Spain for stagnation and nonprogressiveness, despite its success in maintaining an empire for four hundred years, probably historically an almost unprecedented feat.

These problems suggest that historians still have no disciplinary theory of society nor do they accommodate their historiography to some coherent extant societal theory. They do not ask questions arising from a consistent societal interpretation, but rather from temporocentric commitments, with models borrowed uncritically and out of context. These assertions can be documented extensively from the Steins' book. We are left wondering, "To what end history?"

ANTHONY LEEDS
University of Texas

The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade: Britain, Brazil and the Slave Trade Question, 1807-1869 *by Leslie Bethel. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970.—xvi, 425 pp. $13.50.*

The Negro in Brazilian Society *by Florestan Fernandes, translated by J. D. Skiles, A. Brunel, and A. Rothwell. New York, Columbia University Press, 1969.—xxv, 489 pp. $12.50.*

These are two important books—not only for the subject matter—but because they present badly needed and revealing evidence for persons dedicated to the study of Anglo-Brazilian relations and the present

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status of blacks (*prêtos*) in São Paulo, Brazil.

Bethel in his well researched and thoughtful volume has made a valuable contribution toward a better understanding of how the Brazilians were able to resist for 44 years the persistent and determined efforts of the British government to abolish the Brazilian slave trade, first by treaties and subsequently through the use of the British navy.

His approach, rigorously historical and chronological, reveals that Brazilian public opinion related the survival of the slave trade to their "national sovereignty" and economic well-being. The slave traders, mainly Portuguese nationals residing in Brazil and trading under the flags of various nations, were powerful and influential men, and the national government more or less functioned as their captive and pliant committee. One sentence in the book clarifies the ambiguous character and vacillating actions of the Brazilian government: "Thus the government itself is in fact a slave trading government against its own laws and treaties" (p. 289). This paradoxical position of the government was responsible for Britain employing her great navy on the West African and Brazilian coasts to suppress the slave trade.

Although Bethel relies heavily on documents from the Public Record Office, the Foreign Office, and other similar British archival sources which give the bibliographic coverage an uneven but inevitable bias, nevertheless the usefulness of the work is immense and has much to commend it.

Until the appearance of this volume by Florestan Fernandes, a specialized study of contemporary Brazilian race relations in English had been lacking. Brazilians have carefully cultivated and merchandised the "ego-image" that their country is the promised land for blacks and mulattoes because of an absence of racial discrimination. The author, a Brazilian professor of sociology, carefully and systematically destroys this myth of a Brazilian racial democracy.

Thoroughly surveying the literature relating to race and race relations and combining it with field research in the city of São Paulo, Fernandes traces the moral and social ruin of the *prêto* following emancipation; ignored by an indifferent society, he was left to adapt as best he could to the rigorous demands of an urban society.

Fernandes documents instances of institutional racism particularly in employment, which relegates blacks to marginal social and economic existence by not absorbing them in the competitive social order. This is the reason why no blacks can be seen working in the biggest shops, tourist agencies, commercial offices, and first-class restaurants. The *prêto*'s problem is compounded by his existence in a system which, culturally and emotionally unsure of itself, "has a morbid desire to

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be white." Therefore, the *prêto*'s acceptance in the competitive social order is conditioned on the extent to which he loses his somatic characteristics and approaches a white configuration under such paternalistic and benevolent conditions as "miscegenation," "acculturation," and "assimilation."

While Fernandes fires his biggest guns against the traditional racist structure, he levels some of his criticism at the Afro-Brazilian's compulsive personality and his failure to perceive that the nature of Brazilian society as presently constituted is antithetical to his freedom and advancement.

This book should remove many of the doubts concerning the character of race relations in São Paulo and to some extent Brazil in general. Discrimination is not overt but subtle and disguised, and presumably will become worse when the blacks awaken from their stupor and begin militantly to challenge the whites for better positions. Then the tragi-comic joke, "There is no color prejudice here, the Negro knows his place," will become a grim unreality. It is this calamitous situation that Fernandes wants to avoid, and he seeks to warn Brazilians of the impending racial conflagration.

Though Fernandes's title is not accurate, since the book deals with São Paulo, historians and others interested in race relations in Brazil should be grateful for his careful, substantial, and profound study.

ROY A. GLASGOW
Bowie State College

Language and Ethnic Relations in Canada *by Stanley Lieberson. New York, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1970.—xii, 264 pp. $10.95.*

Anyone writing on bilingualism and biculturalism in Canada must be singularly courageous. Since the publication of the various studies by the royal commission on these subjects, any attempt to cover the same ground is indeed quite an event. The attempt, however, is bound to fail if the author ignores, in a book published in 1970, what recent research has brought to the present debate on these subjects. In fact, the present book indicates that Stanley Lieberson seems to be aware of the commission's publications only up to 1967. Furthermore, most of the data he utilizes date from before 1965.

This would not be very important if the theoretical presentation and hypothesis used would warrant the publication of the book now. But in a period which has seen the rise of separatism as a political ideology,

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the birth of a political party whose goal is an autonomous Quebec, as well as recurrent acts of violence and political murder, to limit the theoretical framework to population composition, residential segregation and isolation, occupational pressure, and the effects of age and sex, is to be strangely limited.

The basic weakness of the book is not only its lack of relevance to what is being published now or to the present theoretical debate, but its ignorance of what is being published in French on the subjects under discussion. Not only is the author unaware of Jacques Dofny and Marcel Rioux's researches on the relationship between ethnic groups and class structure, but also of Colette Carisse's analysis of the relationship between bilingualism and family structure. He even manages to quote an author out of context, as when he quotes my own research on the French family as confirmation for the declining birthrate of the French Canadian. I have certainly said a great deal on that subject, but not in the book used as reference.

The title of the book is therefore misleading. It should have been "Some reflections on the relationship between certain demographic variables and linguistic usages." Even then, it is questionable if it should have been published as a contribution to language and ethnic relations in Canada. The use of the royal commission reports will be far more rewarding.

PHILIPPE GARIGUE
University of Montreal

Revolutionary Politics in Massachusetts: The Boston Committee of Correspondence and the Towns, 1772-1774 *by Richard D. Brown. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1970.—xiv, 282 pp. $10.00.*

The justly famous Boston Committee of Correspondence not only contributed to the movement for independence but bequeathed to posterity an extensive record of its activities. Professor Brown has reexamined these manuscripts with a fresh eye and, most important of all, has thoroughly analyzed the town records. He combines these sources into an interesting discussion of revolutionary politics and political thought.

During the colonial period, Brown writes, harmony and deference characterized Massachusetts politics. Most colonials paid little attention to provincial affairs, which were dominated by a small group of politicians. British policy after 1760 disrupted this unity and polarized politics ideologically. Brown outlines the familiar "Whig" philosophy of government accepted by leaders of the colonial resistance. Hutchinson and

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his followers, on the contrary, assumed that most of the colonists would, if properly informed, accept the supremacy of Parliament and defend order and stability.

Since the governor and his allies could influence and even dominate public officials and the legislature, the Boston Whigs sought some method of communication with the towns free from executive interference. Attempts to use the press failed, so they turned to a system of correspondence with sympathetic Whigs, hoping to draw forth and unify the towns' spirit of liberty. The British decision in 1772 to pay judges supplied the necessary issue. In November, the Boston committee produced a major pamphlet, combining a theoretical statement of rights with a list of specific grievances and sent out 600 copies. Hutchinson obligingly entered the fray with a speech emphasizing the necessity of subordination to Parliament and the restoration of harmony.

The replies to the pamphlet from scores of towns "comprised the most elaborate general expression of provincial opinion that Massachusetts had ever witnessed," and revealed an ideological consensus which laid a broad theoretical base for the revolution. Moreover, they apparently reflected the views of the people generally, not just of their leaders. During the following years the Boston committee continued to draw forth expressions of these common assumptions and to help unify the towns into cooperative resistance. "After six generations," Brown concludes, "Massachusetts was turning away from the traditional ideal of active leaders with passive followers toward the radical goal of an alert, actively engaged populace."

Brown's discussion of the committee's pamphlet, his analysis of the towns' statements, and his conclusion concerning the committee's role in drawing out and crystallizing public opinion are valuable and persuasive. Not all readers will accept his interpretation of a pre-1772 stability and consensus, nor will they all agree that integration followed. Indeed, Brown himself indicates that some towns were more advanced than others in their willingness to resist Britain and to establish a popular government, towns which almost invariably lay in the agricultural interior or in Maine. He discards with only superficial mention any cultural, social, or economic explanation of or influence on political ideas. This emphasis on concensus and the importance of ideology makes the committee's role crucial, whereas it might otherwise be merely provocative, so that the committee's significance depends upon the validity of his framework. In general, however, Brown has written an excellent monograph.

JACKSON TURNER MAIN
State University of New York at Stony Brook

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Thomas Jefferson and the New Nation: A Biography *by Merrill D. Peterson. New York, Oxford University Press, 1970.—x, 1072 pp. $15.00.*

This admirable biography underscores Jefferson's irresistible appeal to American scholars. The zenith of Jefferson's historical reputation may have been reached in the 1930s, but the decades since World War II—despite energetic efforts to refurbish the historical reputations of his contemporaries (Madison, Hamilton, and Adams among them)—have witnessed no major abatement of interest. This is attested to by the more than two decades of scholarly dedication and labor which have gone into Julian Boyd's preparation of a new and definitive edition of Jefferson's writings and into Dumas Malone's magisterial biography (neither of which is yet completed). Yet this generation has until now failed to meet another major challenge of Jeffersonian scholarship—a brief, one-volume synthesis of Jefferson's life and thought. A decade or so ago, Professor Merrill Peterson, having completed his superb exploration of *The Jeffersonian Image in the American Mind,* accepted the challenge and the present biography is the felicitous result. Brief, however, it is not; for the 1000-odd pages of this work might as conveniently have been bound in two volumes as in one.

Although Peterson interprets the multitudinous events of Jefferson's life "in the light of three dominant motifs: democracy, nationality, and enlightenment," it is clearly the latter motif that elicits his greatest admiration and enthusiasm. It is doubtless for this reason that the most memorable—and perhaps durable—sections of this biography are those which describe Jefferson the cosmopolitan scientist and philosopher, the personification and exponent of the civilizing arts, the advocate of "rationality in all things," the leader "in the eighteenth-century campaign to enlist man in the cause of nature and nature in the service of mankind." Peterson's book, in brief, excels as intellectual rather than as political history.

This is not to say that Jefferson's long and illustrious political career is neglected. It is the subject of the bulk of this biography and is set forth comprehensively and with extraordinary narrative skill. In conspicuous instances, moreover, Peterson presents innovative and significant reinterpretations, notably in his defense of Jefferson's frequently derided commercial policy as both plausible and statesmanlike. In other instances, however, he knowingly—even gladly—swallows the alluring bait which few close students of the great Virginian's career care to resist—the acceptance of Jefferson's own assessment of his partisan

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opponents and the resolution of those glaring inconsistencies which, as Henry Adams perceived a century or so ago, are more suitable to irony than justification. The most notable example of the latter is the embargo of 1807, which Peterson describes with sympathy for Jefferson's good intentions and his virtually ineluctable difficulties rather than with incredulousness (again, like Henry Adams) at such virtually unprecedented diplomatic naïveté. The most conspicuous instance of partisanship is Peterson's interpretation of Alexander Hamilton ("the little New Yorker, who played at the games of a Caesar," conveys the attitude).

But to take issue with a few of Professor Peterson's interpretations is a disservice to a book characterized by such interpretative balance and narrative skill. This volume, in short, has the design, the skillful construction, the architectural strength that biography of the first order of importance must have.

JACOB E. COOKE
Lafayette College

The Discovery of the Asylum: Social Order and Disorder in the New Republic *by David J. Rothman. Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1971.—xx, 376 pp. $12.50.*

In a book that is simultaneously a work of history and social criticism, David J. Rothman presents an interpretation of American society during the first half of the nineteenth century that is both provocative and disturbing. His thesis, which is clear and lucid, is relatively simple. By the early nineteenth century, according to Rothman, the traditional and stable society of the colonial period had begun to disintegrate. Aware of the momentous changes that were taking place, Americans were uncertain as to how they should meet the challenges of the new order and restore the social cohesion they deemed so vital to society. Obsessed with deviant and dependent behavior, they ultimately came to the conclusion that "to comprehend and control abnormal behavior promised to be the first step in establishing a new system for stabilizing the community, for binding citizens together."

The solution that Americans adopted, writes Rothman, involved the creation of the "asylum"—an institution that would reform criminals, juvenile delinquents, poor and indigent groups, mentally ill persons, and all other deviants whose abnormal behavior might or did threaten society. The result was an incredible proliferation of prisons, almshouses, houses of refuge, and mental hospitals, to cite only a few. Although most of these institutions abandoned any pretense at rehabilitation and

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rapidly degenerated into custodial institutions that served as "a dumping ground for social undesirables," they survived because it was easier to incarcerate undesirables than to seek new and different solutions.

While *The Discovery of the Asylum* will undoubtedly appeal to many contemporary readers who will share its author's anti-institutionalism and moral outrage, as a work of historical scholarship it leaves something to be desired. First, it indiscriminately confuses institutions that have superficial resemblances. A mental hospital—whatever its failures and shortcomings—*did* care for sick individuals, since its patient population included substantial numbers of cases of general paresis and senile psychoses (both of which were clearly of organic origin). To identify jails, almshouses, and mental hospitals as variations of one species is inaccurate, even though they had much in common. Secondly, a comparative approach casts grave doubts over the validity of Rothman's thesis. If confinement in specialized "asylums" was the response of a nation which feared change and saw institutionalization as a means of social control, how then does one explain the fact that these very same institutions (jails, almshouses, mental hospitals) appeared in England and on the continent either earlier or at the very same time as in America. Yet there is little evidence to indicate that the social order in Europe was undergoing the same or a similar process of disintegration. Thirdly, the book is simplistic; it deals with complex social processes without the subtleties and nuances that mark sophisticated scholarship. Rothman's approach to history is too rationalistic and intellectualized, for he assumes a one-to-one relationship between intent and consequence. Finally, the evidence used is either incomplete or one-sided. The book in general is not based on manuscript sources, which would have added a dimension that is presently lacking. To write about mental hospitals and yet not to examine the extensive and rich collections of Dorothea L. Dix, Thomas S. Kirkbride, Samuel B. Woodward, Pliny Earle, Edward Jarvis, and others, is unforgiveable. Moreover, Rothman has conveniently summarized all of the evidence that validates his thesis, but has neglected or slighted the material that contradicts his interpretation.

I am sorry to be so critical of this book, which despite its defects has many shrewd and brilliant insights. Had Rothman not been so intent on reducing all phenomena to one simple thesis and offering a lesson to our own generation, his book could have been a major contribution to American social history. That it is not is partly a product of the confusion of ideology with scholarship.

GERALD N. GROB
Rutgers University

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Charles Sumner and the Rights of Man *by David Donald. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1970.—xix, 587 pp. $15.00.*

The first volume of Professor Donald's biography of Sumner, published in 1960, ended with the coming of the Civil War. This second volume carries the controversial New Englander through the war and Reconstruction to his death in 1874. It is based on painstaking research in the source materials for that period and bears witness to the author's acquaintance with the best secondary literature dealing with the era. It is also one of those all-too-infrequent products of the historian's art that is readable as well as scholarly. Careful analysis, used whenever needed to prove a point, does not destroy the reader's interest. Professor Donald writes with clarity and grace, and his keen sense of humor gives lightness of touch to his portrayal of Sumner's complex character and career.

The highlights of Sumner's role—the influence he exerted as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, his relations with three presidents and their secretaries of state, his attitude toward Negro rights and the reconstruction of the South—stand out in high relief, and in this resurrection of the man, his character is clearly portrayed. He emerges an egotistic, ambitious, contumacious individual, by turns idealist and politician, who proclaimed his moral superiority with insufferable complacency but who, whenever he saw fit to do so, would compromise ideals or negotiate supposedly nonnegotiable principles. But through this welter of contradictions, he emerges as a convinced believer in desegregation and complete civil and political equality for the blacks, a man who in this respect was far in advance of his own time and, alas, of ours as well.

There are occasional statements by the author that raise questions in the mind of this reviewer. That "Lincoln gave Sumner a virtual veto over foreign policy" after the president had toned down Seward's dispatch to Adams of May 21, 1861, and that then "under Sumner's watchful eye he [Seward] grew 'mild and gentle' in his conduct toward foreign powers" (p. 25) are assertions that indicate Sumner was at first given far more control over the government's foreign policy than he actually possessed. They are based on Sumner's letters to his friends, and Sumner, as Professor Donald has made abundantly clear, was a man who by nature dealt in superlatives and who had an unlimited capacity for absorbing the flattery which Lincoln knew how to supply when needed. Sumner's description of his relations with the executive department can no more be trusted in this instance than when, in 1865, Sumner quoted

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Lincoln as saying that he had counseled with Sumner during the war twice as much as with Seward, and Sumner hinted that he might soon be called upon "to decide the question whether to quit the Senate," presumably to replace Seward in the State Department.

Professor Donald's account of Sumner's influence during wartime leaves the Lincoln-Seward team in firm control of foreign policy. Sumner did not exercise anything like the influence over wartime foreign policy that he did during the early part of the first Grant administration. It may also be noted that the author falls into a minor error in saying that Seward "leveled charges" against Motley in Vienna in 1867 (p. 372). Seward simply told Motley of the charges made against him by one George W. McCrackin and asked for denial or confirmation, a standard procedure in such cases.

Occasional exaggerations such as those cited above may be found in any first-rate biography and scarcely mar the outstanding merit of this work. It presents a picture of Sumner's career that must be called definitive.

GLYNDON G. VAN DEUSEN
University of Rochester

Tammany: The Evolution of a Political Machine, 1789-1865 *by Jerome Mushkat. Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, A New York State Study, 1971.—xii, 476 pp. $15.00.*

The myth of Tammany Hall as the archetype of the American political machine was developed in the last quarter of the nineteenth century by patrician political reformers, not without political purposes of their own, and was elaborated by their reform successors who also had their own political goals. It is the purpose of the author to reexamine that myth, especially as it concerns the first 75 years of the Tammany Society and its political arm, ending his analysis in 1865 when William Marcy Tweed came to power as New York City's "first 'Boss.' " His conclusions are not unambiguous: Tammany was hardly a "machine" before 1865, or it was at least only an "inefficient 'machine' "; it had an egalitarian philosophy but was not free from tactics of expediency; its rank-and-file left Tammany management to a professional cadre whose brokerage fees varied with opportunity but included officeholding as the cadre's "sovereign right"; it was dependent on political leaders at Albany or in Washington most of the time before 1865, but won increasing political autonomy

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as its electoral base expanded with New York's population growth from a small city of 33,000 in 1790 to almost one million in 1865. In short, it was an early but not at all a unique American local party organization.

The exposition is generally chronological. The author first emphasizes the early nurturing role of the Tammany Society, a fraternal and patriotic order founded in 1787, and the continuing legitimacy that the society provided for many decades to the Democratic-Republican General Committee of New York County, to whom it also leased the society's meeting room. The fraternal order, the committee, and the hall became synonymous in popular conception as "Tammany Hall." The subsequent focus is upon issues and factions—mainly the national and state issues and factions from which Tammany could not escape: for example, Jacksonian democracy, the Bank War, the Loco Foco revolt, the divisions of the 1850s, and the Civil War. These forces in turn produced local Tammany fissions and fissures. The sources of data relied upon by the author include the memoirs of political leaders, the manuscript collections of letters of leading figures and observers, newspapers and party documents, and relevant secondary works. The weight of these data leads quite naturally to an emphasis on party and factional rhetoric and detailed information about the thrust and parry of political debate, without much illumination of the mainsprings or the consequences of the almost continuously forming and reforming factional warfare. Tammany does emerge, during the long period of Democratic party dominance followed by division and disintegration, as an adaptive political institution, its leaders usually finding their way to survival by sidestepping the intractable issues, modifying their doctrines to absorb the demands of expanding electorates, and escaping the constraints from Albany by recourse to Washington or vice versa. These are among the main skills by which early party organization leaders in New York City and elsewhere built and often preserved the party systems of the nineteenth century in the United States; Tammany appears to have been simply the first and most durable large-scale urban example of a widespread phenomenon.

These findings would have been made more specific and convincing, and indeed might have included some persuasive claims for Tammany's distinctive, in addition to its prototype, qualities, if supplementary data had been used analytically to enrich the chronological narrative. For example, the demographic data of the eight decennial and the various special censuses might have been used systematically to explain the waxing and waning of issues and their relation to factions, as well as the evolution of party organization arrangements. Population growth, the changing composition of immigration, the rise of population density, and

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other evolving demographic characteristics of the city are highly salient to an examination of the early Tammany, but are unused. Similarly, election returns represent important clues to the bases of Tammany electoral strength as well as to its vulnerabilities, but these are also neglected. There is an absence, too, of systematic analysis of the class, occupational, nationality, and other characteristics of successive Tammany leadership groups (comparable, for example, to that provided by Theodore Lowi in his *At The Pleasure of the Mayor,* about New York City's mayoral cabinet membership 1898-1958). Without such an analysis neither the historian nor the political scientist can successfully measure the adaptive qualities of the evolving Tammany. Needed also is a sustained analysis of state-city-county governmental relations, significant charter changes, other alterations in the governmental and administrative structure of the city and county, changes in the electoral structure (particularly the slow movement from control by party rules over voting and over nominations to control by statutory provisions), and both the quantitative and qualitative evolution of the city and county governmental revenues and expenditures. All these matters are indispensable to a full examination of how and why Tammany survived and grew from 1789 to 1865; they are, indeed, more central to the explanation than is the campaign rhetoric of factional leaders using issues more often as tactics and strategies than as authentic statements of doctrine or purpose.

This rich narrative of Tammany's first 75 years provides many insights into the birth and growth of a fascinating political institution. It leaves many equally important questions unanswered.

WALLACE S. SAYRE
Columbia University

Letters of Louis D. Brandeis, Vol. I (1870-1907): Urban Reformer *edited by Melvin I. Urofsky and David W. Levy. Albany, State University of New York Press, 1971.—xliii, 610 pp. $20.00.*

A Mind of One Piece: Brandeis and American Reform *by Melvin I. Urofsky. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971.—xiii, 210 pp. $6.95.*

These two books complement each other to a considerable extent, as is indeed natural since the author of the second is one of the editors of the first.

About the letters one has reservations. Too many of them are trivial and repetitive; others are so detailed as to be of interest only to special-

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ists. Perhaps it would have been wiser not to have issued a separate volume covering this early portion of Brandeis's career and to have published the cream of all the letters in one volume. But despite these criticisms, many of the letters are very illuminating. And the notes are exemplary.

The letters give a picture of the young Brandeis very different from that which his career as justice of the Supreme Court and venerable prophet of Israel gave to those who knew him only in his later life. One is not prepared for the pedantic quality of some of his early letters to his family nor, perhaps, for the almost romantic glow of some of his letters to his fiancee. One is constantly made aware of Brandeis's meticulous concern for detail, a characteristic that remained throughout his life.

There is a temptation to quote from many of the letters, a temptation to which Mr. Urofsky occasionally succumbed in his biographical analysis. I shall imitate him in one respect, quoting Brandeis's two letters to his office associate William Dunbar. From the first comes the rather unexpected advice about the cultivation of the "society of men":

> The knowledge of men, the ability to handle, to impress them is needed by you—not only in order that clients may appreciate your advice and that you may be able to apply the law to human affairs—but also that you may more accurately and surely determine what the rules of law are, that is, what the courts will adopt. You are prone in legal investigation to be controlled by logic and to underestimate the logic of facts. Knowledge of the decided cases and of the rules of logic cannot alone make a great lawyer. He must know, must feel 'in his bones' the facts to which they apply—must know, too, that if they do not stand the test of such application the logical result will somehow or other be avoided.

From the second (1896) comes the prescience with regard to the business aspects of the large law office:

> *First:* The organization of large offices is becoming more and more a business—and hence also a professional necessity,—if properly planned and administered—it must result in the greatest efficiency to clients and the greatest success to the individual members both pecuniarily and in reputation. *Second:* In such an organization the place of each man must be found—not prescribed. The advantage of the larger field is that every man has the opportunity of trying himself at everything or anything—and by a natural law comes to do these things that on the whole he does most effectively. *Third:* As to that class of things which the individual makes his own, he must become in the office in time the principal—for those dealing with the office learn that he is considered the authority there on those things and shortly follow suit; the duration of time required for this public recognition and its extent depend on personal qualities—largely independent of intellectual ability and attainments—and of creating followers. In other words a reputation in the practical world to which the practice of the law belongs —is determined by a large number of qualities and in a proper organization

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they have even better scope for effectiveness today than in individuals standing alone.

There are only fragments of the letters to his future wife, Alice Goldmark, since their daughter has not permitted their full publication. But two of these must be quoted here:

> I long for the time when you will be with me always. You have become so large a part of my life that I rattle about sorely when you are absent. Is it not strange? For seventeen years I have stood alone—rarely asking—still less frequently caring, for the advice of others. I have walked my way all these years but little influenced by any other individual. And now, Alice, all is changed. I find myself mentally turning to you for advice and approval—indeed, also for support, and I feel my incompleteness more each day. I feel myself each day growing more into your soul, and I am very happy.
>
> Occasionally I am oppressed by the multitudinousness of things, and I sigh for the rest and peace which can only come in the thought of your continuous presence. If the twenty-third were not fixed immutably, I should feel like anticipating it, and like the Barons of old, break away and carry you off.

This volume includes much correspondence about utilities, transit companies, stock watering, the New Haven-Boston & Maine merger, and savings bank life insurance—all subjects on which Brandeis became an authority. Indeed he was, almost single-handedly, responsible for the implementation of the last of these.

The biographical analysis is, by intention, limited in scope. It deals in the main with Brandeis as a reformer in relation to the law and to trusts. But it also has chapters on his Zionist activities and his functioning as Supreme Court justice. As the State of Israel and the Supreme Court are so much in the public eye, these parts of the book are of the greatest interest. Mr. Urofsky points out that the conflict which arose in 1921 between Brandeis and Chaim Weizmann arose from fundamentally different approaches to the establishment of a Jewish homeland. Brandeis saw it as an opportunity for solid planning; to Weizmann the appeal was wholly emotional:

> Brandeis's Zionism was a function of his progressivism, a particular faith in the democratic process and in a just society. It also held that men should be free to live where they wished, free from irrational prejudices. The belief that all Jews should live in Palestine struck him as unsound and as unjust as any restrictive covenant or whispered bias. Zionism only made sense to him as a liberating movement, a process that would free the Jew and end the "Jewish problem." To Weizmann, Brandeis's solution might have seemed worse than the problem.

As to the Supreme Court, Mr. Urofsky reminds us of the violence of the opposition to Brandeis's appointment by those who feared that he "would threaten the Court's continued support of the status quo." And, of

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course, that is what he tried to do with help from Holmes and later Stone. He combined legal craftsmanship with progressive thinking. He strongly believed in the educational value of his opinions:

> His devotion to economic independence, to a balanced federal system, and to individual freedom formed a base for the educational work he tried to do on the Court. In a period of transition for the United States into a great industrial power, Brandeis realized that the law would also have to adapt, that it would have to keep pace with the new society. At the same time, he still believed in the old principles and ideals. In his judicial writings, he time and again showed how the old faiths could be adapted to newer times.

That still remains the function of the Court: to adapt the old faiths, not to abandon them.

OSMOND K. FRAENKEL
New York City

Securities Regulation and the New Deal *by Michael E. Parrish. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1970.—x, 270 pp. $8.75.*

Of all history, the legislative history of a federal regulatory statute may well be the dullest. (At least the legislative history of a state regulatory statute is often enlivened by a colorful thread of peculation and shameless self-interest.) Still, legislative history, however dull, is important to the extent that its subject is important. Unhappily, since the legislation of the New Deal subjecting securities markets to regulation (or, at any rate, to scrutiny) had no very notable economic or political consequences, this book deserves the attention of only the small band of specialists who read and write financial history.

Given the limitations of his subject matter, Professor Parrish has done a fine job on the origins of the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Public Utility Act of 1935, and the first years of the Securities and Exchange Commission. (He also includes an interesting, but largely irrelevant, account of the futile efforts of Hiram Johnson to help the American owners of foreign bonds which fell into default in the 1920s and 1930s.) Every actor is portrayed in a convincing shade of gray; the documentation cannot be faulted; and no exaggerated claims are made for the achievements of the New Deal in the area of securities regulation or elsewhere. So far as I can see, Parrish claims only that federal regulation (1) contributed to the standardization of financial reporting and (2) made it more difficult to perpetrate a crass stock or bond swindle.

That these benefits were secured only at the price of raising the cost

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of using securities markets to investors and firms seeking capital seems obvious to an economist. But since neither the benefits nor the costs of imposing federal regulation on securities markets seem to be high enough to be detectable using standard statistical techniques, there is no point in reproving the author for not having tried to weigh one against the other.

DONALD DEWEY
Columbia University

The Supreme Commander: The War Years of General Dwight D. Eisenhower *by Stephen E. Ambrose. Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1970.—ix, 732 pp. $10.00.*

Dr. Stephen E. Ambrose was associate editor of the five-volume edition of the wartime papers of General Eisenhower, so his book *The Supreme Commander* should be the definitive biography. The author has done his best to make it so; it is full, well documented, agreeably written, frank, and on the whole very fair. Eisenhower emerges from its pages as an outstandingly able and likeable man who had too many of the defects of his qualities to be a really great general:

> Eisenhower's desire to be liked and his inner need to have others co-operate were essential to forming and heading a staff. Precisely because he had these virtues, however, he lacked that ruthless, driving force that would lead him to step into a tactical situation and, through the power of his personality, extract the extra measure of energy to get across the final barrier. He never forced his subordinates in the field to the supreme effort, and as a result until almost the very end of the war there would be, at critical moments, an element of drift in the operations he directed (p. 137).

These are hard words from an official biographer, but they are borne out by the facts. In North Africa in 1942 that "extra measure of energy" might have saved a six-month campaign. In Sicily in 1943 the Germans held off an Allied force nearly ten times their size and slipped away successfully with casualties half their enemies' because Eisenhower did not push his subordinates. In Normandy no one at SHAEF could make Montgomery explain exactly what he was doing. In planning the attack on the Rhine this "element of drift" was seen at its worst. "Eisenhower had not taken a firm grip on the battle and he had vacillated," declares Dr. Ambrose of this last campaign; "even two and a half decades later it is impossible to read Eisenhower's letters and telegrams to Montgomery without a feeling of frustration because of their vagueness" (p. 527).

But this was the price to be paid for holding together the extraordinar-

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ily varied team that Eisenhower had to drive. Dr. Ambrose's criticisms of Eisenhower as a general are balanced by lavish, though not exaggerated, tributes to his tact, diplomacy, and common sense. In particular he focuses on his handling of General de Gaulle—a relationship complicated not only by de Gaulle's own pride but by the policy which Roosevelt and the State Department adopted toward France until the last few months of the war. Dr. Ambrose indeed claims, with good reason, that it was due only to Eisenhower that "America's French policy in World War II was not a total failure" (p. 491).

On Eisenhower's much criticized strategy during the last days of the war Dr. Ambrose also puts up a good defense: "The assumptions of Eisenhower's critics has been that he could have taken Berlin and that had he done so it would have made an enormous difference in the Cold War. Both assumptions remain unproven" (p. 629). In any case Dr. Ambrose shows (p. 388) that at the time Eisenhower expected that the Russians would use German labor to rebuild their own homeland and control both eastern Germany and the Balkans, a prospect which then caused him little concern. The account Eisenhower later gave in his memoirs of his feelings at the time was something less than frank. In political as well as in military affairs Eisenhower was to show himself made of willow rather than of oak.

MICHAEL HOWARD
All Souls College, Oxford

Seeds of Repression: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of McCarthyism *by Athan Theoharis. Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1971. —xi, 238 pp. $6.95.*

This is yet another New Left interpretation of the Truman administration's role in the cold war and the second Red Scare, with footnotes omitted to enhance its appeal "essentially to a nonacademic audience." The story, here in fairly orthodox form, is by now very familiar. Harry Truman allegedly reversed F.D.R.'s wise and tolerant approach to Stalin, choosing to pursue a wholly unnecessary hard-line, anti-Communist foreign policy which helped provoke the cold war. The president also set the stage for McCarthyism by hounding the Communist party, whipping up hysteria about internal subversion of the federal government, and persecuting government employees for their ideas. To Theoharis, Truman was the blackest of villains: an "elitist" who placed confidence in experts rather than "the people," an American Legionnaire who surrounded himself with Russophobes, "a politician rather than a statesman," whose "hotted-up rhetoric" distorted national goals and perverted civil liberties.

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Of course, little of this slim polemic is based upon solid source materials, and one can only regret the pretentiousness that appears in a lengthy and at times useful bibliographical essay (hardly constructed for that "nonacademic audience"). Nevertheless, Theoharis raises a number of questions that scholars will have to confront when the relevant government documents and manuscript collections become available. Above all: to what degree was Truman's loyalty program politically inspired? Alan D. Harper's recent book, *The Politics of Loyalty*, attempted to answer this question from another perspective and was more persuasive than the volume under review. But the jury remains out because so few of the facts are available. The story of the politics of civil liberties in the Truman administration remains largely unwritten.

Theoharis does not go very deeply into McCarthyism. He sees it as a political tactic, "a logical extension of traditional, conservative congressional politics," with Joe McCarthy serving as a front man for a number of partisans who sought to roll back the principles of the New Deal. Yes, but surely McCarthyism was much more than that; it extended deeply into American life and it had sociological, psychological, even economic roots. And did it begin, as Theoharis claims, in 1950? Did Senator McCarthy offer ultraconservatives "a new method" of political attack? How meaningful is, "In fact, McCarthyism was consistent with national policy on questions both of containment and of loyalty-security"? Several important volumes on the general subject are missing from the bibliography.

On the positive side, the criticisms of Truman's quest for "absolute security" are well written, as is a description of the administration's approach to the Yalta agreements (Theoharis is the author of *The Yalta Myths* [Columbia, Mo., 1970]). And two appendixes contain summations of public opinion polls on foreign policy and civil liberties. But these features do not add greatly to the appeal of a book for which there was little if any need.

THOMAS C. REEVES
University of Wisconsin-Parkside

Black Economic Development *edited by William F. Haddad and G. Douglas Pugh. Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969.—x, 176 pp., $4.95.*

Two conferences on black economic development were held during the weekend of April 26, 1969. One, sponsored by the Interreligious Foundation for Community Organization and held in Detroit, Michigan, issued the Black Manifesto which demanded reparations of $500 million

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from the United States white religious community. The other, the Thirty-fifth American Assembly of Columbia University held at Arden House in Harriman, New York, produced the papers which are collected in this book.

The above observations tell us much about the ideological framework of the authors and the nature of the papers in this volume. The contributors are primarily government officials and businessmen who have been engaged in promoting and trying to implement "black capitalism" and this is apparently their task in these papers. (The book was originally entitled "Black Capitalism" but was changed because of the objections of some of the black authors.) In reading the book I got the impression of listening to a host of campaign speeches filled with vacuous lists of things which must be done to effectively implement programs for black economic development. In fact, one of the essays, John McClaughry's "Black Ownership and National Politics," is an attempt to establish Nixon's commitment to black economic development and his role in the formulation and sponsorship of the Community Self-Determination Act, although the depth of his concern has yet to be demonstrated and the act has not been passed.

The strategy of black economic development with which these papers are concerned seeks a simultaneous increase in the level of economic activity in the community *and* in the share of that activity which is owned and controlled by the community. The achievement of both these goals, however, requires resources which are largely controlled by a relatively small segment of the white community. Thus, black economic development necessarily involves a transfer of resources from white control to black control. To be successful this change in the distribution of wealth and income between whites and blacks must not create a relatively small managerial class within the black community but must somehow involve the bulk of that community. (Similar considerations obviously apply to other nonwhite people and to poor whites as well.) The Black Manifesto meets these issues head-on by demanding that reparations be paid to the black community for centuries of racist exploitation and brutalization. This is in sharp contrast to their rather superficial treatment in this volume. Only one paper, Roy Innis's "Separatist Economics: A New Social Contract," argues strongly for the necessity of black control of the institutions which service their communities. The other authors are primarily concerned with schemes like tax credits for inducing greater investment in black areas by the white ownership class. Their reluctance to accept community control of the development process is based ostensibly on a fear that black self-determination will lead to separatism (as if that isn't now imposed by the

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white community) and on a transparent paternalism which is clearly part of the problem rather than part of the solution.

ROGER E. ALCALY
Columbia University

Black Child, White Child: The Development of Racial Attitudes *by Judith D. R. Porter. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1971.—xiii, 278 pp. $8.95.*

No one needs any proof that America's blacks have a whole range of attitudes toward themselves, as members of a distinctive and large minority; nor is it any news that in this nation (and elsewhere, too) white people in significant numbers fear or hate black people. What we are less likely to understand is the way those racial attitudes develop—when, how, with what degree of intensity or rigidity. Now Judith Porter, a social psychologist at Bryn Mawr, has given all of us an opportunity to learn so very much about ourselves—as we once were, young boys and girls growing up in a particular nation and more susceptible than we may realize to the powerful influence of a given culture. Mrs. Porter has worked for years with black and white children; in all she has studied four hundred boys and girls between the ages of three and five. She offered the children a chance to play with black and white dolls, and she asked them to draw pictures of themselves, then talk about what they had drawn. She also spent a good deal of time watching children at play, and in so doing followed Anna Freud's longstanding advice to clinicians—to make direct observations as long as possible, and only then to construct theories to account for what has been seen. The result is a book that is full of firsthand earthy description, trenchant analytic essays, and a sensible theoretical discussion which is one of the best of its kind I have read in the whole sociological and psychological literature. What one learns is that well before children go to school they have spent a lot of time listening to the racial attitudes their parents and relatives and older brothers and sisters express; and those attitudes (yes, at age three or four) have become very much the child's own. Thus do black children learn self-doubt, learn to fear for their future, learn worthlessness; and thus do white children learn to shun those different from themselves, learn to associate dark skin with hurtful, dangerous, or "lower" people.

Still, Mrs. Porter does not only overwhelm us with the poignant and alarming experiences she had to experience as a sensitive and thoughtful

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observer of young children. She studied children from a wide variety of backgrounds, and she spent a long time with them—and the result is a study both impressive and refreshing for its breadth and depth. Even more remarkable is the author's capacity to acknowledge the various ambiguities and ironies she met up with—and do so in clear, uncluttered prose. For the fact is that if black children learn to take up the habits of mind that belong to their powerful white fellow citizens, other things also happen: those same children struggle hard to learn self-respect. Even more interesting is Mrs. Porter's sense that as blacks climb up the social and economic ladder, they become in certain respects less rather than more sure of themselves; in contrast, throughout the ghettoes, for all the extreme poverty and despair around, children seem to be tough, shrewd, agile, and not so prone to morbid self-scrutiny and anticipatory self-hatred. And finally, among the many findings Mrs. Porter offers, one ought especially to compel the attention of those who are interested in the relationship between a government's policies and the behavior of its citizens. Again and again children were observed to have very definite (and often enough dismaying) prejudices. Black, they felt measurably hopeless about their future or inclined to feel sorry for themselves or feel sad about their fate; and white, they already had succumbed to the false if seductive psychological blandishments that racism can offer: I may have my own good cause to feel unsure of myself, but so long as there are others around whom I have learned to call names and look down upon, things aren't so bad, after all. Yet, when black and white children were enabled to be with one another, get acquainted and then play with one another, the racial "attitudes" they had, however fully developed, yielded to the situation in which they found themselves—and they responded to one another with spontaneity, enthusiasm, and continuing pleasure. President Eisenhower once remarked that America's racial problem will only go away when "the minds and hearts" of its people go through a change. Mrs. Porter's work indicates that in order for such a change to begin taking place children of both races need to get to know each other so that their minds, quite early on bent toward various racial attitudes, will yield to the experiences they actually have; all of which, to be achieved, requires a national commitment, set forth in laws that establish and encourage such encounters—moments of liberation Mrs. Porter shows them to be.

ROBERT COLES
Harvard University

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Politics of Social Research: An Inquiry Into The Ethics and Responsibilities of Social Scientists *by Ralph L. Beals. Chicago, Aldine Publishing Company, 1969.—vii, 228 pp. $6.95.*

This is a sane and well balanced approach to a complex and controversial area. It merits a careful reading by any and all who claim to be concerned, either specifically or generally, with the conflicting relationships and obligations of social science investigators to their own and other governments and to the peoples they study. It is particularly pertinent in view of the hue and cry over the so called Thailand affair.

Dr. Beals is a senior and highly respected anthropologist who became deeply involved in this subject when he conducted an investigation for the Committee on Research Problems and Ethics of the American Anthropological Association, as the association's response to the furor occasioned by Project Camelot. This book is a more comprehensive report than was possible in two papers published in the *Fellow Newsletter* of the American Anthropological Association and in the *American Anthropologist*. Although his study is derived primarily from anthropological sources, much of it is applicable to other social disciplines.

Beals's purpose is to identify general problems, but not to set up a rigid ethical code nor to pass judgment on specific cases. As a good anthropologist, he approaches his subject keenly aware of the multiple and conflicting sets of value themes and obligations of our society, with their resultant counter pulls on the individual. He is not polemical. His conclusion that enforceable codes of ethics are both impractical and undesirable does not mean that he takes a completely laissez-faire stance: "My hope is that the majority of social scientists will agree on a set of basic professional behavior principles and control violations with sanctions that already exist in the academic and scholarly world rather than establish enforcement machinery. Inefficient and slow as these sanctions may be, . . . within a reasonable time they would discourage most violations" (p. 172).

Beals's opening account of the Camelot affair and his later references to it comprise the fairest appraisal of that ill-fated project that I have seen and may surprise those who have been using it polemically as a whipping boy. With this and the Sanchez affair, he introduces problems which he elaborates and supplements in chapters on "The Evidence from Foreign Research" as derived from specific cases; "The Problems in Perspective," which deals with role conflicts, kinds of research, the definition of ethics, and ethical problems; "The Use and Support of Social Research and Government Agencies," which reviews many structures, both organizational and financial; and "Solutions and Guidelines," which

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is neither dogmatic nor ambivalent. Two appendixes outline the procedures followed in his research and republish some pertinent documents. Strongly recommended.

ROBERT W. EHRICH
Brooklyn College, City University of New York

Anthropology and the Behavioral and Health Sciences *by Otto von Mering and Leonard Kasdan. Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1970.—xi, 340 pp. $12.95.*

Most symposium volumes are bad; this one is not. Also unusual is the amount of ground covered and the diversity of the papers which are united around the relationships between anthropology and other behavioral sciences as well as the health sciences. In all, the interaction of anthropology with sociology, economics, history and political science, education, normal and abnormal behavior, communication, and ethology is discussed. In addition, there are articles on constitutional medicine, physical anthropology and forensic medicine, dentistry and oral medicine, social medicine and public health, medicine and psychiatry, and even aerospace sciences. Length has been sacrificed for breadth, and most of the papers are too short.

Such diversity makes the book very difficult to review and I shall restrict my remarks to the introduction and to those subjects closest to the readership of this journal.

The Introduction: "The Craft and Discipline of Anthropology" will make good reading for anyone outside anthropology who wants a coherent introduction to that field and to anyone who dreams of organizing his own symposium. Printed here is the original charge to the contributors outlining the theme, the tasks, and the issues to be discussed. One of the major issues which has plagued anthropology in the United States is the assumed conflict between anthropology as science and as history. The papers go a long way in showing that these are only two interrelated ways of studying human behavior. Other issues revolve around the central theme of the conference, including such practical problems as "should graduate anthropology education continue to be based on the assumption that at least one half of the Ph.D. candidates have not achieved a sufficient level of exposure to rigorous scientific study. . . ." Finally, the participants are directed to a consideration of the important question of training in the ethical basis of science and the obligations and responsibilities of the scientist.

Richard Salisbury's discussion of anthropology and economics centers around the argument between so called formalists and substantiv-

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ists. Salisbury is impressed with recent evolutionary studies which owe their origin to the work of Leslie White, but which are more sophisticated, considering, as they do, technology levels and organizational variables which may be given quantitative form.

Bernard Cohen stresses past differences between historians and anthropologists. The former were recruited from the establishment and concerned themselves with its institutions. Anthropologists, on the other hand, were unconventional and devoted to the exotic. Historians and political scientists have been wary of theory, while anthropologists have consciously searched for a theoretical framework to account for both the evolution of human society and contemporary human behavior. These differences kept the two fields apart until recently. Cohen's paper does not go very far in uniting these fields even though he emphasizes the false nature of the dichotomy. As one discussant, Fallers, points out, Cohen's discussion of the two disciplines is too parochially American and avoids coming to grips with both Hegel and Marx as they have influenced both history and all the social sciences. Political science is discussed only marginally in this paper.

This reviewer is an ecologist and therefore is pained that in the wide range of subject matter covered, this field is not considered. In the past several years, anthropological theory has drifted toward structuralism on the one hand and ecology on the other. The ecological approach has contributed both empirical and theoretical material to most of the subdisciplines covered in this book, and it has emerged as one of the major integrators of anthropological inquiry.

ALEXANDER ALLAND JR.
Columbia University

A Behavioral Approach to Historical Analysis *by Robert F. Berkhofer Jr. New York, The Free Press, 1969.—xiii, 339 pp. $7.95.*

In his recent book, *Political History*, Geoffrey Elton points out that philosophers of history seldom explain well what it is that a historian does, for they are too preoccupied with relating what the historian should do to a theoretical structure of knowledge. Professor Elton implies that only historians can successfully explain to other historians, and to laymen, what the work of the historian is about.

On the evidence of Professor Berkhofer's book, one fears that Professor Elton is mistaken, for Professor Berkhofer is a historian but not at all a clear one. Perhaps he has attempted too much in suggesting that historical analysis may be reduced to behavioral terms; certainly he has

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promised too much, for the chapter titles are fascinating, and one turns with pleasure to chapters which bear such titles as "Conceptions of Time: Their Variety and Uses" only to find nothing not already said by Poulet (cited), Toulmin, or Roy Pascal (not cited). Elton points out that the philosophers of history often choose to analyze the historian in terms of some subordinate remark passed *ex cathedra*, rather than in terms of the historian's method; Berkhofer chooses to indict historians who see "time as successive moments of duration," that is, those who see change "as a series of 'firsts,' " by citing Ronald Seth as "an extreme example of this type of historiography," while surely no practicing historian would think Seth, a journalist of no remarkable ability, to be a historian at all. "Only recently have historians turned their attention to the history of words as an important indicator of history itself" is simply not true; has Professor Berkhofer not read Gibbon?

There are good things here to be sure: a statement of what the "neo-abolitionists" are up to, a reasonably concise analysis of role theory as it relates to history, and a nice page on imperialism. But what is one to make of the statement that "the idiographic-nomothetic dichotomy" does not square with "either the practice of historians or the nature of language" and, this being so, "it probably does not square with reality either." Aside from the jargon, why need either Samuel Eliot Morison or Noam Chomsky be correct in their conception of reality? This book, one suspects, will do little to help historians understand what it is that they do and will mislead sociologists and others into thinking that history is something other than it is.

ROBIN W. WINKS
American Embassy, London

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Book Notes

There is something disturbing about Harold D. Lasswell. His obscure terminology, unorthodox methods, and omnivorous scope are much too demanding to be accepted with a tranquil mind. His more trenchant critics argue that, aside from a genius for obfuscating simple matters, Lasswell has actually made few substantive contributions to political science. His admirers, including the contributors to the volume under review—*Politics, Personality, and Social Science in the Twentieth Century: Essays in Honor of Harold D. Lasswell* edited by Arnold A. Rogow (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1969; 455 pp. $11.00)—consider him a pioneer and a giant among social and political scientists. Bruce Lannes Smith, for example, describes him as "a kind of Leonardo da Vinci of the behavioral sciences" (p. 41). Unquestionably, therefore, a serious study of Lasswell's work is long overdue and remains to be written. There is now enough of a perspective on him and on the period he represents to make such a study feasible and meaningful. And when that work is commenced, this volume will be an invaluable aid. It provides a sympathetic overview of his contributions in the many areas that he has touched, often enlightening discussions of some of his basic constructs, and a useful bibliography of his published books, articles, and reviews. The collection begins with a delightful portrait of the man by Leo Rosten. Heinz Eulau then attempts to shed some light on Lasswell's "philosophical underpinnings." But it is Professor Smith who provides an excellent outline of Lasswell's intellectual history and development. In addition, there are valuable essays by Daniel Lerner, Allan R. Holmberg, Edward Shils, Karl W. Deutsch, William T. R. Fox, and Myres S.

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McDougal, as well as a number of informative articles by other contributors. Only one essay, that of Arthur J. Brodbeck, is critical of Lasswell, and it is an outstanding, original, and thought-provoking critique. The trouble with Lasswell, Professor Brodbeck argues, is that his conception of knowledge, research, and discovery lacks the element of emotion, of joy. Lasswell has, in Brodbeck's words, "played up the intellectual dimension of science" while "submerging the aesthetic and poetic and mood-dominated process of creative discovery" (p. 246). Consequently, his systematic categories often appear "as a 'laundry list' of abstract intellectual terms," that remain empty of empirical content and appear meaningless and absurd (p. 244). In the end, therefore, it is the overintellectualization, the cerebral pedantry that is most disturbing about Lasswell. Even his admirers often compare him to a machine or a computer. For instance, Professor Smith notes somewhat sardonically, and yet seriously, that "his facilities for selecting, digesting, abstracting, classifying, and filing information-inputs have always been highly efficient, and his internal servo-mechanisms are intricate yet rugged" (p. 45). In short, Lasswell in many ways personifies the best of behavioral science, and even the devotees of the science are somewhat frightened by the Leviathan it has generated.—WALTER ODAJNYK, *Columbia University.*

It is of great consequence for political systems to what extent the membership of such basic social categories as class, religion, or ethnicity coincide. The degree of coincidence of lines dividing basic social categories reflects the extent to which membership in one category is shared with persons who may be members of different groups in other categories. The degree of coincidence results, at the same time, in a high or low degree of homogeneity (regarding various basic social categories) in voluntary associations, including political parties. *Social Fragmentation and Political Hostility: An Austrian Case Study* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1970; ix, 207 pp. $7.50) by G. Bingham Powell Jr. presents a study of the political process in a community in a country characterized by a high degree of coincidence of fundamental social categories with voluntary associations and political alignments along with a traditionally high level of political mobilization. The author describes in detail the affiliations and associations of political leadership of the community. This, together with the data obtained from 213 questionnaires, presents us with a study of the power pattern and the decisionmaking processes in a small industrial town in a country with clearly contoured and deeply rooted

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ideological camps. The use of the concepts *fragmentation* and *overlap* as if they referred to discrete entities is unfortunate because they veil the continuity of the dimension dealt with. Especially with reference to Austria it is noteworthy that the blunting of political conflict has been a factor in as well as a function of an increase in overlap or a decrease of coincidence of lines dividing group memberships at the levels of various basic social categories and of political parties.—WALTER B. SIMON, *University of Guelph.*

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

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

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

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